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ESSAYS ON SUBJECTS OF MORAL AND SOCIAL INTEREST.

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FOR

DAVID DOUGLAS.

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ESSAYS ON SUBJECTS OF MORAL AND SOCIAL INTEREST

BY

JOHN STUART BLACKIE

EDINBURGH
DAVID DOUGLAS
1890

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TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE EARL OF ROSEBERY,

STATESMAN, PATRIOT, AND THINKER,

THESE PAGES

ARE WITH SINCERE ESTEEM AND

PLEASANT MEMORIES

DEDICATED

BY

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THE discourses in this volume, though bound together by a common unity of topic and tendency, grew into shape each from an independent root, and were intended to be complete, as much as possible, each of them within its own range. This circumstance, with a reasonable reader, will be a sufficient apology for a certain amount of repetition, which in a book of continuous structure would justly have been noted as a blemish. As in a collection of sermons, so here, an occasional repetition, naturally evolved, may without offence serve to indicate both the fruitfulness of the text and the importance of the subject.

J. S. B.

EDINBURGH, *January* 1890.

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION.

THE Christian religion has now for nearly two thousand years been prominent as a moral force in the world, and though, like all dominant forces, asserting its position not without contradiction, sometimes of a more cool and sober, sometimes of a violent and even virulent description, still stands before the historical eye as the most significant factor in the future fortunes of the race. The fact is that, so far from being weighed in the balance and found wanting, as certain shallow sophists fondly conceit themselves, men are only now beginning to look its true character fairly in the face, and to discern its bearings on the problems which the more complex constitution of modern society is presenting for solution. The present paper is intended as an humble contribution towards what, borrowing a phrase from the science of spaces and numbers, I may call Applied Christianity: Christianity applied not only to the moral consciousness of the individual, in the fashion of common pulpit addresses, but to the social system generally, and the machinery by which the moral

stream of society is set in motion. The various subjects which fall under this head of course belong to the pulpit as much as the appeal to individual conscience; and the great preachers of Christian ethics, from the mediæval Churchmen to Savonarola, Martin Luther, Wycliffe, John Knox, and Dr. Chalmers, have not been backward to declare the right of the gospel of Christ to march as a formative force into all the relations in which man as a social being can stand to man; but partly from the press of more special work, partly from the ignorance of the preacher, partly from his timidity, and partly also from the great danger of meddling rashly with delicate and complex social questions, applied Christianity, in the wide sense of the word, has been for the most part a stranger to the pulpit. There is room therefore here, if anywhere, for lay preaching; and, though less curious in Greek and Hebrew, the lay preacher may readily breathe an atmosphere more bracing, and stand on a platform of larger survey than the professional evangelist.

Of course, in attempting to analyse the moral influence of the gospel, I confine myself to its ethical ideal alone, without regard to its dogma. This I do partly because, while Christian Churches differ considerably both about points of doctrine and about forms of administration, I do not find that the evangelical ideal put forward by our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount, and expounded with such fulness of detail in the Apostolic Epistles, is affected in any way by the doctrinal or ecclesiastical differences that

divide a devout Italian peasant from a sermon-hunting Scottish church-goer; partly because, whatever influence the dogma may have in the process of converting the individual from a carnal to a spiritual humanity, the standard of the spiritual humanity which all parties equally acknowledge remains the same. No doubt an Italian peasant may sometimes, under the influence of what our theologians call the old Adam, allow the painful minuteness of his ceremonial observances to compound for looseness of practice in certain more important matters of the law, as the theological Scot, under the same influences, may do with the five points of his Calvinistic dogma; but this is only an obliquity of the individual will, not a denial of the general law. Extreme Papist and extreme Presbyterian equally acknowledge the Sermon on the Mount binding on all Christians, as much as the laws of Solon were on the Athenians, or the Twelve Tables on the Romans. We now proceed to business, which in the present case will conveniently take the form of formal propositions.

I. In all questions relating to Society, or the harmonious action of congregated moral beings, the primary element, dominant power, and plastic force is the Ethical or Moral; all else is secondary, ancillary, and mechanical.

This proposition is true not only of man, but in a limited sense of the lower animals. The moral forces in man are the steam of the social machine;

with lower animals also steam is required. But in speaking of them, the forces which set the machine in motion, to mark their generically different character, are called vital forces, or instincts. Nevertheless they are strictly secondary, servile, and mechanical. Nest-building in birds, like house-building in man, is subsidiary and ancillary to the dominant instinct of self-preservation, social aggregation, and multiplication of the species. Only the instinct or shaping force here acts by compulsion of Nature in certain prescribed lines or ruts, whereas man, while in some domains acting under the same compulsion, has a large range of free or reasonable choice, which he uses like a minor god in the little world which he commands, with the mission and the function to bring order out of confusion, and harmony out of jar where he stands. These plastic forces in man, or moral forces in the strict sense of the term, are familiarly known under the name of emotions, passions, and inspirations, and are understood to put forth their power beneficently under the habitual presidency and regulative control of Reason or Mind, thought, *νοῦς* or *λόγος*, as the Greeks call the unifying principle in the great cosmos of the universe, and in the small cosmos of man; and it is from the dominion of these forces only, and always under this legitimate regulation, that any properly human excellence can be achieved, whether in the individual or in society. Love, for instance, in its lowest form is a purely animal instinct, of which a mouse is as capable as a man, and a worm

as much as a woman; but love in the highest form in which it claims the seat of honour with Plato and in Christ, and which may be defined, on the one side, as the impassioned admiration of excellence, and, on the other, the potentiated sympathy of being with being; this is a love of which only men and angels are capable, and is the only kind of love on the possession of which man has any reason to plume himself. The best words are always the most widely abused, and none more widely than love and religion.

II. Christianity in the march of history plainly stands out as the most prominent fact in the evolution of society; and, in addition to this, the ideal of sentiment and conduct presented to our moral nature in the character of Christ and the teachings of His apostles, has been admitted, through a long chain of thinkers, from the Platonising Fathers of Alexandria in the second and third centuries, down to Lord Bacon, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Goethe, to be the most pure and elevating, and practically the most efficient, in the history of the human race.

In the present age of generally diffused cheap books, of the most solid and substantial character, there can be no need of adducing any formal array of quotations to justify this proposition. Let it suffice to allude to the noteworthy passage in Goethe's *Meister* on the three forms of the fundamental virtue of reverence, as exemplified in three ascending types of religion, culminating in Christianity :—

"No religion founded upon mere fear comes under any estimation with us. With the reverence which any one allows to sway his soul he can always retain self-respect, however low he may prostrate himself before a superior; he is not, as in the case of fear, set at variance with himself.

"The religion which is founded on reverence for what is above us we call *ethnic*, or, as it is in vulgar English, *heathen*. It is the religion of the nations (ἔθνη), and the first happy deliverance from abject fear. To this class belong all Pagan religions, whatever names they may bear. The second type of religion, founded upon the reverence we cherish for what is on a par with ourselves, we call the philosophical; for the philosopher, who takes a central position, must draw down to his level what is above, while he seeks to elevate what is below; and only when in this middle state does he deserve the name of a sage. In so far, then, as he has a clear insight into his relation to his equals, and to all humanity, as also to all his earthly surroundings, whether necessary or casual, does he live, cosmically speaking, in the truth. But now we must speak of the third type, founded on reverence for what is beneath us: this is Christianity; for in it chiefly is this sentiment dominant. It is the highest step in the ladder of reverence to which humanity can attain; for, consider only what extraordinary moral force is required to be in a religion, which could not merely let the world drop from its view, claiming for itself a higher home, but could recognise obscurity and

poverty, disgrace and contempt, ignominy and misery, suffering and death, as being something godlike; yea, and could conceive a certain honour even in sin itself, and in crime, transmuting them from hindrances and obstructions into means of positive progress to the saint. Of this sentiment no doubt we find traces in all ages; but a trace is not the goal; and once this height has been reached, mankind cannot recur to a lower platform; and we may thus say that the Christian religion, having once appeared upon the earth, cannot disappear; nor, having once assumed a divine embodiment on the stage of humanity, ever again retreat, and be as if it had not been.

"These three types together form the true religion; and the religious man of highest culture now professes virtually all the three. From these three embodied types springs the consummation of all reverences,—the reverence for one's self; out of which the other three again develop themselves. And so man in this way reaches the highest of which he is capable, and may think of himself as the acme of all that God and nature have produced; may even dwell on this height with a healthy complacency, without being dragged down to the common level by conceit and selfishness."

The kind of persons who may be found here and there dissenting from the great poet-thinker of the Germans, with regard to the superlative excellence of Christian ethics, may, I think, be reduced to three classes: First, gross sensualists, persons who,

to use the words of the apostle Jude, "speak evil of things which they know not; but what they know naturally as brute beasts, in these things they corrupt themselves." Let them pass. Then: persons of an essentially selfish and self-aggrandising character, idolaters of money, rank, power, or other private as opposed to public good, and material as opposed to moral wealth; and who, though they live in society, are virtually devoid of all large social sympathies, and can no more understand what is meant by a religion of love than a fox can conceive of chivalrous conduct to barn-door fowls, or a hawk of pitiful gentleness to pigeons. They are men like the Regent Morton in Scottish history, for themselves full of energy, and for their class not without honour: but beyond that they will not move an inch, any more than an oyster will move out of its shell. As soon shall running water flow rapidly when the thermometer stands at zero, as any intelligence of evangelical motives and catholic human sympathy reach the heart of these worldlings. Lastly, there is a class of men, unhappily not uncommon in the present age, who object to the ethical ideal in Christianity, not so much from any inherent vice in themselves incapacitating them for the reception of high moral truth, as from their misfortune in never having been brought face to face with the object, but having seen it only through the caricatured features of a mirror which distorts the beauty that it reflects. Such people come in contact with Christian ethics, somehow as a

blind man might do, without warning suddenly stretching forth his hand to pluck a rose; he takes it by the thorn, and protests, in the face of the sentiment of all seeing people, that it is an altogether hateful and a hurtful flower. Among the Socialists and other extreme social reformers in our working classes, there are, I fancy, not a few who have confounded Christianity as it shines in the person of Christ with the harsh dogmas and barren subtleties of scholastic theologians, with the silly mummeries of superstitious priests, or with the insolence, selfishness, and exclusiveness of ambitious and worldly-minded churchmen. The obliquity of such persons' judgment in this matter is to be condoned; though it must be confessed their narrow-mindedness and lack of charity is not rarely as unblushing, and as much to be condemned, as the exhibitions of the same unamiable qualities in a certain class of orthodox believers. A Christian gentleman, when passing through Bradford, asked the Sunday Lecturing Society there, for what reason, as he had been informed, they made it a rule to exclude religion and Christianity from the subjects of lecture; and the answer which he received was, that, if religion were admitted into the programme, nobody would come to the lecture. This reply showed an amount of ignorance, prejudice, and exclusiveness in a certain class of Englishmen, which could not be surpassed by the most narrow-minded adherents of the stiff old Calvinistic church of the sixteenth century, as it still survives in the

Highlands of Scotland, some twenty miles north-west of Inverness. A Socrates, as we read in Xenophon, was so tolerant on a certain occasion as to give formal hearing even to a common courtesan on the philosophy of beauty, and the æsthetical principles applicable to female dress; but these illiberal liberals pride themselves in not even allowing the name of Jesus of Nazareth to appear on their programme—a name universally confessed, and by widespread facts proved to be the watchword of the grandest series of victories that the Powers of Good on this terrestrial stage ever achieved over the Powers of Evil. There is no limit to the monstrosity of prejudice generated by strong passions and stationary points of view, in the minds of those who are taken captive by them.

III. The dominant moral forces of Christianity are *Love* and *Reverence*; love not directed merely to the superficial attractions of personal beauty, but elevated into the impassioned admiration of pure and noble character, and in its liberal sweep expanding beyond the narrow circle of family, clan, and country, so as to embrace universal humanity; and reverence forming as it were the natural key-stone of the moral arch, in the worship of a self-existent self-plastic Reason (λόγος) worthy of human worship, not so much on the ground of mere physical power belonging to its object, as for the well-balanced forces of justice and mercy wielded by Him in the moral government of the world.

This proposition may stand without comment, as it is evident from every page of the New Testament that love is as much the central force of the Christian life, as the sun is the source of light and heat in the physical world; and as for faith, of which so much talk is made in pulpits, if it means, as it must mean, a faith in a law of love, a loving Saviour, and a life of love in His service, to say that we are saved by faith is only tracing the fruit to the root from which it sprung, which does not alter the nature of the mellow nutriment which it affords; and, as for reverence, it is only love raised into a higher power by the inferior position of the lover; as indeed we see even in common human loves not rarely, that a pure passion for a noble character, or a noble idea, as in the case of the Jacobite risings, passes lightly into worship, and becomes a sort of religion. And a very slight acquaintance with life, and the social obligations which it involves, will convince any person that the great want of the world is more love; and that no laws, no constitutions, no sciences, no arts, no trades, no commerce can do the world any permanent good without love and reverence, and the kindly interplay of man with man and class with class springing therefrom. It may be thought, however, by some persons, that this Christian love, so highly vaunted as the fulfilling of the law, is after all a very one-sided force, and utterly incapable of producing that judicial impartiality on which the just balance of the social forces depends; and is it not rather true,

as often remarked, that your ardent strong lover is no less fervent in his hatred, and that love, so far from helping a man to an impartial judgment and a just verdict, makes the weighing of moral values impossible by putting all the weights into one scale? Now no doubt zeal is always a dangerous ally to justice; and it is the very essence of passion not to be impartial; but herein precisely shines forth the glory of Christian Ethics, in that, while sounding the praises of its favourite virtue, it never uses the so often degraded word ἔρως or "passion," but the milder one ἀγάπη or "kindly affection." And in this sense we may well see that love is not only not contrary to justice, but that justice in its noblest sense, that is, perfect equity, cannot exist without it. For what is it, let us ask, that makes harsh and unjust judgments so common in the world? simply the lack of the capacity and the habit of doing as much justice to the adverse party as we do to ourselves, and this incapacity of course has its root in the want of perfect sympathy with the adverse case, that is, in the want of love. No man, as Goethe observes, has a right to pass judgment on another man's conduct who does not first transplant himself into that man's character or situation, in other words, do in life what Shakespeare did in literature, dramatise himself into another man's position. How difficult this is, large experience of personal gossip, newspaper articles, and party speeches daily teaches; so much the greater ought our reverential acknowledgment to be to the ethics

of the great Teacher, who gave the world those two golden texts of Christian equity : "Judge not, that ye be not judged," and "judge not according to appearance, but judge a righteous judgment;" in perfect harmony with which is the teaching of St. James, who in his admirable contrast of carnal and spiritual wisdom, characterises the latter as specially just and specially impartial (*ἀδιάκριτος*). And, if Christian love is altogether free from the leanings of unregulated passion, and plants itself before the eye of reason in as chaste repose as the *δικαιοσύνη* of Plato, there is another virtue even more rare in the world than love, which grows to heroic stature from the strong root of Christian reverence. That virtue is moral courage; a virtue not formally lauded by name in any part of the Gospel records, but facing us everywhere in the character or conduct and lofty principle of the Divine Master and His illustrious ministers. *How can ye believe that receive honour one from another?* is a sentence which pulls the mask from the face of that respect of persons and fear of vulgar opinion so often paraded on respectable platforms as a virtue, but which is simply moral cowardice. In fact, there is no more potent force than religion to inspire a man with that highest form of courage, which in the face of bristling prejudice, armed authority, and noisy multitudes stands with untroubled look, bearing calm witness to the great truths on which the moral world reposes, notwithstanding incidental oscillations, as firmly as the physical world on the law of gravitation. The

fear of God is thus the most potent exorciser of the fear of man; and the single stout protester who at the critical time or place has uttered the sentence—"Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto men rather than unto God, judge ye; as for me and my house we will serve the Lord"—has done more for the progress of the human race than all the swords of a Thirty Years' War, or all the triumphs of a score of conquerors.

IV. In presenting itself to the world as a moral regenerator, Christianity does not assume the attitude of an organiser, like modern socialism, or other schemes of that kind, but appears on the stage as a converter of the individuals who compose society, and as forming them into a purely ethical association, as distinct as a university or a royal society is from the general community. Not a small matter this, though, like many great matters, springing out of small beginnings; for, whatever your socialism or other social organisation may be, however various in theoretical type, and however beautiful on paper, their practical success must depend ultimately on the character of the majority of the individuals who compose them. It is plain indeed that Christianity as an ideal of moral perfection never could entertain the hope of being recognised in the machinery of the state as an official organising power till the *οἱ πολλοί*, or the great majority of whom society is composed, should have become interpenetrated with the idea that such an ideal, at

least in approximation, is the supreme good that politically associated man ought to seek after. But history and experience plainly show that the ideal of sentiment and conduct in the character of Christ is far too exalted to have been practically accepted as a model to regulate the laws, customs, maxims, habits and fashions of the men who compose society, whether taken in the mass or in the classes of which the mass is composed. Christianity, accordingly, has always been in the main a matter of individual conversion, and if history, as in the case of Charlemagne in his wars with the Saxon heathens, regales us exceptionally with wholesale conversions and incorporations of wholesale converts into a state organism, such conversions are more formal than real, and have no more to do with the regenerating virtue of the Gospel of Christ than washing the face of a patient has to do with healing the disease under which he labours. It is the special glory of Christianity that it cannot be dealt with in a wholesale style, as land may be portioned out by roods, or children in a school forced up to a certain standard of knowledge, by a system of payment by results, or any other mechanical formalism. It is and ever must be received into the individual soul, by an act of moral spontaneity and lofty self-assertion, lifting the individual under spiritual influences out of the careless or carnal level, and accustoming him to breathe a purer atmosphere, and own the beatings of a stronger pulse; and as such it is, from its high ideal excellence, always a conversion from a

majority to a minority. The world remains now, as it was in the days of the Apostles, if not to the same extent, or in the same intensity, at least in quality, temper and attitude, essentially antagonistic to the church. All true Christians, that is, all Christians who act out the principles of their Master, are the moral aristocracy of the country to which they belong; and an aristocracy, whether in the world of thought or in the world of action, always means the few, not the many.

V. Nevertheless, though Christianity from its lofty position did not and could not attempt to organise society, the ethical tendencies with which it was instinct, and the moral notions which it inspired, were of a nature that, as their excellence became more and more acknowledged, could not fail to elevate the tone, mould the temper, and to a certain extent remodel the structure of society; become, in fact, as his Grace of Argyll says of the Church in the Middle Ages, "a great civilising agency."[1] What were these tendencies? Mainly two: *first*, To confer a greater dignity on, and to attach a higher responsibility to, the individual by the appeal made to his personal conviction in the matter of conversion, and in his voluntarily giving himself as a living member to an ethical association called the Church; *second*, By the action of the moral force of love to introduce a kindly reconcil-

[1] *Scotland as it Was and as it Is*, by the Duke of Argyll, ch. iii.

ing and finely harmonising element into the social relation of the dominant and subservient classes of society. Under Christianity, the relation of man to man and of class to class could not remain that of master and slave, but of brother to brother and of friend to friend, or, more correctly, of upper servants to lower servants, for, according to the Christian ideal, all are servants—the apostle who preaches no less than the hearer to whom he preaches, the Roman pope in the pride of his purple as much as the Irish peasant in the wretchedness of his rags. For in the new Christian man, the man renewed, as the apostle boasts to the Colossians, after the image of his Creator, there is "neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ is all, and in all." All are free, because all equally redeemed from the hateful slavery of sin; all slaves, because all equally the willing servants of one Master in Heaven.

VI. These tendencies are of a character that would in modern language be called democratic; and that there is a strong equalising and democratic element in the Christian religion no one even superficially acquainted with its nature and history can deny. An aristocracy, as we have just said, a pure Christian church undoubtedly is, in the midst of a world that lieth in wickedness: but within itself a pure moral democracy, a brotherhood to such a degree that even its ministers and

officers are superior in function only, not in nature and character, to their subordinates. There is nothing more opposed to the free and equal individualism of a Christian church than a caste or body of specially authorised priests, divinely stamped with an exclusive commission to perform legitimate sacred ceremonies, and to interpret the text of the Divine law. The parade of a sacrosanct and pretentious hierarchy, so common in heathen religions, owes its existence in the Christian Church, on the one hand, to the self-importance of the clergy, willing to magnify their office, and on the other hand, to the ignorance and indolence of the laity, willing to leave the care of their souls in the hand of the clergy, as not seldom people demit the care of their bodily health to the physician. But the man is either intellectually blind or a sophist of the most perverse ingenuity who can discover any authority for a caste of priests, either in the words of our Lord in the Gospels, or in the constitution of the early Church, as we gather no dubious glimpses of it from notices in the Acts and the Epistles. The meetings of the first Christian churches beyond all question were more like a congregation of grey-mantled and brown-coated Quakers than a festive ceremonial in St. Peter's, with a crowned head on a lofty throne, and a ring of scarlet courtiers waiting on his nod. But plain and unpretentious as the show of early Christianity stands before us, it would be a great mistake to confound the democratic spirit thus evinced with

the democratic creed amid moral earthquakes, fever fits, and thunder-claps enunciated by the French revolutionists in 1789, in their famous shibboleth of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. The religion of Christ, as the sworn enemy of all selfishness, is as much opposed to the violent domination of the many over the few as to the calculated mastership of the few over the many, as much to extreme democracy as to oligarchy; is now and always has been the friend of social order and subordination, not of lawlessness and disorder and imperious individualism. "Honour all men" is an apostolic precept as strongly accentuated as "Love the brethren"; and disorderly persons who despise authorities and speak evil of dignities are classed by an apostle with sensualists and cowardly-minded creatures of the lowest type.[1] The liberty in which Christians rejoice is not a liberty from salutary restraints of law, but from the slavery of debasing passions, traditional conventions, soulless observances, and unreasonable creeds; the equality which they acknowledge is their personal equality as equally accredited members of a moral association, not as units in a social organism; and, if all Christians are brethren, they are brethren just as all trees of the forest are trees, not in any wise trees all of the same size, the same beauty, or the same value; or, as in any human family, though all are equal in one sense—that is, all brethren, sons of one father—yet they have each his separate char-

[1] Jude 8-13.

acter, capacity, and function in the orderly conduct of the family. So far, indeed, is the Christian religion from being in its political action essentially and characteristically democratic, that, casting a glance over its social state in the long period of the Middle Ages, we shall find ourselves compelled to admit that it "brought in its train three remarkable effects—a tendency to unite, an inclination for kingly government, and a preference for hereditary institutions;"[1] but these effects may fairly be considered as deducible, not so much from the essential nature of the religion as from its adaptability to whatever form of political life it might come in contact with in the course of its travels through time and space. Herein, also, undoubtedly lay its wisdom, as it was the wisdom also of the great Teacher, to avoid entangling a purely moral association with political relations that might confine and hinder its free action, or even assuming a polemical attitude towards social relations, such as slavery, that were too engrained in the moral habits of the time to admit of formal eradication. When the new seed that was being sown had once taken firm hold of the ground, the roots of the noxious growth might be safely loosened, and the stiff old stump cut down and thrown into the fire.

VII. In actual history the first step which society took when strongly moved by the moral force

[1] *Scotland in the Middle Ages*, by Cosmo Innes, chap. ii.

of Christianity, was to form a union with the Church: to take the ethical association under its protection instead of warring against it, as it had done for three centuries, in the form of recurrent persecution. This was a perfectly legitimate step, and highly honourable to both parties. On the one hand the State could only gain by the infusion of a richer moral blood into its body; on the other hand, the Church would gain those earthly supports and adjuncts which, as human nature is constituted, no ethical association can afford to despise. Of course there was the danger of a possible loss growing out of the same root with the gain, against which the nobler party in the alliance, the spiritual body, the Church, would require to be specially armed. The danger was twofold. Either the officials of the spiritual body might allow themselves to be bribed by the secular power in such a fashion as to become the willing agents of the State in acts of lawlessness and oppression—an evil state of things which cost Scotland rivers of blood and showers of tears in the days of the Covenanters; or, on the other hand, the State, not content with its actual position of patronising and supporting the spiritual body, might, as in the case of Henry VIII., aspire to control and remodel it. But neither of these abuses is essential to the natural healthy action of a Church in alliance with a State. In the normal condition of society it is as natural and as reasonable for the State to patronise and subsidise the Church as to patronise and subsidise schools and

universities. No doubt the majority of a people, or a section of the people, may take it into their head that any alliance or system of mutual understanding and co-operation between the Church and the State is either sinful or useless. If so, there is no help; no State is bound to aid a spiritual body that from some speculative principle or private crotchet makes it a point of honour to receive no aid; but the crotchet remains a crotchet, and the point of honour a folly; or, on the most charitable supposition, a morbid scrupulosity—nothing better. By all means let Dissenters be free to dissent; their act of separation will gratify themselves, while their rivalry may act as a useful spur to the Establishment. The secular body can have no right to impose penalties on any members of a moral association for refusing to submit to State prescription in matters essentially moral. Intolerance is a double sin: the sin of forcing your brother to do and to be what he has a perfect natural right to be and to do, not at your dictation, but from himself, and for himself; and the sin of intruding with a sword into a domain with which swords have as little to do as with the inculcation of elementary knowledge in a school or the verifying of scientific experiments in a laboratory. Besides, intolerance is bad policy; you cannot root out a heresy or a dogma as you would do a weed in the garden; for the more violently you pull the more stiffly the root holds: the Dissenter will cling to his darling notion and his pet whim, as a mother draws the child to her bosom more closely the more

roughly you try to snatch it from her. It is his whim, and he has a right to have it. Besides, religious whims and theological crotchets carry a stiffness with them that belongs to none other; and, however trifling in themselves to the eye of pure reason or the pulse of evangelical sentiment, when blown into importance by political bile and clerical jealousy they are as difficult to deal with as a wild bull. Therefore let dissenters alone; but let them not say that they alone are free, and that all State-paid preachers are hirelings and slaves. Neither let them conceit themselves, as on occasions they may have done, that, when they walk out of the Establishment they take the Holy Ghost along with them, and leave the Established Church a shell without the oyster, a body without the soul, a dress without the body. Such conceits of the saints are the delectation of the sinners.

VIII. Our Church being now fully constituted as a great civilising agent, and our State acting in cordial concert with it, the first matter that it has to deal with is LABOUR. Is there to be a working and an idle class in the commonwealth, or are all Christian men in a Christian State to be workers? On this point the religion of Christ is quite distinct. Christianity found slavery in the world, and for wise reasons, as above mentioned, did not interfere with it; but, as slavery of the body does not imply slavery of the soul, so neither does freedom and the enjoyment of a certain superior civil status imply

freedom from fruitful work. Anyhow the Founder of the Christian faith left no doubt on the point that definite social work, not mere contemplation or self-indulgent idleness, in any, even the most pious shape, was to be the watchword of those who served under His spiritual captainship: "MY FATHER WORKETH HITHERTO, AND I WORK." The whole of the living world, with the scenery amid which it unfolds itself, is in truth nothing less than a continuous transcendental miracle of Divine self-existent, self-working, self-shaping automatic Λόγος. Work is the condition of existence, or rather, all existence is work, in a world where all repose is merely slackened speed, and all death merely transition from one form of life to another. "If a man will not work neither let him eat" was the utterance of that wonderful man, than whom none ever displayed a more harmonious union of evangelic inspiration and apostolic zeal with common sense and administrative talent. Christianity is decidedly opposed to all sorts of idlers, loungers, and self-indulgent persons; they are cumberers of the ground, ungrateful recipients of gracious gifts from a gracious Giver, and will fare accordingly. Better to have no talent at all, according to the well-known parable, than to have it and make no use of it. And to the same effect our greatest prophet of work in these latter times, Thomas Carlyle: "What are you doing in God's fair earth and task-garden, where whosoever is not working is begging or stealing? Woe! woe! to clergy and nobility, if they can only answer, Collecting tithes

and preserving game!"[1] St. Paul was a tent-maker, and by using this trade as occasion required, amid his apostolic work, gave to the world the most speaking sermon on the text that all work is honourable. Honourable unquestionably: the man who cuts down the trees to clear the way for the march of a great conqueror does work as honourable and as indispensable as that of the conqueror himself; only let it not be supposed that the work spent on material stuff for material results is the only kind of hard work in the world. St. Paul was an apostle as well as a tent-maker, and as such had to undergo labours and hardships of various kinds, demanding exertion, both of soul and body, in comparison of which the amount of vital force expended on the making of tents was as a mere trick of the little finger. The work expended on such material stuff produces what is popularly called wealth, and can produce nothing better; but Christianity despises wealth, or keeps it loftily down in its proper place. By wealth we mean the material foundations, adjuncts, appurtenances, or decorations of human life,—all merely external, and having the same relation to something higher that the cathedral has to the anthems that are sung in it, or the pulpit to the sermon. But Christianity as a moral force of the highest order estimates the value of all human things, not by the amplitude or splendour of their outward furnishings and flourishes, but by the dignity of character which comes from within. Moral

[1] *French Revolution,* iv. 4.

work producing little wealth, or no wealth at all, is higher in the estimation of Christ than material work producing much wealth. Material wealth, of which money is the exchangeable token, is merely the tool and no part of the type of that model Man who is held up to the world in the Person of our Saviour. "The kingdom of heaven is within you." He that does not understand this understands nothing of Christ. But besides this utterly unchristian and unphilosophical notion that there is any real good or wellbeing in external furnishings,—a notion only too apt to be entertained in a country of wide commercial relations and large manufacturing industry,—there is an abuse of language not uncommon in this country by which men talk of a certain class of workers, mechanical, and other wielders of physical muscle, as if they were the only *working* classes. The great majority of intellectual workers—lawyers, statesmen, politicians, scientists, and literary men—work a great deal more, and not seldom with a great deal less pay comparatively, than artisans.

Labour being in this way not only a natural necessity but a prominent element in Christian ethics, a society organised on Christian principles will, as a matter of course, put a distinct mark of reprobation on all sorts of unfruitful idleness and loose self-indulgence. Laws will not be made to prevent laborious persons from fully enjoying that leisure, bought with the fruits of honest labour, which is often sought as the soil out of which a higher and a less irksome sort of work may grow;

but a Christian society will take care, in various ways, to have as few drones in the hive as possible. Therefore no sinecures or pensions will be allowed, except as the natural sequence of a long recognised career of fruitful activity; no incumbents in the service of the Church will be allowed to do their parochial duty by proxy; no professors to delegate their academical work to tutors; and no landlords to leave the care of their people to the loveless superintendence of factors or land-agents. In a Christian State, landlords who do not do their duty by personal presence and loving care to the place and the people over whom God has made them overseers, will be marked for their dereliction of social duty by a swinging absentee-tax, and by a double duty on their succession. Also in countries where, as in Britain, there is a hereditary peerage, no person will be allowed to act as a legislator in the House of Lords unless he has done his duty to society by faithful work, either as resident proprietor for at least six months in the year, or by faithful service in some branch of the public administration.

In a thoroughly Christianised community nothing will be more prominent than the kindness and sweetness of the relation in which the employers of labour stand to the labourer. Here indeed, if anywhere, comes out practically the truth of the compliment which Goethe paid to the religion of Jesus when he said, as we have seen in the passage before quoted (pp. 6, 7), that Christianity is the only religion that brings into the foreground the reverence which

is due from superiors to inferiors in the social scale. The natural attitude of the superior to the inferior, in what Scripture calls the unregenerate man, is indifference or insolence: you are my footstool to mount by to my seat of mastership—nothing more. But the Lord Jesus, when He sent out His disciples into the world, called them not servants, but honoured them as friends and as brethren. In the current conception of commercial and industrial enterprise there is no idea of this kind. Material gain is the object, and material service or labour, sought only as the means of attaining that object, for a material recompence. But the moment the commercial speculator or the industrial captain becomes a Christian, the loveless relation of hired service passes into the kindly bond of a moral brotherhood, and a change passes over the spirit of their companionship as great as that from a cold east wind to a soft breath of balmy breezes from the west. In a Christian society all employers of labour are bound to exercise their administrative functions in such wise, and in such a spirit, as to increase the comfort and elevate the character of those persons who naturally look to them for guidance and protection. And here high Christian principle approves itself, not only as the greatest promoter of individual happiness, but as the wisest policy for the permanence of healthy social relations. Cash payment and political economy never can form the strongest bond to unite class and class. Love, which is the fulfilling of the law, is the only

sure cement of society. Under the inspiration of this evangelical force, the great manufacturer will see to it that his industrial dependants, so far as it may lie within his power, shall be comfortably lodged; that special provisions for health and cleanliness shall be made in his establishment; that the hours of labour shall not be unduly extended, so as to interfere with recurrent seasons of rest and recreation; and that the whole industrial activity under his eye shall be so ordered as that the workers may come every morning to their work with cheerfulness, and depart every evening without exhaustion. Of course, nothing but a distinct moral intuition and a fine moral contagion can achieve this: just as in a school one master may make the boys miserable till they get out, and another may make them eager to get in. But law also, and positive enactment, as place and circumstance may allow, can do something to prevent the employers of labour from using their vantage-ground in such fashion as to stunt the growth, curtail the enjoyment, and tyrannise over the vital and social functions of the industrial toilers by whose sweat they gain their wealth. In this regard, the Jewish Sabbath, adopted by the Christian State, and such laws as the Factory Bill of 1878, indicate the sort of action that Christian States will naturally take in the interest of the labouring population in great centres of industrial activity. But no great moral work can be done in the world except by the free action of moral agents. In the majority of cases, law is powerful only to

prevent evil, not to create good. So in the relation of domestic servant and master, law would never dream of enacting that, because long times of service are favourable to the creation of a kindly relation between master and servant, therefore no short periods of service shall be allowed: the good results of long service can flow only from the genuine atmosphere of Christian brotherhood that is breathed in the family; and this is a matter with which law has as little to do as with the temperature of the air or the brightness of the sky. But where the truly Christian sentiment of brotherhood or fatherhood exists in reference to any kind of dependants, it is pleasant to observe how much good may be done, how much evil prevented, by a little kindly regard and friendly concern in the person who holds the superior position. I remember well, on occasion of one of those many visits which I make to the great metropolis of industry on the Clyde, a master manufacturer, whose hospitality I had the pleasure to enjoy, taking me through his office, where a number of pleasant-looking young men were seated, busily exercising their function of the quill, said to me, "Well, you observe these young men: when they come to me once, they remain with me till such time as opportunity may offer for their starting on an independent footing, and I have never had occasion to dismiss one of all their number. How? Because I say to them when they enter my service, 'Now, remember: the moment I hear of your going to a certain place of amusement, where

I know you will meet with bad company—and I am sure to hear of it—that moment you leave this place.' " A firm word of this kind, with a habitual air of kindness and small acts of friendly attention from the employer, as occasion may offer, is a small price to pay to save a young man from ruin and degradation. And yet not every one pays it; and why? Because even to lift a pin is a burden to him who is too inert to bend his back.

IX. Labour being the condition of living in this working world, the question arises, What is to be done with that class of persons, unfortunately not so scanty as one might wish, who either will not or cannot labour?—in other words, Shall there be POOR LAWS? I am inclined to think NOT. Christianity, of course, above all things, as strong in the love not only of admiration but of pity, desires and enforces the duty of the strong helping the weak, and the rich, with their overplus, eking out the deficiencies of the poor; but it is one thing to accentuate strongly a natural claim for human sympathy in all discriminated cases, and another thing to ensure people by law against the consequences of their own laziness, want of thrift, and unforeseen accidents. To make poor laws is to remove one of the great incentives to thrift in a class whose besetting sin is improvidence.[1] Rather

[1] "I have inquired into the causes of the poverty of great numbers of distressed people, and my experience is that the greater part of all the misery in this country is the result

learn to save sixpence a week on tobacco, or tea, or gin, and put it into the box of a Friendly Society, than spend all your wages when they are high, and when they are low come upon society with a claim to save you from starvation. No man has a right to be saved from starvation. Starvation may, in certain cases, be the best thing for him, as it certainly is the best thing for society to be saved from the necessity of prolonging the existence of an altogether worthless character. The relief of the poor and the unfortunate in a well-ordered Christian community is a voluntary exercise of discriminating pity, not the satisfaction of a legal claim, and ought to be conducted either individually, where individuals are sufficient for the work, or by voluntary association on a well-considered plan of territorial superintendence. Generosity ceases to be a virtue when what you might have done morally as a helper in need, you are forced to do legally as a payer of rates.

X. In connection with labour, the consideration of the wages of labour, and its organisation, rightly claims a serious word; and the rule here—a direct application of the Christian doctine of love as the fulfilling of the law—is to pay the workman full value for his work; and to pay him not scantily and scurvily, but generously and liberally, as far as circumstances may allow; for it is of the nature of

of intemperance and the want of thrift and foresight." —SAMUEL SMITH, in *Fallacies of Socialism*; London, 1885.

love to spread and to overflow, as it is of selfishness to shrink and to contract. But the difficulty lies not in the principle of full payment, which every Christian and every true gentleman will admit, but in the determination of the matter—value of work—to which the principle is to be applied. In a simple state of society the value of a day's work to a labourer should be represented by a price sufficient to support himself for the day, with a certain surplus for innocent luxuries, and a daily contribution to a store for the possibilities of the future. In other words, a good Christian employer of labour will pay his workmen so that he may live comfortably and happily on the fruits of his labour. But to determine the exact rate of this remuneration, as times, places, and circumstances vary, is impossible. Generally also we may say the rate of wages must be left to adjust itself, according to local demand and personal discretion; though in some cases exceptional prices may be fixed for the public benefit, to the exclusion of the free choice of the labourer or his employer. Thus the fees of Professors in the Scottish Universities are fixed on such a scale by authority, that they shall not be too high for the pecuniary capacity of those who hire professional work for intellectual products, nor again too low to afford the producer of intellectual work an honourable reward for his honourable toil. In the same way, the fare to be paid to cabmen in large cities is exactly defined by the municipal authorities for the convenience of the public and the avoidance of

unpleasant altercations about the rate of conveyance. But in all such cases it will be noted that the rate of payment which the law fixes is rather below than above what a good Christian and a kindly man would be inclined to pay for the labour performed; so much so that I once heard a gentleman defined as a man who never pays a cabman a shilling when he can find a decent excuse for giving him eighteenpence. And this is indeed the sum and substance of all that Christianity has to say in the matter. Pay a man fairly, according to the quantity and quality of the work done—this is simple justice; pay him a little more, and justice rises into the region of Christian love; while anything like squeezing out of the labourer the greatest possible amount of labour for the lowest possible wage, or treating him as the insolent Norman barons treated the lower classes in the days of Stephen,[1] is in the highest degree both unhuman and antichristian. But bear in mind specially, it is not the mere expenditure of time and muscle in the way of labour that you pay for; it is the quantity and the quality of the product. If one man does twice as much work in an hour as another man, he deserves twice as much pay, and, if he does it twice as well, he deserves four times as much. Be it kept in mind also that brains are by no means so common in the human world as muscle; and, as a man pays more for a Cairngorm topaz picked up on Cairngorm than for a lump of common granite from the same Ben, with the same amount of labour, so

[1] Saxon Chronicle, 1137.

the wages paid to the manager or controller of a great manufacturing business may not be measured by the wage which falls to the individuals whom he controls. Not so much the number of hands willing and able to work in any profitable branch of industry is the determining element in the profits that may arise from any business, as the inventiveness, sagacity, courage, decision, and skill of management in the man who started the business, regulates the machinery, and it may be supplies the steam-power by which the machinery is moved. A man of invention, like Mr. Lister of Bradford, by teaching the people to make a profitable use of materials which ignorance had thrown away as waste, creates work for some 1000 or 10,000 men who otherwise would either have starved or not come into existence. It is brains in the social world, as in the individual man, that sets muscles in action; and it is no more possible for mere muscle to do great things in the industrial world than for steam machinery to have been set at work without the thinking faculty of James Watt. This ignoring of the creative function of brain in the industrial world is one of the fruits of the crude notion about equality which came forth from the monstrous ferment of French wits in the Revolution of 1789: an equality directly contrary to the great principle of variety in unity which is at once the wealth and the wonder of the universe. Another mad product of the same volcanic period in social history is the desire that certain sections of labourers in the in-

dustrial world have shown to exclude competition from every field of social activity and economic productiveness. Such an exclusion, if it could be made general, would operate simply as a bribe to all laziness, a sop to all stupidity, a penalty on all enterprise, and a discouragement to all talent. Inequality, as the condition of a rich and stimulating variety, must exist everywhere in the moral as in the physical world; and competition is the most potent force that can be brought into play to bring forth this variety with the greatest amount of individual energy and general luxuriance. To exclude competition would simply mean to establish the reign of feeble monotony and self-satisfied mediocrity all over the globe. No doubt not a little of the evils that afflict the industrial world at recurrent seasons arises from competition; but this is from a competition without sense and without moderation, and is merely another instance of what we daily see, that the excess of a great virtue is a great vice. All extremes are wrong. Water is good; but as the lack of rain starves the plant, so the excess of rain drowns the fields. Another favourite corollary, drawn by the same class of thinkers from the French doctrine of equality, is that there should be no ACCUMULATION, and that the capitalist who accumulates wealth lives by the robbery of the labouring man. Never was there a greater mistake. Accumulation is simply stored labour, and belongs as necessarily to the system of a working world as it belongs to trees to grow and to rivers to swell. The forest accumu-

lates trees not by any means all of the same size; the scholar accumulates learning; the thinker accumulates ideas; the manufacturer accumulates skilful materials or articles of trade, and what they may bring in a favourable market. As a form of growth and vital expansiveness, accumulation is and must be everywhere where there is life. It may be that a merchant shall accumulate more money than he knows to use, for the public benefit, or a thinker more ideas than he can put forth in any profitable shape; but that is his business, not yours. You have no right to bring him down to your level, any more than a wise forester will cut down a strong tree for the sake of half a dozen weaklings that may be creeping feebly round about its bole. As a fact, however, the big trees in the social world, so far from being inimical to the small ones, are the main forces that set the small ones in motion. As the brain, of which we have spoken, to take a military simile, is the commander-in-chief and strategist of the industrial campaign, so capital forms the basis of operation which facilitates the progress and ensures the success of the campaign. It is not true that the stores of accumulated labour represented by money are either stored away carelessly, in the general case, or foolishly squandered by their possessors. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it will be found that wealth is wisely spent in sending various forms of industry into fruitful operation, which otherwise would be nowhere. Abolish a wealthy class, that is, lay a penalty on all sorts of wisely stored

labour, and we shall in a few generations find ourselves dwindling back into the social state of the Red Indians who peopled America before the arrival of the Virginian colonists and the Pilgrim Fathers.

XI. As a necessity of existence, labour must first be expended by food-eating mortals on the food-producing earth; and, as the necessity of living makes labour on land the earliest field for the expenditure of productive force in man, so in order to secure to the labourer the peaceable possession of the fruits of such labour, property in land becomes the distinguishing mark of every association of human beings that has made the important step of passing from the nomad or gypsy stage into the type of a permanently localised society. The land, of course, is naturally free to all who can turn a sod or break a clod and run up a fence; but, when once honest labour has been expended on it, it is no more free, but belongs to the person whose wisely applied productive force has redeemed it from the wildness of unappropriated heath to be a theatre for the special selected growths of the field and the garden. In this way arises the landed proprietor, whose right, constituted by nature, is recognised by society and stamped by law as amongst the most primary postulates of all social existence. But not only so: the man who by persevering industry and wisely calculated work has redeemed land from the unproductive waste so as to become a permanent nursing-ground for human food, has created for himself a

position in the early stage of society, and a dignity which does not belong to those who practise any loose and vagrant method of expending their energies and obtaining their living. When much ground lies unredeemed by productive labour, men of energy and skill may support themselves, both pleasurably and comfortably, by hunting and fishing; but they can never strike root in the social system as the man does who knows to expend a calculated amount of persistent labour on a sure and measurable field of production. Originally the tillers of the soil and the lords of the soil were identical; but differences will soon arise. Some men are lazy, some men are unsteady and fitful, and not a few are dull and stupid. Persons of this class, who are incapable of management and administration, will be willing to accept wages as diggers of ditches, hewers of wood, or drawers of water, in a subordinate and servile position to the man who, with strong brain and persistent energy, knows both to make work available and property valuable. Thus arises naturally, and in a healthy way, the relation of lord of the soil and cultivator of the soil, in the shape of farmer, tenant, crofter, or agricultural labourer, which forms such a prominent feature in modern society. Of course there is no reason why the lord of the soil should not also be the cultivator; but the division of labour, arising out of the diversity of talents, naturally brings with it the result which we now see, that the lord of the soil is one person and the cultivator another. These two distinct classes being

permanently established in the social organism, the application of the ideal standard of Christian ethics to this relation becomes one of the most important, and, at the same time, one of the most difficult problems of social co-operation. The closeness of the relation between the lord and the cultivator of the soil is much more intimate than that which subsists between any other mutually dependent classes of the community. The customer may leave the shop with which he is dissatisfied, and find the needful supply in the next street or the next village; the tenant of a hired house in a town, if ousted from one roof, may find shelter under another not a stone-cast removed; the parent who finds his son's education neglected or bungled at the public school may send him to a private academy, or get an intelligent young man at small charge to do the work at home. But it is not so with the small tenant or poor crofter: land, in advanced stages of the social system, is not so common or so cheap as to lie open largely for any one that wants it; in many cases the poor tiller of the soil is practically at the mercy of the landowner, and must either accept the harshest conditions or starve, or become a beggar or a thief. Here then is a case where the weaker party is peculiarly dependent on the kindly handling and considerate sympathy of the stronger; and it is a case which not only makes the greatest call on the Christian duty of paying special respect to inferiors, but puts forth a claim for State regulation, with a plea more powerful than belongs to any other social

interest. For not only are the cultivators of the soil, as the weaker party, preferentially entitled to claim the protection of law, which in fact exists mainly for the defence of the weak against the disregard or oppression of the strong, but the farmers of the land and the agricultural labourers, as a class, are perhaps the most healthy, the most hardy, the most constant, the most steady, the best affected, and the most conservative body in the community; are the veritable nursery, *seminarium reipublicæ,* as a Roman writer has it, the class from which all other classes require to be periodically recruited, and as such deserving the special consideration of every well-governed commonwealth. With all respect for the wonders of modern industry and the beauties of modern manufactures, it is better for a State to maintain a numerous population of well-conditioned agricultural labourers than to breed swarms of mechanical waiters on mechanism in large towns. The conditions of life, both physical and moral, are more favourable in the country. In consideration of these relations a Christian State might well be justified in interfering so far with the freedom of personal contract as to prevent both rack-renting and wholesale hasty evictions, which the land laws of this country, made by the strong to make the strong stronger, till recently, without any restraint, allowed; and in the matter of the apportionment of profits, between the landlord as the furnisher of the raw material, and the actual cultivator as contributor of skilled labour, the Christian ideal seems to point rather to the Tuscan

system of partnership and the principle of sharing profit and loss, according to a known scale, than to the British system of fixed rents independent of yearly returns. In the matter of accumulation also there are specialties in the form of stored labour called land which do not belong to accumulation in the form of floating or transferable capital. His position in the social fabric marks the landlord as the head and bishop or overseer (ἐπίσκοπος) in civil matters of the peasantry on his property; to perform this function efficiently he must reside on his property, and make it his highest ambition to be the centre of a healthy life, both economical and moral, in his district.[1] It is in consideration of this high function indeed that the State has been forward to confer on him the dignity of certain official positions in local government; and it is in consideration of this also that he is entitled to think highly of himself as something better than a mere retailer of wares or invester of profits. This proud position he forfeits the moment he becomes a habitual absentee, a mere gatherer of rents; and an absentee, to a certain

[1] Mrs. Grant of Laggan, in her admirable *Letters from the Mountains*, April 1773, speaks of the then fifth Duke of Argyll as a model resident landlord: "Look for a great man's true and solid praise at his own door, among his tenants and neighbours, and let it be a material part of his praise that he has neighbours—that is to say, that he lives at home amongst them. In this particular the Duke is unrivalled and alone. Every mouth here will tell you of those quiet waters, soft and slow, that steal silently on, carrying honesty and beneficence into all the corners of obscurity."

extent, in spite of himself, and with the best intentions, he will become when his property is very large; for in this case he must demit his duty to factors or land agents; and the government by factors, as a rule, is loveless, and therefore in its spirit essentially unchristian. In order therefore to prevent the growth of enormous landed properties, which make the performance of social functions and Christian duties practically impossible —for a man cannot be present everywhere, or go about from one province of his huge empire to another, as the Emperor Hadrian did, animating with his presence and restamping with his name some of the most notable cities of the East and West of his world-wide domain,—in order, I say, to prevent the saddling of landowners with impossible duties, a wise Christian State will adopt various precautions. In the first place, laws of entail and settlement, tying up land in the hands of those who cannot use it, making the living servants of the dead, and defrauding the public of its interest in the land for the gratification of a silly vanity and a pampered conceit, must be absolutely disallowed. This, however, does not mean that natural accumulation shall be interfered with in the case of land any more than in the case of other kinds of property; what a man knows to acquire, let him be allowed to use and dispose of freely so long as he lives; only let there be no laws either to encourage artificial accumulation or to discourage natural redistribution. Death, as the dismissal of the

holder of property from the theatre of his earthly doings, is the occasion which brings into play the natural law of redistribution; the moment a man dies his property becomes vacant, and lorded by no one, except in so far as society may choose to recognise the wish of the dying man for its disposal, or the claims of his near relations for its distribution among themselves. Here, therefore, the Christian legislator will find an emergency for kindly prevision and wise regulation, to the effect that laws of succession to heritable property will be made equally remote from the French extreme of large division and the English law of artificial accumulation by primogeniture. On the one hand, Christianity, while from its principle of impartial justice it disallows the claim of any one member of the family to appropriate the whole succession of a common parent, will, from economical considerations, not fail to see the necessity of preventing properties from being split up into such small and ever smaller sections as would render profitable cultivation and personal comfort equally impossible. The result of this combination of Christian justice and economical wisdom will be something like the old Norman law of succession to landed property at present acknowledged in the Channel Islands, a law technically known by the name of limited primogeniture, and which practically means, that, while the eldest son, from family and economical considerations, has a preferential right of choice among several properties, held on different

titles, he can choose but one of the number, the others going to the junior members of the family in a prescribed order; the principle being that each property is an independent entity, which neither can be absorbed into another entity, nor lose its independent completeness by subdivision.[1] Laws might also be made obliging the proprietor to maintain a certain proportion of small farms on his estates, and to regulate the residential position of the agricultural labourer in such fashion as to secure in his behalf the healthy influence of family life, and to banish for ever from Christian countries the conjunct evils of very large farms, with farm labourers herding in bothies, and living otherwise in a manner unfavourable alike to physical well-being and the formation of a manly character. Further, in order to impress on the holders of land the living conviction that their only proper function as members of a society organised on Christian principles is that of residential proprietors, and that an absentee holder of land is, in fact, as great a sinner against plain social duty as an absentee rector of a parish, a Christian legislature would lay on a heavy absentee-tax, the proceeds to be applied to purposes of local utility; and as a yet more potent discouragement to the formation of enormous aggregates of land under one lordship, it would enact that there should be a tax on land rising in an increasing ratio to the amount of

[1] See this subject fully treated in my book on *The Scottish Highlanders and the Land Laws.* London: Chapman, 1885.

land possessed. If, for example, a landed property worth £4000 a year were taxed at a certain rate, say £2 per cent., a property worth £8000 a year should be taxed not simply double that amount, but with the addition of a third more. If to some persons these restrictions on the growth of large properties should appear exceptionally severe, the answer from an ethical point of view is plain, that there is no class of society which stands so loosely bound to their social function as landowners, no class which is so apt to be self-indulgent, so given to encroach on the social rights of the community; no class which has such large liberty to be imperious, and even insolent; no class which, under wise limitation, can do more to brace the nerves, or, with unlimited sway, to break the spirit, of the most valuable section of the population. In this country certainly they have been, up to a very recent period, the spoiled children of the State, and have lost more ground by obstinate clinging to artificial preferences than they will ever regain, by the most graceful concessions to natural right.

XII. A word now on TAXATION and REVENUE. Taxation is merely the wisely-ordered and well-calculated contribution which each member of a community agrees to give in order to make a well-ordered society possible, the price paid by each and all for keeping the civil machinery in good working order. Savages and nomads pay no taxes; freedom from taxation is the privilege of barbarians; the

progress of civilisation is the progress of limitation; and the law which in so many other respects curtails the freedom of the uncultivated man, interferes also to a certain extent with the free disposal of the fruits of his labour. He must surrender a certain proportion of what is rightfully his own for the whole herd of fellow-workers with whom he acts, as a member of a various and complex organism; and the action of Christian ethics, under the influence of impartial justice to all, kindly consideration of the weaker brother, and jealous watchfulness against the intrusion of deleterious elements, in the construction of a calculated rate of taxation, will be fourfold. First, it will provide that all shall contribute where all are benefited; that the rich shall contribute proportionally more than the poor; again, that all sorts of luxuries shall be looked upon as a more large field for the operation of the tax-gatherer than the necessaries of life; and lastly, that a Christian State shall as much as possible discourage vice, by laying heavy charges on all articles of consumption, and on all trades and practices that are either vicious in themselves, or naturally lead into vice. If, for example, the drinking of stimulating liquids is a natural and pleasant practice which ought not to be absolutely forbidden (1 Tim. iv. 3), nevertheless, as it is a practice very open to abuse, and which when abused is the fruitful mother of some of the worst evils that infest society, a Christian State will take special care to place the access to these stimulants under such restrictions, and to stigmatise their abuse in

such a marked fashion, as to render the beastly apparition of a drunk man as rare as possible in a Christian community.

Besides calculated contributions from various forms of internal energy and expenditure, the State has always been accustomed to replenish its coffers by contributions laid on the import of various articles of foreign trade. In the domain of Trade and Commerce, Christianity, as the most human and catholic of all religions, would naturally be inclined to favour a general free interchange of the products of various climes and various races of men, as mutually complementary members of one great commonwealth; but, as the nations of the world are yet very far from acting as a great fraternity, jealousy and rivalry rather than confidence and co-operation giving the tone to international intercourse, a wise Christian statesman may often find himself compelled to prefer a fair reciprocation of mercantile benefits to an absolute freedom of interchange. It is a sentimental rather than a practical idea to look upon all nations as one great human family. Even among brothers and sisters, brought up together, and connected by the same ties of the most kindly significance, innate differences of character and contrary strokes of fortune are daily seen giving birth to a tone of sentiment and a course of conduct anything but friendly. How much more among great nations, living under diverse social conditions, separated by wide seas, and grown up, in the long process and character of the ages, into forms of contrary type and

forces of antagonistic tendency, must it ever be that "the great human family" remains a beautiful phrase rather than a calculable fact! As an essentially distinct, self-contained, and self-bounded social entity, every State must attend to its own interests in the first place, just as every individual man is called upon in the first place to help himself, grows into manhood in effect mainly by having to help himself, and being less a man in proportion as he hangs on others for aid in the performance of functions that ought to act naturally self-sustained out of a healthy and strong vitality. It ought to be the wisdom therefore of every State to be as much as possible independent within itself, and to seek for support from abroad only when it has exhausted its native resources. The protection of a weak trade on this principle might be as much a virtue as in other cases the pampering of a strong trade would be a vice. The comparative freedom or restriction of trade is always a question of circumstances. In some circumstances foreign goods may be allowed to enter free of duty for the general good of the body of consumers as well as for the creation of a healthy rivalry in the native produce; in other cases, to crush a healthy native industry in the bud merely to save a penny to the home consumer by the free importation of a foreign article would be an act of unmotherly self-regard of which a Christian community could not be capable. The strong trees of the forest require no protection from the blast; the delicate flower of the garden does.

In a country like Britain, which has allowed such hives of sweatful workers to settle in great centres of manufacturing industry, the clamour for cheap bread may reasonably have achieved the abolition of the Corn Laws, notwithstanding the manifest injury thereby inflicted on one of the most important bodies of the community, the farmers and the tillers of the soil, and in the face, at the same time, of the fact, that by this system of unreciprocated free-trade, we seem to be strengthening the arm of our adversary to strike a blow at our vitals, while we are weakening our own arm to ward it; but, however strong the compulsion may have been that forced the British nation in the year 1846, to sacrifice the bone and sinew of the agricultural interest to the demands of the manufacturing districts, it does not therefore in any wise follow that French silks and French sugar should be allowed to overwhelm and to extinguish two important branches of native industry for the mere sake of an unqualified devotion to a humanitarian dogma. Theoretical economists and philanthropic sentimentalists are equally out of place here; but Christianity is a religion not only of uncommon love but also of common sense, and desires that manufacturing generosity and private charity should equally commence at home. He who attends not to his own family and his own friends, before all else, is worse than an infidel; and, though a Christian loves all men, and hates none, he is bound to spend his love on those who are of the household of faith in pre-

ference: that is, applied to national trade, no people is bound to order its law of import and export in such a fashion as to encourage all branches of foreign industry, while they impoverish their own.

XIII. EDUCATION, which comes next to be considered, in a Christian State belongs, in the first instance, to the Church; for knowledge, or brain-culture, as St. Paul teaches, without love, is mere sounding brass and tinkling cymbals; and the Church therefore, as the moral teacher, must stand in the front. But it does not stand alone. It works with two other great training bodies, the family and the school. To the family, as the social monad, the nursery of all kindly and unselfish affections, the Church has to look, as the divinely ordained preparer of the ground and sower of the seed for the spiritual operations on a larger scale that are to follow; it must therefore be looked on not only as a sin against Nature, but as a procedure directly contrary alike to Christian principle and State policy, when parents, as will lightly happen in ages of wealth and self-indulgence, and social dissipation on a large scale, demit their functions as family educators wholesale to professional teachers. A certain marketable result no doubt may be secured in this way, but the fragrance of the flower and the mellowness of the fruit will equally be lost. As for the school, two things are plain—first, as religion is not a special business, but an atmosphere for any kind of business, it must have its place in the

school, not in the way of dogmatic teaching, which belongs to the Churches, but in the way of psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, and prayers such as the Lord's Prayer, in which all Christian Churches and creeds agree. Sacred music and sacred song will occupy a prominent place in all schools organised on Christian principles. They form the living breath, and stir the spiritual pulse of every system of youthful training to which the name of Christian can with any propriety be applied. But further, Christianity as founded on historical records, and on the moral relations of God and man, continuously followed out through long centuries, is a religion that cannot exist without a considerable amount of popular intelligence, divorced from which, indeed, it is sure to degenerate, and has in fact degenerated largely, into various forms of sacerdotalism and ceremonialism, than which nothing can be more contrary to its essentially ethical genius. Thus differentially distinguished from the great Heathen religions, growing out of loose and floating traditions more fanciful than historical, Christianity cannot do without adopting the school as its natural ally and indispensable complement. Sacred history, therefore, and geography, as a matter of mere intellectual furniture, and as a basis from which the Church may commence its spiritual strategy, naturally belong to every school in a Christian country; while in the higher schools, called Universities, no course of instruction can be deemed complete in which the history of the Church does not form a prominent branch. How

closely Church and School hang together in a well-organised Christian State is exemplified nowhere better than in Scotland, where the superior character and intelligence of the peasantry are well deduced by all fairly instructed persons from the admirable relations established by the great Reformer between Church and School. That he did not raise the superstructure of the educational edifice in Scotland as effectively as he laid the foundation was owing not to the faultiness of his own conception or the feebleness of his intent, but to the unchristian selfishness of a nobility more anxious to spoil the Church of its accumulated wealth, for their own aggrandisement, than to use it for the improvement of the Christian people. It is of more importance in a Christian commonwealth to have well-paid teachers than to have huge-acred landlords; and though to furnish "honest stipends" and an honourable career for the schoolmaster, is beyond all question among the foremost duties of a Christian legislature, in no country have these duties been more systematically neglected than in Scotland. In that country, the teachers of the parochial schools, after having been for many generations overworked and underpaid, and shut out from any sphere of social advance, have been subjected to the mechanical operation of payment by results,—a system which means education without inspiration, without nature, and without enjoyment, and which, along with the personal dignity, original genius, and moral force of the teacher, systematically sacrifices the real benefit

of the worthy few to the apparent benefit of the worthless many. Education will never do the work which it ought to do in a Christian State when teachers are subjected to this mechanical treatment. The only way in which a Christian State can show its appreciation of the teacher's work as secondary only to the work of the Church, is to pay both churchmen and teachers liberally, as sheriffs and judges are paid, and to open to them in calculated stages a career of honourable ambition, indicative of the value which society places on their services.

XIV. War. It is a not uncommon notion that Christianity is absolutely opposed to war. Not so. It is only opposed to the motives (James iv. 1) from which wars sometimes or often proceed. Wars arise primarily from the immense wealth of overflowing vitality in the world, manifesting itself in a rush of contrary tendencies, unforeseen entanglements, and unfortunate collisions of various kinds. It is not always lust of power or greed of acquisition that makes war, though no doubt, as in the aggressive wars of the Romans and the Normans, which were merely a splendid name for robbery, this has been the main motive, but not rarely simple stupidity, narrowness of view, careless blundering, and a want of practical wisdom in the administration of affairs. Anyhow, Christianity, as eminently the ethics of common-sense,[1] has nothing to do with the senti-

[1] I use this word when talking of Christianity to note the practical character of our religion, as displayed in the general practical genius of its apostleship, and specially

mental amiabilities of the Friends in regard to the absolute sinfulness of war. To declare defensive war sinful is to open the door to burglars, and to offer a bribe to all kinds of insolent aggression. On the contrary, a great defensive war has generally been the making of a great people. All notable nationalities have been cradled in war: witness Palestine, Scotland, and the Netherlands. There is no better school of virtue than the discipline of a well-regulated army; and the horrors of war, though they strike the imagination more, are, in my opinion, less degrading to humanity than the systematic lies and adulterations habitually practised among certain classes of tradesmen and shopkeepers. The morality of the mere trader, uninfluenced by any higher consideration than the love of gain, is proverbially low. A soldier is always an honest and a manly fellow; a dealer in cows' milk or in coffee not always. Soldiers in moments of infuriated attack may become tigers; but in the general tone and habit of their profession they may be as gentle as lambs, and are as obedient to the promptings of a lofty ideal of conduct as a mettlesome steed to the reins of the rider.

XV. *Lastly*, It may seem strange to some persons that in talking of the application of Christianity to society I have made no mention of a great moral or immoral force, which has recently appeared amongst us, called Socialism. Some people will tell you,

with reference to the use of the word *σωφρονισμός* in 2 Tim. i. 7.

founding on a well-known text of Scripture, that communism, or a community of goods, *i.e.* Socialism in its extreme form, was actually part of the organisation of the primitive Church; but this is only an illustration of the manner in which Scripture is perverted by persons who are full of crotchety imaginations and utterly destitute of judgment: a style of hermeneutics in which an accidental or incidental historical notice, in a loose and general style, is elevated to the platform of a fundamental principle and an absolute law. There is no proof, either in the Epistles of St. Paul, which are full of the details of Church management, or in the works of the early Fathers, that a community of goods was a part of the constitution of the Church. The text in the Acts of the Apostles (iv. 32) means nothing more than that, in the burst of moral enthusiasm out of which the Church sprang, all the members, rich and poor, contributed liberally to a common fund, just as the members of the Free Church in Scotland did in the year 1843, and in a less notable way do still; and, if any early Christian proprietor went so far as to sell his estate, and lay the proceeds at the apostles' feet (Acts iv. 37), it was no doubt a very chivalrous thing in him to do, and chivalrous generosities of the same or a similar description have not been without example in recent times; but no man of sense, then or now, would dream of constituting such act of an individual into a general rule for all social organisation of Christians. As to the Socialism of the present hour, so far as it goes beyond co-operative societies, to

which no sensible man has any objection, it seems to consist mainly in an absolute negation of all the principles that have hitherto regulated human action in society, from the earliest times to the present hour. Competition and accumulation are accordingly denounced as the prime causes of all sin and misery in the world. To this I have already spoken (p. 36); and I may add the general remark, that, if people will not learn to distinguish the abuse of good things from the use of them, they will find nothing good in the world; for all good in excess is simply bad, and all social sanity is the just balance between too much and too little of a good thing. Another favourite mark of the Socialistic lust of denunciation is private property. Because some landlords have behaved selfishly, therefore all landlordism is bad; this is their logic. That the State might in some cases be a better landlord than many a bad landlord is true enough; and the public land in the old Roman law, the mismanagement of which gave rise to the agrarian agitations of the Gracchi, is a familiar example of State landlordism, from which modern allotters of unoccupied land in America and the colonies might take a useful hint. On this one point Mr. Henry George talks sense; but from this specialty to leap to the conclusion that there should be no private property in land, and that all landlords are thieves and robbers, is a sort of logic which only hot-brained crotchetmongers can look on as worthy of reasonable regard. There is no proof whatever that a State as the general landlord would or

could act more fairly and more beneficially than private landlords under good land laws. The generous enterprise of individual landlords has not seldom done more for the improvement of the land and the good of the people than the mechanical routine of State landlordism would have done in centuries.[1] Then, if I understand them rightly, there is another class of Socialists who denounce State landlordism as unconditionally as private ownership of land. They will have no State, no Government; they are professed anarchists, or nihilists—no Government, no State, no Church, no nothing; only leave us to ourselves and we will create a millennium to-morrow, by a general robbery of all persons who have any property, and a general distribution of it to all who have none. This is what I have been able to make of Socialism. I will keep myself open to further teaching; but with my present insight, I could no more think of begetting a stout progeny by embracing a cloud, than I can hope to elicit any indication of a practical creed from such a ferment of hazy imaginations. If there is any truth in Socialism in its extreme form, as preached by its apostles, it can only be realised on ground free from the numerous entanglements of our complex civilisation. Let these promoters of an economic millennium have an uncultivated island assigned to them, somewhere in the far Pacific, and there prove to the world, by the powerful logic of

[1] See instances of this on a large scale in *Scotland as it Was and as it Is*, by the Duke of Argyll, ch. viii. ix.

facts, what a paradise they can create by pure manual labour, and the jealous exclusion of the old serpent in the shape of competitive capital and accumulation. I should be willing to live to the age of Parr, to witness the result of such an experiment. But till that experiment is made, I shall continue to believe that Socialism in its extreme form is simply the fact of an incidental evil transmuted by a fevered fancy into the dream of an impossible good.

PHYSICAL AND MORAL ANALOGIES.

I. In the physical world we plainly see all things have a BEGINNING, a POINT *from* which they start, stretch out, and amplify till they reach a certain crowning completeness of their type. This beginning is always small, and of the smallest, a mere dot, so to speak, from which the stature uprises and the periphery expands.

In the moral world it is the same. However great the gap may be between the mind of a Shakespeare and the mind of a man who never thinks beyond the compass of his day's work, or sees beyond the range of his day's walk from the fireside to the shop, there is no proof that the mind of the baby Shakespeare, at the hour of the baby's birth, was in any wise more alert, more vivid, or more capacious than the mind of the common man. Something there was, no doubt, and a mighty something, working within and behind to produce the extraordinary difference of the subsequent development between the two babies; but it was a something invisible and incognoscible; the infinitely great mysteriously starting out of the infinitely small, and shooting up into its destined complete-

ness by a process equally mysterious, equally incomprehensible, and equally divine. In society the same smallness of beginnings is equally obvious: from the family to the cousinship and the clan; from the clan to the tribe; from the tribe to the people; from the people to the kingdom; from the kingdom to the empire. Always, whether it be Rome, or Britain, or Germany, or America, every biggest unity of associated human beings can be traced back to the smallest beginnings.

II. The name of this process is what we call *growth.* All increment in the physical world is growth; and its law is to be slow, step by step, gradual addition and gradual expansion. Here, however, we must carefully distinguish between mere concretion of dead or inorganic matter, and growth of things which have life, as plants and animals. In one sense we may say not improperly that the beach grows by the accumulation of sand, layer after layer from the sea, or from the débris of the rock; but this growth is not growth from within by what in the plant or the animal we call a *vital force*: it is an increase from without by supraposition, as when two boards are glued or nailed together; an addition, no doubt, and a very noticeable one, but plainly of the nature of what we call a manufacture, a thing made mechanically by extraneous instrumentality, not dynamically by inward plastic force.

In the moral world, whether we take individuals or societies, we find this law of growth equally

prominent. No Shakespeare or Raphael jumps into perfection at a bound; and, though some highly gifted men have astonished the world by marvellous displays of juvenile capacity, yet even that precocious display was the growth of slow weeks and months and years; and it remains doubtful in all cases whether the slower development is not in all cases the better, the more natural, the more healthy, the more sure in its progress and the more rich in its results.

In social man the gradual nature of the growth is no less striking. A multitude of people, with diverse inclinations, tendencies, and capacities, though they may have much in common which they owe to race or circumstances, cannot be brought to act together for common ends, under a common authority, in a day; the formation of a nation—that is, a number of persons spread over large habitable places, each with a distinct individuality, yet acting together harmoniously for a common end—must always be the result of slow growth, a heritage of habits gradually hardening into a type. The Roman empire took seven hundred years to perfect itself in the type which it owed to the first and greatest of the Cæsars. Greece, though it started earlier than Rome, never grew into the compactness of a unified State; and so with all its grandeur of intellectual culture and æsthetical display, it fell politically a prey, first to the Macedonians and then to the Romans. Germany is only in our own day beginning to act with common concert and unity of

purpose in the great council of European nations; and, if India is wisely governed by a colony of strangers from the North-Western Seas, who do not know to settle where they have conquered, it is simply because India never was a nation that as an effective unity could assert itself against a super-induced stranger who planted himself, with vigour of purpose and consistency of scheme, on their border.

III. It is equally certain that in the physical world, all growth, after achieving the consummation of its type, falls away from its perfection by a process which we call *decay*, leading it, step by step, through stages of well-marked deficiency, to a final disruption of all vital coherence, and a disappearance from that type of existence which we call *Death*. Whatever the differences may be, and they are no doubt considerable, in the longevity, or capacity of continued existence among living things, anything like absolute permanency is unknown in the circle of finite existences with which we are acquainted. All life is force: where there is force there is motion; where there is motion there is change; where there is change there is ascent from low to high, or descent from high to low. Even the eternal mountains, which grew by mere mechanical concretion, are smoothed down and made nearer to the plain by the constant attrition of the breezy and humid forces of the atmosphere; not even of the sun in the sweep of its radiance, nor of the ocean in the plenitude of

its swell, can we assert that they have always been and must always be even as they are now, and have been since Adam first looked up to the light in Paradise and Noah sailed with his crew of motley creatures on the flood. But be that as it may, we are assured that the most vivacious crow, and the most mossy oak, with its hollow bole where many creatures have found refuge from the wintry blast, will die some day. And man, though his span of life is greater than that generally conceded to other walking, creeping, swimming, and flying things in the animal world, whatever credit may be given to certain antediluvian traditions, now-a-days certainly has no reasonable hope of a comfortable existence protracted much beyond the limit of the threescore and ten years laid down by the Psalmist some three thousand years ago.

But man, as is commonly believed, whatever Darwinians may assert, is a very strange creature—an animal in some respects altogether *sui generis*, a compound and complex creature—a creature with a dual life, physical and moral, or spiritual; and it may be justly asked, therefore, whether in this moral aspect of his nature he is as subject to death as he certainly is in his physical. Now the first thing that strikes us here is that the mind grows from small to great, and from narrow to wide, along with the body, and, if so, why should it not decay with the body, and die with it? And do we not in fact see that grand conceptions and noble passions,—all that goes to make the poet, the philosopher, the

apostle, and the hero,—goes along with young blood? And when the pulse becomes feeble, the nerves weak, and the muscles awry, do not the thoughts become flat, the emotions feeble, and the general tone of the inward man low? And does not the productive energy show itself as decidedly in the ebb, as in youthful days, and days of physical growth, it rose to flood, and could with difficulty be kept from overflowing its bounds? All these indications seem to speak decidedly for the decay and death of the spiritual man, in perfect analogy with the decay and death of the physical man, and in harmony also with the general law, that whatever has a beginning has an end, and that birth, in whatever form, and under whatever disguise, implies death. But there is another side of the question which must not be overlooked. That the mind grows up with the body, like two persons walking together and keeping good step, is unquestionably true, but true only up to a certain point. The body at a certain stage attains its ripeness, and ceases to grow; not so the mind: rather it then only begins to grow when the body has ceased to be capable of adding an inch to its stature; and from this moment a moral life, or a life of reasonable productive spiritual manhood, commences, which seems rather to stand on the physical body as a speaker stands on a platform, than to go along with it, side by side, and *pari passu*, as one fellow-pedestrian walks along with another, or two horses yoked together draw a chariot. This is certainly a noteworthy phenomenon, and a phenomenon

which means that man as a moral being lives a life which does not run parallel with his physical life, nor care to follow its analogies. Still the fact remains that the moral life, though to a certain extent unaffected by the gradual decay of the physical life, does come to an end; when a man dies his brain ceases to think just as surely as his heart ceases to beat; so far as this stage of existence is concerned, his spiritual as well as his fleshly life has come to an end; and, if it has not come to an absolute end, it can only be by going through a process of revivification in another state, an altogether exceptional process, so far as our knowledge goes, and a process the reality of which will require to be proved by arguments of an exceptional nature and of the most potent cogency. What these arguments are, and how far the quality of objective validity may be predicated of them, we shall have occasion to examine by and by; in the meantime we are perfectly warranted in saying that, so far as his vital exhibition in the present visible stage is concerned, man in both parts of his nature, the moral and intellectual, no less than the physical and sensuous, lies as much under the law of the fourfold change—birth, growth, decay, and dissolution—as any other product or type of existence in the creation.

IV. The most general expression of the form of existence in the physical world is what we call Order; that is to say, the atoms, or smallest parts of which existing things are composed, are not

thrown together fortuitously or at random, but are arranged according to regular measure and exact number, with the most curious cunning and the most accomplished grace. By the action of this regular measure existing things in the physical world present themselves under certain fixed types or definite forms, such as crystals in the inorganic world, and the various distinctly differentiated genera and species of plants and animals; in all which not only *order*, as distinguished from *confusion*, appears everywhere as the condition of their existence, but order in the nicest subservience to co-operation, common purpose, and unity of character, what in æsthetical phrase we call *symmetry*, *proportion*, and *congruity*. The petals of a rose or of a daisy exhibit this nice order no less perfectly than the most mathematically measured sides and angles of a crystal; and the structure of the most simple forms of animal life is full of those references of one part to another, without which no part could act comfortably or effectively as part of a living whole: everywhere plan, purpose, and common action of plastic forces tending to a harmonious result; accidental coincidence and random strokes nowhere.

In the human world of reasoning and conscious purpose we find the same principle. The rudest savage cannot put together the poles and skins of his wigwam without a certain calculated measure; and the most imposing edifice ever raised by the intellect of an Angelo or a Palladius is merely this fundamental principle of calculated order

efflorescing with all the graces that are consistent with unity of character and congruity of type. The arrangement of the thousands and tens of thousands of an army in rank and file, in battalions and squadrons, is another familiar instance of the same kind; in fact, all intellectual action whatsoever is simply a creation of order, a subjection of the many to the one, the rational and necessary result of the action of that imperial unifying force which we call Mind. Always, in every field of reasoned action, the more the presence of regulating mind the greater the display of fair order; and always in proportion as mind ceases to act do weakness and vacillation, tending to confusion and dissolution, usurp the stage. In the moral world it is exactly the same, so much so indeed, that a disorderly life, in common language, is simply another name for a life more or less immoral. "Let all things be done decently and in order," says St. Paul; and no doubt he, as the prime mover in the most rousing gospel that ever stirred a torpid world, had very strong reasons for saying so; for in proportion as the moral world is more fervid and intense in its forces than the intellectual, the danger is greater that these forces, shaking themselves free from the restraints of regulative order, may rush into disorder, and waste themselves in the fever of an unreasoned dissipation. Every day we may see character ruined, misery entailed, murder rampant, and madhouses peopled by the domination of passion, that is, by want of order in the moral estate of this or that mistempered

individual; and in the social world, in the commonwealth, and in the church, what is the cause of those tremendous outbursts of popular wrath called *revolutions*, that ever and anon, or it may be only once in a thousand years, disturb the smooth action of their machinery? Simply this, that the harmonious and well-ordered relation of class to class, on which a healthy social habit depends, had been disturbed by the influential or governing classes acting on the disintegrating principle of *selfishness*, rather than the binding principle of love, and an overbalance of moral force on one side had thus been produced, and an abnormal condition of the body social created; a pressure which Nature, in her love of just balance and fair order, can no longer endure, and therefore throws it off violently in one of those volcanic eruptions of suppressed moral force which we call revolutions. All revolutions are exceptional phenomena, and always mean that the body social in which they occur is labouring under a dire disease, to which either a drastic remedy must forthwith be applied or the patient dies.

V. This phenomenon of notable social disturbance called Revolution leads to the remark, by way of corollary, that there are unquestionably in the physical world also disturbances of the most violent and revolutionary character, which bear a striking analogy to similar disturbances in the moral world, but which we are not entitled to subsume exactly under the same category, and that for the very

obvious reason, that the disturbances and revolutions of the moral world are of our own making, and confined to a limited sphere, of which we can take the measure, and may have the control, whereas the disturbances of wind and weather, of storm, tempest, and tornado, which we yearly witness in the change of the seasons, belong to a sphere of operations necessary, no doubt, to the harmonious action of the vital elements, but altogether outside our means of judgment. The violent subterranean forces, again, which produce those disturbances known under the name of volcanoes and earthquakes, may be necessary, either as preparatory stages for a future orderly state of existence, or as hasty riddances of some temporary incumbrance. Anyhow, like the revolutions in the social world, they are exceptional, and do not in the least degree disprove the great general principle of our analogies, that the constant form of all existence in the physical and moral world is ORDER, and that all sorts of disorder are either a penalty of violated order, or a passage from one stage of order to another, or from life into death.

VI. One very obvious law of productiveness, pervading both the physical and the moral world, is the law of the greatest possible multitude in the greatest possible variety. As in the space which the universe occupies, so in the materials with which that space is furnished, we everywhere encounter and we are everywhere overwhelmed by *Infinitude.* Our

smallness everywhere is embosomed in vastness, our narrowness in amplitude, our poverty in wealth. In the inorganic world the heaving waters and the towering hills everywhere are spread round about us on the largest scale; and the moment we pass from the material and mechanical to the vital and sensuous province of existing things, we find ourselves in the middle of a rush and throng, and luxuriant outpouring of all sorts of creatures, with curiously organised structures, which makes it plain that the Supreme Reason which informs and shapes forth the universe is a Spirit as inexhaustible in the fulness of productive energy as He is incalculable in the grandeur of His plan. A single glance at a swarm of flies or midges in a warm summer eve, or a shoal of herrings drifting round the shores, or troops of rabbits scampering through the woods, or, to take the vegetable world, armies of winged seeds, stored with new life, floating in all directions before the breeze, will suggest the idea that the plastic virtue of the Supreme Reason in the universe is as potent to squander life abroad as the whirlwind to gather the dust into clouds. Nor does the race of unfeathered bipeds form any exception to this tendency. No doubt man, like other animals of large size, is less productive of increase to his kind than the smaller animals, and specially those which have their home in the pliant element of water; but over him, too, the law of the greatest possible number visibly dominates, as the great increase of population in all well-conditioned countries, and sometimes in nowise

advantageous circumstances, notably shows. Had it been the intention of Nature to produce only a certain limited number of human beings to subdue the earth in certain limited spaces, the procreative instinct would have been made as tame, and as mild, and as easily reined, as it is now strong, and wild, and impatient of control; but, as things are, we see on all hands a redundant population and an irrepressible tendency to multiply in cases where multiplication is not particularly desirable. In the earliest ages of society polygamy was almost universally practised, favoured as it was not only by the rampancy of the procreative instinct, but by the demand for more men in thinly-populated countries; but it is still the normal relation of the sexes in many countries where no such demand exists; and even where monogamy has established salutary restraints on the vagrant concubinage of early times, we do not find that restraint operating in any due proportion to the curtailment of the demand. Let it be laid down, therefore, as a universal law in the physical world, that the greatest possible fertility shall prevail. And the variety which this multiplicative tendency necessarily induces appears in the souls and in the characters of men as much as in their bodies. Multitude, no doubt, might be without variety; under the same conditions, a thousand, or a million, separate existences might be launched into being, exactly of the same type; but not the greatest possible number, for this implies that every difference of conditions shall

be made to submit to the law of indefinite increase; and the utilising of new conditions will bring on the stage of being a number of modifications of the type that an absolute sameness of conditions would have excluded. Hence *variety* follows as a corollary to *multitude*; as, in fact, we see everywhere that the same seeds flung into a different soil, or stimulated by different airs, produce a correspondingly different growth in flower or tree. So with man. We have, in the first place, the broad triform distinction of the black man, the brown man, and the white man; but far more striking than this is the difference in feature and tissue, in temper, talent, and endowment, that marks off one man from another. I have only twice in my life met in the same family two persons—twins—so alike in all superficial respects that I lived days in the same house with them without being able to discriminate the one from the other; but to those who knew them intimately, and conversed with them from day to day familiarly, the points of distinction arising from mental endowment and character, with variation in feature and expression, were as obvious as their points of similitude were to me. A potter, in the simple mechanical process of working a mass of dead clay into a given shape, may lightly produce scores, and hundreds, and thousands of vessels, presenting to the general eye an absolute identity of form and feature; but in the complex process of vital creativeness it never appears that the law of heredity, which acts in the transmission of qualities from father to son,

can show its power in the production of any such absolute identity as is found every day in the simple forms of dead manufacture. And even supposing two sons born to the same father, absolutely undistinguishable in any form or function of the human being, the experience of life, and the adverse or favourable influences of which the experience is made up, would ultimately make them as strikingly different as a trim vessel newly launched is from an old cruiser battered and shattered in a hundred storms. Thus variety dominates everywhere in Nature; identity nowhere; or, if anywhere, only in the simplest forms, where there are few tendencies to combine and few influences to disturb.

VII. As a corollary to this cosmical law of the greatest possible number in the greatest possible variety, we may note that one origin at least of what is called *Evil* in the world stands out with great clearness and distinct emphasis. For, mark: if the greatest possible number of organised existences in the greatest possible variety is to be produced, this wealth of various being implies that not only a few, or a definite number of well-selected species, shall people the scene, but as many as possible of all kinds, high and low, great and small; —some that, as compared with others, shall appear defective, or at all events stinted in the amplitude and accentuation of their type; what the gardener, making up a special bouquet for a lady of quality, would reject as bad specimens of the flower. Now,

in the physical world, no person thinks of making serious objections to this state of matters. All grass is not expected to be the best grass, nor are all trees the best trees; but bad and good are taken as they come, more or less thankfully; with the feeling that scanty grass in waste places is better than no grass, and that even stunted pines or plane-trees, in the face of the east wind in Aberdeenshire or Caithness, afford a shelter to man and beast better than no shelter at all. But in the moral world, when stunted and starved specimens of humanity are presented, people raise a howl; and persons with a large stock of pity and piety are much exercised to understand why a wise and good Father of the human family should allow such a pack of sorry humanities to crowd the stage and mar the effect of the grand social drama. But this difference of sentiment, ruled by our principle of parallel phenomena in the physical and moral world, has manifestly no root in reason; on the contrary, the fundamental unity of plan manifested in the thousand and one correspondences of the system of things with which we have to do, should lead us to expect that whatever laws or principles play a large part in the one sphere of existence should proclaim their action no less distinctly in the other. And so it literally is; only we have a fellow-feeling for the stunted humanity, none for the stunted grass; and forthwith we set ourselves to invent cunning theories for the origin of evil in the moral world, while the physical world

remains unapproached. Our judgment here, in fact, is a mere matter of sentiment; the analogy, which stares us in the face, demands the same logic for both cases; and, if it be good in the one case to have scanty grass rather than no grass at all, it is equally good in the other case to have deficient or distorted specimens of humanity rather than no men at all. In both cases the evil exists as a necessary consequence of the law of the greatest variety of the greatest possible number; if the most favourable conditions for the production of the most excellent types cannot always be found, inferior types must come to light, and are, in fact, in a large view of the case, a good, not an evil; just as a single penny in a poor man's pocket, though it falls under the category of the evil which is called poverty, not of the good called wealth, is better than an empty pocket. This is the view that I take of the so-called street Arabs, young thieves, neophyte burglars, and all the trooping class of stunted and distorted types of humanity which makes itself so prominent in this age of large towns, and in whose behalf associations of benevolent persons in this Christian country have done and are doing so much. By all means let everything be done for them that can be done; but, when the most is done that can be done by people's palaces, East-end apostleships, and otherwise, let it ever be borne in mind that in the best gardens, with the best gardeners, weeds will grow; and that these ragged urchins, brought up in all sorts of filth, and in a

training sometimes to all sorts of knavery, are yet organised creatures, partaking of the miraculous gift of vitality, and happier, not seldom, to judge by their looks, amid all their squalor, than not a few screwed faces and loveless lips that may be seen in the dainty procession of titled Amazons in the Row, or in shining saloons and gilded receptions at Piccadilly or Mayfair. If a wasp may sting habitually, and a flea bite, without giving any just ground for atheistic speculation, why should not an idle boy sometimes steal?

VIII. Another plain sequence from the doctrine of the greatest diversity of the greatest number is that rivalry, and competition, and strife, in various forms, and most strikingly in its sternest form WAR, will from time to time arise, and, as human beings are constituted, cannot be easily avoided. The reason is plain. Variety in its perfect manifestation implies contrariety; contrariety implies antagonism; antagonism leads to collision; and collision means war. Of course, if there were always present a presidency of cool reason and impartial judgment to decide between contending claims, and to moderate adverse tendencies, the collision of opposing moral forces called war would be avoided; but where the plan of Providence has evidently been to people the world with the greatest possible number of more or less imperfect creatures, all asserting themselves in different directions, and all under the spur of motive forces not very subject

to control, it is plain that the explosive materials thus amply provided will reveal their suppressed force ever and anon emphatically. In the physical world the war of elements is a trite phrase, and a phrase meaning a fact over which no sane man feels himself called on gravely to moralise. We have thunder-storms, and whirlwinds, and tornadoes, and cyclones, and blizzards, and all sorts of hostile elemental freaks and furiosities, necessary, no doubt, for the right balance and adjustment of that most fluid feeder of life called air, and the right distribution of the most motive and most subtle of all invisible virtues called electricity; but be their whence and whither known to us or not, they are there; and we prepare against their destructive outbreaks as best we may, but never dream of banishing them from out the range of our sublunary sphere of action. But with the war of human beings it is otherwise; here, as in the previous case, our human feeling steps in, and invents a pious philosophy to square, not with the largeness of the cosmic plan, but with the smallness of our personal likings. Christianity is the most peaceful of religions, and tends undoubtedly both to the diminution of wars and to the amelioration of their procedure; but even our Saviour said emphatically, on a certain occasion, "I come not to send peace, but a sword;" and St. Paul, as the most prominent apostle of the gospel of peace, says only, "*If it be possible,* live peaceably with all men;" for he well knew that sometimes it is not possible; and in

such cases, unless a man will be content to drag through life as a coward and a slave, leaving a free field open to robbery, violence, and oppression of every kind, he must make up his mind to stand up and fight. Nor is there the slightest reason to think that there is anything monstrous or outside the range of a well-ordered world in this occasional necessity of hostile collision. Once start from the postulate that a contrariety of claims for a common object arises necessarily out of the wealth of various vitality in the world, and you see plainly that the severe struggles undergone for the assertion of these claims tend powerfully, on the one hand, to increase the estimation of the desired object in the mind of the claimant, and on the other to strengthen his character. A bloody battle is no doubt a powerful agency to stir the imagination and to move the feelings of the tender-hearted; and in persons so moved the elegiac utterances of poetic sensibility or evangelical protest will be natural; but with all this, a patriotic war, and the bloody battle in which it culminates, remain, as all history teaches, the soil where patriotism fixes its deepest roots, and the stage where manhood performs its most manly achievements. The Greeks had good reason to call courage, the special virtue of the soldier, by a name (*ἀνδρεία*) which signifies manhood; for not only is a cowardly man in popular estimation justly held as no man at all, like a bull without horns, or a bird without wings, or a fish without fins; but besides courage there is no highest virtue of which

human nature is capable that does not find its proper field in the course of a strong struggle for the right of free self-assertion.[1] A patriotic war is in fact the making of a people, as Bannockburn and Drumclog in Scotland, and Lützen, and Leipzig, and Gravelotte in recent German history, attest. Habits of co-operation for a common social purpose, loyal obedience to a supreme authority, willing self-sacrifice for the general good, courage to face cheerfully the greatest danger, and persistency to persevere in a path sown with difficulty, not to mention the kindly care of the sick, and chivalrous mercy to the foe,—all these most virtuous of the virtues grow out of the bloody soil of war, which my excellent but one-sided friends the Quakers systematically denounce as pure barbarity and butchery. So true is it that, as in mathematical measurements, so in moral estimations, it is impossible to lose in one direction without gaining in another; if your perfect circle is stinted in one of its diameters, you have in some respects a more beautiful figure, and an otherwise impossible figure, an ellipse; your perfect square in the same way becomes a parallelogram, a figure which both Greek and Gothic architecture have agreed to prefer; and so your perfect peace becomes more finely developed, and more nicely appreciated, by a war. Every-

[1] Barbour, in his *Bruce*, very naturally hits on this principle, that as people never know the value of freedom till they suffer thraldom, so generally in all cases

> "contrar thingis ever mar
> Discoweryngis of the tothir are."—I. 240.

where in the world a great gain finds some great danger growing up from the same root, and a great loss is never without considerable compensation, which a wise eye will quickly perceive and a wise hand use. As in the mercantile world, so in the world at large we cannot get a good article without paying a good price for it. In war we pay for the independence of the many by the devotion of the few.

IX. These remarks on War lead naturally to the consideration of Death, of which death in the field of battle is only a variety. Death is popularly pictured as the king of terrors; and of all deaths, death in the field of battle is supposed to be the most terrible. But here, as in so many other cases, Imagination plays a treacherous part, and witches reason out of her seat of judgment. The spectacle of a green field soaked in blood and strewn with gashed corpses on the morning after a great battle is one of the most appalling that mortal eye can look on. But what then? Between the intensity of the impression on the senses and the logical conclusion often jumped at therefrom there is always a great gap. Granted that a field strewn thickly with mangled dead men and horses is the most horrible of sights, it is not therefore true that death on the field of battle is the most terrible of deaths. On the contrary, it is often the most happy and the least painful. Less painful, because it comes not in the shape of long protracted disease and recurrent

agonies, but is done often at a single stroke, with a slight addition, it may be, of convulsions and gaspings, soon over; even joyful sometimes, and triumphant, when the fallen hero hears the shout of victory with his closing ears, giving him the full assurance that the life which he surrendered with a momentary pang will purchase a lasting happiness to those dear ones, without whose assured wellbeing life would have been to him an insupportable burden. Death in itself, when it comes once for all with a blow, is in fact the very smallest of evils. It is not death but dying that is painful. Therefore a brave man will not pray, as in the English Liturgy, against sudden death, but he will rather pray for it; as Suetonius, I remember, tells us, that in the night before his assassination the noble Julius was supping with Mark Antony and Lepidus, and, an argument arising among the three on the question what sort of death is the most desirable, the founder of the great world-wide empire gave in the shortest possible phrase his judgment, "*quae citissima*"—the quickest death is always the best. And here we may note an immense advantage which the unreasoning animals, which we kill for our aliment or our sport, have over our reasoning selves; for the grouse which we bring to the ground with a single ball from our gun has sported about the moors in full enjoyment of life for weeks and months, but feels the sting of death only for a minute or two; and in the same way the troop of flies that have been weaving their dance joyously in the long summer eve, when taken

suddenly aback by a thunder-plump, are swept into a black pool, and die in a moment without a pang. Nor is the general suddenness of the stroke of death, when it levels them, their only advantage. As they know nothing of the pleasures, so under the beneficent compensations of Nature they know not the pains of imagination, content to take death quietly when it comes, and not poison the enjoyment of to-day with fretful anticipations of the evil that may come to-morrow. In fact, it is an ill-regulated imagination rather than any sting of actual pain that is the cause of more than half the sorrows into which foolish mortals industriously lash themselves. Ghosts will always be seen in churchyards, when people are inclined to see them, and when they will walk in such places at the hours when they ought to be asleep. But with all the philosophy and all the piety that we can muster to subtract from its terrors, death, or rather dying, is often a very painful business, though more painful in most cases to those who witness it and are left behind than to him who departs. The drawing of the black curtain over the face of a dearly beloved one, not for an hour and a day, but for a lifetime, and it may be for ever, is indeed a sorrow for which to a heart strongly possessed by a noble affection there is no perfect cure. Death in this view is certainly an evil, a great evil, and to some delicately strung souls perhaps the greatest, and in this life, when curable, curable not without the memory of a pang. What shall we say then to this great evil? In a perfect system of

things, framed by an omnipotent Architect, could it have been avoided? Is a world without death the typical or ideal world? or is death here present as a necessary part of the best possible world? The answer to this question will depend altogether on the point of view from which the inquirer starts. If, as mortal men are fond to do, he makes himself and his own pleasurable sensations the centre of his theology, the answer will unhesitatingly be in the negative. Death is not and cannot be accounted a good thing in any world, certainly not in the best possible world. But by those who have trained themselves to look on the cessation or suspension of existence in any class of creatures, or in all creatures, as a point of transition in a great scheme for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the affirmative answer will be given with no wavering assurance. For consider only this: If all the millions, or rather billions of millions, of living creatures that have peopled the globe since its beginning, or even since the records of credible history, had continued upon earth to the present moment, in full vigour of life and activity, where would there have been room for those shoals of happy living creatures that now play the merry game of life on a stage which has been left clear by the sweep of death carrying away all previous generations? It is plain that, if the Divine Power is to disport itself gloriously in the continual growth and blossom and fruitage of the greatest possible number of individual lives, the immortality of the

race on the same stage, at least after all disposable room has been filled up, becomes impossible. As in a public banqueting-room which holds only a certain number, when one set of guests has been satisfied, they must make room for other partakers in the general bounty, so one generation must pass away, that another may enjoy the scene and play its part in the drama. Nor is it only the want of room on the stage that necessitates this exit of the old generation of actors and the entrance of the new. With all modesty we may say it would be impossible, even for Omnipotence, to make the world as full of charm and delight to eyes long familiar with the scene, as to the strange visitant and the young admirer of so noble a spectacle. Novelty, which is neither a measure nor a cause of beauty, will ever exercise a magical power in rousing to the perception and quickening the enjoyment of beautiful objects; and therefore, of all the wonders in this wonderful world, rejuvenescence, or the constant shooting forth of new lives to taste with an appetite of fresh surprise the never-dying beauty of things, is the most wonderful. Death in this view, therefore, as the departure of the old to make way for the coming of the new actors on the mundane stage, is a necessary condition of the best possible world. Whether it might not have been made to take place in a more easy and agreeable manner, and with less painful disruption of curiously compacted members, is a question which, from my point of view as a poor peeping biped, and from my ignorance of the forces that drive the machinery of the Universe,

I do not feel myself entitled to ask, much less to attempt to answer.

X. The next great leading analogy between the physical and the moral world we find in the principle stamped with the name of Aristotle, viz., that the healthy state of any living thing or cosmic type is always a mean between excess and defect; in other words, all extremes are wrong; and the just balance of contraries is the norm of perfect existence. In the physical world, the truth of this presiding law meets us at every turn. Life, whether vegetable or animal, means warmth; without warmth there is no fluidity, and without fluidity there is no life. Let there be a deficiency of heat, and all the fluid forces, which mean life, are stiff and ossified; but, on the other hand, let heat become rampant, and feverish fretfulness, tending to inflammation, explosion, and dissipation of all regulated energy, is the result. Look at the weather. What do we mean by fine weather? Not tornadoes, certainly, which lift us from our legs; or sultry airs, which stretch us languidly on our back; but a fresh breeze, which is neither very cool nor very hot, neither too strong nor too soft—a well-tempered mixture of contraries, which taken singly, the one by too much, the other by too little, are deleterious and destructive. In the minutest action between the atoms which form compound bodies, this principle is as universal as in the greatest array of forces that sweeps the vastness of the globe. No man can

breathe pure oxygen, the active principle of the vital air, and live; and equally in its passive element called nitrogen, all creatures would die; but the mean between the positive and the negative principles, the marriage of the two floating contraries, is air, the element of all healthy vitality. In the moral world, without the help of Aristotle, sermons are daily preached to us with the most startling emphasis from the same text. There is not a book of popular wisdom in any language which is not spread over with practical illustrations of the motto of the Greek sage—*μέτρον ἄριστον*—moderation is best. But of all rules by which human conduct is measured and tested, there is none which it is more difficult to practise; and the difficulty arises generally more from the excess of the force employed than from the defect. Not that the deficiency of certain virtues, say courage and self-esteem, is not common: but the negative character of those virtues when deficient renders them more manageable, and if not more elevating to the individual, certainly less dangerous to the public. Persons with defective moral inspiration are content to do their work quietly in a quiet corner; but the moment the strong breeze of a noble passion swells a man's sails, the difficulty of control commences, and the danger of striking on some hidden reef is near. The great seductive power of excess in the moral world lies, as we hear it sometimes expressed, in the difficulty of believing that there can be too much of a good thing. Every drunkard or every

vinous headache might serve to refute this notion, at least to those who believe that a glass of wine is a good thing; but it is possible to be drunk with love and with religion, and with any good thing, as well as with wine; and in fact, too much of any virtue, whether exhibited in overflow of quantity, in over-intensity of quality, or extravagation in place, is always a vice, and sometimes a vice of a very gross kind, as the old adage has it, *corruptio optimi pessima*—the better the thing when well used, the worse when abused. Every virtue has its place in the commonwealth of the soul only alongside of another virtue, which may be its contrary, but which claims an equal right in the harmony of the spiritual life. And the assertion by any virtue, as of Justice, for instance, of a right to reign with exclusive sway in the soul, to the misprision of Mercy, is simply the invasion of one territory by the lord of another, an illegitimate irruption by which the peace of the community is violently disturbed. But so far are people generally from realising this notion of the relative rights of antagonistic virtues, that, like weak mothers, they pet their favourite virtue habitually, and spoil it into a vice: and this vice becomes a noticeable trait in their public presentment, just as a big nose or a bulging lip intrudes upon the fair proportions of the face; and in this way your free-mouthed man will be always talking, when maybe his public utterance is to fling pearls before swine, or to wound the sensibility of a friend; while, on the other hand, your reticent man will

not utter a syllable, when to be dumb is to betray a great public cause, and silence virtually amounts to a lie. How long will people be of learning, in the adjustment of their moral tendencies, to emulate the craft of the accomplished pianist, who strikes a note equally firm with the finger of his left and of his right hand?

So much for individual character. In the great movements of society, and in the relations of class to class in the difficult art of government, the operation of the same principle is universally noticeable. The wielders of power, who ought to regulate the movements of the social machinery, and be on the watch, like the factory girls, for the snapping of a thread or the loosening of a peg, sit quietly in their chairs, and do nothing, till the time comes when the machine will no longer work smoothly, and grating noises of all kinds are heard, which disturb the slumbers of the citizens; and now, suddenly, they leap to action, but either act in the wrong way, from haste or ignorance or prejudice; or the action is taken altogether out of their hands, and the business of adjusting the forces that move the social machine falls into the hands of men who blunder as egregiously in their imperious lust of doing everything as the other party in their easy habit of doing nothing. And thus fretful discontent springs up in the community, which will fester into sores; the severing power of hatred will prevail where love has failed to bind; seditions, mutinies, evil conspiracies and rebellions, will

break out like long-suppressed diseases, or long silent volcanoes, and play their tempestuous game till the rulers of the world shall have learned that the safety of society consists in the preservation of the just balance between the authority of the governors and the freedom of the governed, a balance which can be maintained only where love between class and class is the inspiring force, and intelligence the watchful guide of the community.

XI. Curious observers of the detailed processes or vital conditions of animal and vegetable life on the globe, as well as of the action of variously complicated forces in the inorganic world, might easily point out not a few other lines of analogy between the lowest and the highest manifestations of the Divine creativeness. I am content to have indicated a few leading traits of the fundamental variety which pervades every field of energy in the rich diversity of the universe. What concerns me now, in conclusion, is to inquire whether there may not be in the moral nature of man, over and above its manifest affinities with the machinery and vitality of the physical system of things, a something *sui generis* that lifts him so high above all other known existences, that his life in its most perfect state shows us only a platform or stage on which he is privileged to enact his part, as the first act, so to speak, of the great drama of his existence. That the catholic consciousness of human beings in all ages has been in favour of this view of an impassable gap

between man and all inferior existences seems pretty plain; and ethical philosophers and Christian evangelists have stamped the general instinct of men in this matter with their authority, when they draw a line of broad distinction between all sorts of physical evil, for which no man is blamed, and moral evil, which means guilt. On the other hand, in the most recent times, a tendency has been shown to cut down these lofty claims of the proud creature called man, and to point out to him, in a graduated scale, the various links of his connection with the lower and the lowest forms of animal life on the globe. He is no more to be regarded as a peculiar, specially endowed being, created in the image of God, according to the Mosaic theology, but he is to rejoice in the brotherhood of the monkey, the cousinship of the ascidian, and the fatherhood of a protoplastic germ, of which nobody knows whence or what or how; but there it is. According to this view of things, the relation of man to the life that lies below him is not the relation of a house to its foundation, necessary indeed to the piling up of a house, though in no sense a part of it, but the relation of the fruit of an apple-tree to the blossom of an apple-tree, of the blossom to the bud, of the bud to the leaves, of the leaves to the stem, of the stem to the root, and of the root to the seed. It is all natural and necessary growth or development in a straight line out of something which we do not know, but to which we give a Greek name. Now it must be confessed that the advocates of the animal

and not the Divine kinship of man have certain presumptions in their favour which must not be overlooked. The first presumption springs out of the very natural conceit with which every creature is fond to magnify itself, and assert a superiority over all other creatures, on the ground of its differential features. Thus the eagle despises the elephant, we may fancy, because it has no wings, and the elephant despises the eagle because it bears neither kings nor consuls on its back; and both despise the worm because it has neither legs nor wings, but only creeps. Judgments of this kind, proceeding from a self-complacent estimate of some point of real or imaginary superiority, are found wherever human beings congregate,—in a petty provincial village as much as in the select society of the Court end of a big metropolis; so much so, that, after the love of pleasure, the love of money, and the love of power have disappeared from the soul of the regenerate recipient of gospel truth, self-importance, in some shape or other, still remains as a field in which the enemy of all noble motives can practise his wiles without disturbance. Then, again, there is the presumption arising from the indubitable and well-marked animalism of our human nature, not only in our vital machinery, in our vital needs, and in our familiar daily enjoyments—a good dinner, for instance,—but in our passions, and in our employments, and in our amusements. If cats prowl after birds, do not men lay snares for fish? If hounds run after hares, do not gentlemen run after deer? And if dogs bark

and bite at strange faces and strange aspects, do not men, and not only savages, but politicians and priests and other highly planted human respectabilities, do the same? Certainly we can lightly discover many familiar points of kinship with the lower animals; and it is in the highest degree salutary to look down with a sort of fellow-feeling on every form of inferior existence, as Burns did on the daisy and on the field-mouse. God is the Father of the smallest things in the world as well as the greatest; and there is as much beauty and curious skill displayed in the wing of a small insect as in the arm of the most cunning-fingered man. But what then? The points of likeness do not destroy the points of difference. A daisy, with all its kinship to the palm-tree, remains a daisy, and a mouse, however well deserving of the rhythmical sympathy of a ploughman-poet, remains a mouse and not a man. Let us therefore fix our eye on the difference, and consider whether there may not be, after all this breadth of talk about development of a man from a monkey, and a monkey from a moth, some good ground for the distinction, so strongly emphasised in the old Hebrew book, that God made man in His own image, but not in like wise the monkey or the moth. The fundamental unity of conception in the structure of a moth, a monkey, and a man, is of the same nature as the conception of a house in the mind of a great builder, which may be a palace to-day and a piggery or a hen-house to-morrow; but the likeness and the difference which these two

opposite types of architecture exhibit are equally derived from the constructive faculty of the builder —not from development the one out of the other, by lithic solution, or whatever phrase a would-be philosopher may choose to juggle with for the nonce. The animals and the trees do what they must do simply because they are altogether in the hand of God, just as the chronometer is in the hand of the watchmaker; but man does what he will do, and what he has purposed and determined and planned to do, by virtue of the distinctive attribute of his nature called moral freedom. People have denied and will deny this in theory, but their own practice daily confutes them. They know that they can purpose and plan, and, among a score of possibilities, choose that which gives the freest swing to their choice and the nicest adaptation to their purpose. Though the passion which inspired them to construct may justly be said to have come directly from the prime source of all action, as much as the beating of the heart or the flow of the blood, the process of construction they are conscious to have had in their own power; an act of freedom, as much as the advancing of the right foot or the left, when the purpose to move is taken. The dog, you say, has a religion, and man is his god. Granted; he has affection, a great virtue which not all men have; he has reverence, the root of all religion; but why does the root not grow? why does it not bear fruit? why has he no churches, no creeds, no curiously formulated liturgies, no theology, no priests, no

doctors of divinity? Again, a bird, you may say, is attracted by the beautiful plumage of another bird of a different sex, and forms a union with it after the fashion which we call marriage; but why is there no marriage ceremony, no marriage vows, no marriage consecration, no marriage laws? Why no songs and sonnets inspired by and bearing the impress of the beautiful plumage? and why, finally, no æsthetical dissertations and theories of taste on Utilitarian, or Hegelian, or other principles? Why, again, do birds build nests, most skilfully as everybody knows, and yet they have neither Greek, nor Gothic, nor Byzantine schools of architecture, neither a Phidias nor a Palladius in their bowers? And why do horses, and bulls, and rams, and wild dogs, and all other strong animals, not combine to drive from their haunts that feeble creature who has so unjustly fettered their freedom and abused their subserviency? Simply because, as on a lower platform of being, the special divine-human faculty freely to purpose and independently to plan, has been denied them; because, in the exercise of his special faculty, man is akin to God, not to the monkey; because, as we said, they do what they must do, not what they will to do; and they have, in fact, no more knowledge of what they are doing than the silk ribbons on a Coventry loom have of the changes of the intertwining of the threads which weave the pretty pattern on their face. They work, but do not know what they are working; they do unconscious of the what, whence, and

whither of their doing; they have neither knowing nor consciousness, strictly so called, in the range of their vital energies. Not a few shifts, and what we would call cunning devices, no doubt, they have, but all in a very narrow and well-marked range of vital activity. What they do they do reasonably, that is, in accordance with and by impulse from the Divine Reason that shapes forth the universe, and manifests itself as cunningly in the nest of a bird, and in the fidelity of a dog, as in the wheeling of a planet or the rhythmical pulsation of an inspired human heart; but not at all *by* reason, by the direct action of a reasoning function within themselves. No education, however skilfully conducted, no centuries of natural or unnatural selection, could ever bring a dog to know that $2+2$ are 4, and not $=5$. To him a formulated proposition has no meaning, any more than sound has to a man born deaf. If the brutes had λόγος in its inward sense of *Reason*, they would assuredly have the same λόγος in its outward form of language or reasonable discourse. For the whole universe being only an array of Divine forces, manifested in an array of correspondent Divine forms, in whatever types of being, the outward form does not appear, it is a legitimate inference that there the inward force does not exist. *De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio* is a maxim as true in philosophy as it is in law.

We see therefore that the old Hebrew kinship of man with God rather than with the monkey, notwithstanding the fashionable animalism of certain

minute scientists of the hour, still retains its hereditary and well-earned supremacy. We may say certainly that over and above, or alongside of, the admitted relationship between Man and the general physical and vital forces of the cosmos, there exists a direct kinship of a peculiar kind between the soul of Man and the soul of the Universe—a kinship which consists in the free play of intellectual constructiveness, exercised on a large scale, with supreme dominion, by the great underived Spirit whom we call God, and on a small scale with subservient fidelity by His creature Man. Subservient fidelity, but, observe, always with free choice,—from the conscious conception of the Deity, not from the unconscious impulsion of Nature. The chief end or τέλος of Man, therefore, is to be a god in his own small world; and to manifest this godship by shaping into fair order whatever chaos he may find before him. He is, in fact, in all matters where he puts forth his energy, actually what the Roman Pope assumes to be in matters ecclesiastical, the vicegerent of God, and, as such, infallible when he is true to his best self, and to the terms of his delegated commission. Nevertheless man is and must be a great blunderer, a misfortune from which the lower animals are free; but they are free from blundering only because they are not free in any large sense at all; they are free to follow their impulses, but not to direct their course. A being of such limited capacity and of such complex constitution as man, dealing only with a small portion of a curiously interwoven system of things,

must always put forth his energies with great caution and foresight; and even with the greatest caution some element may have been overlooked which will nullify his nicest calculation and undermine his most ambitious architecture. But this possibility of failure in a delicate experiment only brings the greater glory to an achieved success, and serves, like an occasional disaster in a protracted campaign, to brace the nerve and to prove the capacity of a great commander. In the ethical world, what in the intellectual appears as blunder presents itself familiarly as sin and guilt; so that in virtue of these two things, blunder and guilt, both the fruit of his special gift of liberty or freedom of will, man, with all his lofty pretensions, becomes strangely contrasted with the brutes, and stands out not in the most favourable light sometimes as an exceptional creature. In this way our privilege may become our penalty, and our badge of distinction an avenue to our ruin; for we can no more divorce ourselves from the companionship of the lower elements of our nature than we can disown the higher. An anomalous and self-contradictory creature is thus produced —a compound, to use St. Paul's language, of flesh and spirit, warring the one against the other, like a restive steed against a steady rein; and with this double nature man must be content to toil and to struggle, to strive and to aspire what best he may; or else to give free swing to his animal impulses, and become a brute, or, by a just penalty of Nature, a something, as Mephistopheles says in *Faust*, "more

brutish than any brute can be." With this two-faced character, divorced from the mere animal, and yet far removed from the god, man finds himself in a world full of strange strivings, which have no correlative in the vital drama of the monkey or the moth; he cannot be content with calling sin a folly or a disease; he feels it is a guilt; and with this word the idea of accountability and responsibility comes to the front, and, with that in close sequence, the idea of penalty and punishment. Without these ideas no human society can exist; no schoolmaster could teach his boys, no sergeant drill his recruits. And, so far as law is concerned, and a formidable array of limitations on natural liberty, with penalties for transgression, the most marked features of contrast betwixt man and the brute meet us at every turn. But human laws can reach an offender only when his sin against moral rectitude displays itself tangibly and measurably as an encroachment on the rights of a brother. What of the hundred and one sins against the laws of a man's nobler nature which are either committed in secret, or do not present any point of assailable attack to the guardians of social order? Are these offences against the dignity of human nature, though not cognisable by statute law, punished by way of natural sequence in this life, or, if not here, perhaps in some after state of existence? This is a question which we may feel pretty sure never entered the brain of the most dexterous monkey or the most metaphysical moth; but it is a question which has been put in some

form or other by all associations of human beings, the most rudely savage as well as the most finely civilised, and it has received an answer which appeared more or less satisfactory in two ways. On the one hand, the Hebrews, whose psalms we sing in our devotions, lived in the strong assurance that all sin is punished in the present life, that the prosperity of the wicked is only for a day; that, though he flourish as a green bay-tree in the state of his iniquity, before the end of his career his sin will surely find him out; that we live, in fact, under a system of habitual Divine superintendence, which makes it as impossible for a sinner in the long-run to escape the mark of the avenger, as for a reptile to elude the hawk that has pounced upon its trail. And in this view there is a great amount of truth; as we see every day vicious indulgence leading lusty youth to premature decay, careless waste leading to pinching poverty, lies and forgeries of all kinds blown into smoke, and pretentious Babels of unsound speculation falling to the ground with a crash that makes a grim mockery of their pride. All this is very true; but what are we to say to the misery which these unregardful forgers of lies and pilers of heaven-scaling towers are ever and anon heaping on hundreds and thousands of innocently confiding souls? Are these innocents to receive no compensation, and these offenders to get off with any slight castigation to which the letter of the law may have left them exposed, or even to escape altogether unscorched by the slippery

machinery of human police? Nay, more; not only is it glaringly true that hundreds of good people continually suffer under the unpunished offences of the bad; not only do whole classes of worthless men go on through life in a continued career of prosperity, while thousands and tens of thousands groan through a miserable existence under the tramp of their tyrannous foot; but is it not true also that in certain conditions of the social body, the more virtuous a man is the more sure is he to be shunned and slandered and despised, nay, even imprisoned, for the strength of his truthfulness, and hanged or beheaded for his steadfastness to the right? Considerations of this kind, arising from historical facts that stare us everywhere in the face, have led thinking men to views on the moral government of the world very different from the simple loyalty that satisfied the demands of old Hebrew faith. The Egyptians, by the united voice of Greek and Hebrew witnesses, the wisest people of the oldest civilisation, gave a prominent place in their social code to the judgment of departed souls, before a formal inquest, after death, on the stage where their life-drama has been enacted,[1] and again, after the passage of the Stygian pool, before a solemn array of hawk-headed and jackal-headed gods in the judgment-hall of Osiris.[2] And this belief in immortality, and a moral retribution accompanying it, was indeed so rooted in the life of the Egyptians, that Herodotus says they were the

[1] Diodorus, i. 92. [2] Wilkinson's *Egypt*, iii. 468.

first people who formally taught the immortality of the soul, and along with that the Oriental doctrine of the Metempsychosis.[1] With the Greeks themselves this faith existed, but not in a very vivid or glorified shape, otherwise Homer never would have made his favourite hero Achilles, when Ulysses bespoke him in Hades, declare so emphatically that he would rather be a serf bound to the glebe of a small farmer than be king of all the myriads of shades that flit through the dim abodes of an unsubstantial Hades. The Romans, in their rude worship of Manes, Lares, and Penates, evidently acknowledged the separate existence of human souls after death; and Virgil, in the majestic pomp of his sixth book, much more worthy of so solemn a theme than the eleventh of Homer, brings in the Cretan Minos to perform the function of the Egyptian Osiris, and portion out the habitations of the dead, according to the measure of their nicely weighed characters:—

> "Quaesitor Minos urnam movet; ille silentum
> Conciliumque vocat vitasque et crimina discit."

These quotations may be sufficient to show the general expectation, growing out of the moral nature of man, that a reign of justice, imperfectly indicated here on earth, will be bodied forth in rounded reality in some future stage of existence. And there can be no doubt that not only Justice, but Pity, seems to cry out loudly for some such correction to the loose apportionment of good and evil to saints

[1] Herod. ii. 123.

and sinners under the sun. For not only does throned injustice lift its head loftily in high places, unsmitten by the avenging thunderbolt of Jove, but heavy woes on woes, and sharp pangs on pangs, are heaped on the most innocent heads, to a degree that would render life intolerable, were it not for the faith in a blissful future reserved for the patient endurers of an unequal martyrdom here. All this points to Christianity, and to the great Teacher who, in St. Paul's phrase, "brought life and immortality to light," and thereby set His seal on the highest aspirations which man in his most buoyant hour could indulge; while at the same time he administered the sweetest consolation that can approach him in his hour of deepest prostration, treating man altogether as an exceptional creature, and exempted from the common law of fleshly disruption by his proud kinship with a higher order of things beyond the grave. The regenerative power of this teaching has been proved by two thousand years of conquest, as significant in the history of the moral world as the sword of the Romans was in the political; and its adaptation to the wants of humanity in its best estate is so evident that only those can object to it who never looked its Author with unprejudiced eyes in the face, having had the misfortune to know Christianity only from the caricatures of it which churches and creeds so largely present, or who think that the evangelic story altogether is too marvellous to be credible, and too glorious to be true.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARTY.

THE Quakers, or the Friends, as they prefer to style themselves, are a most excellent people, personally loveable, and in their public capacity exercising a most beneficent influence on the moral tone of the community; but Quakerism, viewed not merely as a moral tendency, but as a philosophical principle, is weighed in the balance and found wanting. The most distinctive feature in its social attitude is a protest against war; but war has always been and always must be in the world, so long as it is possessed by swarms of creatures of different tendencies, interests, and capacities, and apt to be moved in critical moments more by the force of passions than by the balance of reasons. Our peaceful friends also seem to forget that there are other wars in the world than those which are waged by the sword and the cannon ball. There is the strife of parties and the fever of factions, there is the sting of the tongue and the poison of the pen, from which not all our churches and all our pulpits, during a Christian career of nearly two thousand years, nor all our philosophies from Plato to Hegel and Herbert Spencer, have been able to deliver us. We must fall back,

therefore, with all our peace societies and all our gospels of love, on the old philosophy of Empedocles, that not only *φιλία*, but *νεῖκος*, not only love, but strife, or, as modern scientists would prefer to phrase it, attraction and repulsion are fundamental principles of the moral, as they manifestly are of the physical, world.

> *Αλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,*
> *Ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νεικέος ἔχθει.*

And nowhere is this strife of adverse elements more visible than in the forms of political life of which the modern world makes its special boast; for the only form of government that history shows to have succeeded in avoiding the war of parties is absolute monarchy, which owes this success to making one man the master and the rest of the community slaves,—a social state of compulsory peace from which society in its advance to higher stages has never failed to redeem itself, and has done so always by asserting the right to individual freedom, and the right to govern by the balance of antagonistic parties, as the only possible expression of public action by a mixed multitude. Circumstances, indeed, can be conceived, and in fact present themselves here and there in historical record, under the action of which great masses of people, threatened by some immediate danger, have instinctively coalesced and massed themselves, for the nonce, into the firmness of an organic unity ; but, when no such danger presses, it is quite certain that the more

people are advanced in culture, and the more that a strong pulse of life beats through every vein of the body social, the more certainly will parties arise, the more intense will be their strife, and the more determined their antagonism. Not to quash parties, therefore, but to moderate them and to manage them, must be the object of all statesmanship worthy of the name; and, in order to understand correctly the problem which this moderating statesmanship has to solve, there can be no more useful exercise than to set before the eye in detailed array the different battalions, so to speak, of which the opposing armies of the great social war are composed; and this is what, in its main lines, I will attempt to sketch in the present paper under the name of the Philosophy of Party.

Now in the body social, as in the physical universe, we observe everywhere the action of two antagonistic forces, the one tending to stability and permanence, the other to mutability and transition. Strictly speaking, indeed, there is no absolute permanence—*πάντα ῥεῖ*, as Heraclitus has it, "all things flow"—and you can never pass through exactly the same river twice; but relatively there is a permanence, so long as the mutation which is slowly going on has not advanced so far as to undermine or to overthrow the accumulated growth of the past which makes up what we call the present. It is quite plain also that unity of character and attitude may often remain where absolute identity is not predi-

cable; as, for instance, the banks of a great river in their general line and sweep will remain banks, though in some places they may have been enlarged by accretion, and in others diminished by attrition. In the organism of our British constitution we find the principle of permanence incarnated in the persons familiarly called Tories, Conservatives, or Constitutionalists, while the adverse principle of change and movement is represented by Whigs, Liberals, and Radicals. We will start with a classification of the Tory or Conservative party, as in many views the most important, certainly the most necessary to the continued existence of any sound political body. For what is the object of any change, unless to produce something that shall remain? and the better the thing and the more effective the change the greater will be the permanence. It is a bad house that requires constant repairs, and no house at all that demands continual pulling down. We shall say therefore that, as a rule, the whole structure of society is conservative, and that every man who performs a part in the social machine is a Conservative ninety-nine times for once that he is an advocate of change. It is only when the machine gets out of gear and needs repair that the wise manager has to call in the man of change. Stability is the condition of all continuity of existence, and the maintenance of this stability is, and must be, a primary object with all statesmanship. Look at the French Revolution of 1789. Nobody imagines that portentous change was without good cause;

such social earthquakes and volcanoes, like those of the physical world, never come without good reason, and never without some great benefit, though the damage which they bring with them naturally affects us more, and every man of sense wishes to have done with them as soon as possible, and none but a maniac would revel in the idea of their perpetuity. Is it not plain, on a review of the history of the last hundred years, that France has suffered almost as much as she has gained from the good thing called the French Revolution? And why? simply because in her fever-fit of change she lost hold of all stability, and went reeling like a drunken man from one form of government to another, never at ease within herself, and ever with goads of fretful stimulation to her neighbours. Here is a lesson indeed, a lesson such as a drunk man may always give to a sober man, who may sometimes think that he has had enough of dull sobriety. No doubt, "standing still," as Browning says, is stupid, and stagnant water may breed malaria; but racing yourself into a fever is nothing better, and boiling water that keeps continually hissing and spitting in your eyes may be even more dangerous than falling into a ditch. Let it be true, as John Stuart Mill said, that the Conservatives are the stupid party in the State; we may say with equal truth that the bones are the stupid part of the body; but what could the heart do with all its pumpings, and the lungs with all their puffings, without the bones? Let Radicals therefore, and all hasty reformers, bear in mind that

the conservation of the past is as essential to the success of their movements as the creation of the future, and that, unless they stand on the firm stage of historical tradition, their high-blown schemes may collapse in a moment, and the grand social epos which they were to produce so sublimely end in a bloody tragedy or a ridiculous farce.

At the head of the Conservative party we naturally place the King, President, Archon, or whatever title the supreme magistrate may wear, and all wielding authority with or under him, in controlling the movements of the great State machine; and in cases where the real power of governing does not lie with a single person, but with a select body, as in the ancient Roman and mediæval Venetian oligarchy, there will always be a traditional policy, and inherited interests, rights, and privileges, which it will be the instinct and the habit of the favoured few to conserve and to perpetuate. In fact an aristocracy is always more conservative than a monarchy, for the very obvious reason, that it is more difficult to move a strongly massed body of persons from old habits and usages than to influence a single will. The position of a king, where he really can play the king, and understands how to use his counters, is indeed one of the greatest independence; and he may have it in his power, at some great turning-point of the national life, to make the most extensive reforms, which the people, for lack of combination, could not, and the aristocracy, for lack of will, would not attempt. Of

this game played by wise and energetic sovereigns all history is full, specially the history of Europe since the reform of religion downwards; for the power of the Church, both spiritual and secular, in those days, was so tremendous, that either the combined conservative forces of the sceptre and the crosier must prevail to crush all independent vitality in the people, or the king, seizing his opportunity, must seize the moment to intervene between the oppressor and the oppressed, and earn for himself the noble distinction of being the deliverer of the people, where he might have been content to be their master. Thus it came about that the Emperor Charles at Worms, though he was far from being a bold man, refused to enact the part of the perjured Sigismund at Constance, and sacrifice an honest inquirer after Divine truth to the sacred revenge of a club of priestly dogmatists; and under the same influence our bluff King Harry, a few years afterwards, with the assistance of a reasonable section of the clergy, took it upon him, not only to save the people of England from the autocracy of the Roman Pope, but, in the style of the old Hebrew theocracy in the days of King David, to carve a creed and shape a liturgy for his people; and in this way showed himself to astonished Europe as the most prominent and the most effective religious reformer of his time. Following his example, two centuries later, Joseph II., the Emperor of Austria, made himself notable by inaugurating certain sweeping Church reforms for which his people were not so

well prepared; nevertheless in the general case we must say that a king, whether he be a real king of men and a shepherd of his people, or, as Fulk, the Count of Anjou, said to King Louis of France, merely "a crowned ass," is by his position and his function naturally a conservative member of the body social. It is his business not to initiate changes, but, as public conservator, to protect all legally transmitted rights, and to keep the State machinery going as he found it. After the king, and, because more dependent, much more conservative are all his head clerks and officials,—the right hand and the left hand, so to speak, which, like an expert pianist, his brain uses, when keeping the State together, what we call the bureaucracy, or, more vulgarly, the red-tapists of the Civil Service. These men may be in a position to start new ideas, and to receive into intelligent nostrils the whiffs of change that come up from stormy quarters; but in general they are mere formalists, receptive of ideas only so far as they may be mechanically measured, the willing slaves of paper precedents and regulated prescription in all points, and above all things averse to what prophets call inspiration and reformers progress. And this, no doubt, is just as it should be. The State steam-engine must of course have steam; but it is not the business of the bureaucratists to make the steam, but to use it wisely when made, to regulate its speed, and to guard against over-pressure and collision. We do not expect watch-dogs to start game on the moor: their

duty is to stick to their station, rejoice in the dignity of their gilded collar, and to bark at the sight of a strange gentleman or a tramp.

The next class of men whom their profession has stamped with the distinct impress of Conservatism are Lawyers. Why? Lawyers are the interpreters of the law; and law has no meaning except this, that what was the rule of social right and wrong yesterday and the day before, shall be the rule to-morrow and the day after. To bring some sort of calculation into matters naturally uncertain, to impose some sort of check on the outbreaks of an unreined freedom; to substitute some intelligible rule for the vagueness of personal whim, and the licence of loose presumption: this is the very business of law, redeeming men from wild freedom by wise limitation; and this implies permanency. The lawyer, therefore, so far as his character is formed by his profession, is the declared enemy of change. The permanency of which he is the exponent is apt, in the exercise of his profession, and the long review of the past which it implies, to pass into the idea of perpetuity; and thus there is begotten in him a type of mind which places him in strong antagonism to the movement of the age to which he belongs. Neither in nature nor in society is there any such idea as perpetuity: circumstances change, and laws must change with them; but this your mere lawyer can in nowise be brought to see. He has only one eye, and that eye is in the back of his head; he looks continually behind; the present trembles

beneath his feet, if he does not hold firmly by the past; and to introduce change is, from his point of view, to bring back chaos. In fact, there is no more perfect type of a four-square Conservative, not even the Roman Pope with his infallibility, than the mere lawyer in full panoply. He has neither poetry nor philosophy to give a certain sentimental aroma to his stiff adherence to the past. Poetry, of course, he has none, any more than a tin box; and as for philosophy, in his habit of thinking the idea of natural right has altogether given place to conventional law; the soul from which all law originally started has become completely ossified in the form; and the great human question, whether a rule is reasonable, or just, or equitable, is dismissed with a simple reference to what is. The Statute-book is his Bible, and the decisions of the Courts of Law are his conscience in doubtful cases. Strange creature! There he sits in his seat of judgment, as serene as a bust of Buddha in an Oriental tope, with the statutable wisdom of centuries in his wig, and the words Progress and Reform buzzing all around him like flies on a summer day, all unconscious that in a single night of quick debate a single Act of Parliament may draw the brush across a thousand grave decisions, and turn the rare old furniture of his memory into a lumber-room of absurdities.

But lawyers, as is well known, are often Liberals in politics; and without some help from them no great change in social arrangements was ever success-

fully carried out. This requires a word of explanation. We have been talking of the mere lawyer; but not all lawyers are mere lawyers: the profession does not always usurp the man; some are large-minded, human-hearted men, and not a few, especially in moving times, are politicians. In all countries the maker of the laws, whoever he may be, cannot dispense with the advice and co-operation of the learned gentlemen whose business it is to interpret the laws when made; but in democratic countries, or countries where the people, assembled in representative councils, have much to say in the making of the laws, it is plain that the lawyer, to maintain his natural influence as adviser of the legislator, must aspire to a place in the Legislative Council, that is, become a Member of Parliament, and take an active part in all the political movements of the hour. As such, of course, he will be a man with men, and a citizen with citizens; and there can be no doubt that the active participation which he is thus compelled to take in the political movements of the day is of equal advantage to the public and to himself: to himself, because, though his professional style may have unfitted him for achieving the highest excellence as a parliamentary speaker and popular orator, the contact with the general public, and the necessity of feeling the pulse of the people, which a political life implies, will go a great way to foster those finer humanities which the formalism of his profession is so apt to starve; to the public, because the fellowship of a cool and

clear-headed jurisconsult is their best preservative from those rash innovations, crude changes, and ill-considered remedies, in which an excited multitude of men is so apt to indulge. The people know what they want; but only the practised lawyer can guide them safely through the entanglements of the old, with which the pathway of the new is ever thickly beset.

Our next battalion of professional Conservatives, presenting everywhere in civilised society a firm front and well-massed ranks, are Churchmen, Priests, and Theologians. Perhaps, had we been curious to give precedence to the stronger, we should have commenced with them; for the religion of a people certainly strikes deeper roots than either politics or law, and is less given to change. A glance at the civil history of any notable State, say Athens, will show that during a long career of well-marked changes in the form of civil government, the religion of the people remained unchanged, at least remained without any formal remodelment or modification. From 1000 B.C. to 330 B.C. the form of government in Athens went through six distinct phases. The stages were from monarchy to archons for life, from these to decennial archons, from these to annual archons limited by aristocracy, from this to aristocracy limited by democracy, and thence to democracy pure and simple, the *ἐσχάτη δημοκρατία* of Aristotle, which naturally led to subjection under the Macedonian. But more than three hundred years after this total loss of their civil liberty, St. Paul on the hill

of Mars found the mass of the Athenians acknowledging a host of anthropomorphic gods with a faith as loose and as liberal as in the days of Homer, who lived in the time of Solomon, or not much later. This permanency of the religious, as contrasted with the mutability of the civil type of society in any people, is in every view quite right and natural. Why? Plainly because God is the One unchangeable in the shifting panorama of change which we call life; and the idea of God as the source and centre of vitality gives that unity to the highest thought and feeling which is an essential constituent of all coherent nationality. Religion, indeed, as the key-stone of the moral arch, must be delicately touched, and never tampered with, till a new key-stone has been wisely insinuated into its place. We shall therefore expect to find in all the records of great social movements that the priesthood and the Churchmen rank with the Conservative party, and that not only in virtue of the permanence of the fundamental idea of religion in the popular mind, but because in all well-conditioned countries the clergy hold a high position in society, and besides this, to use a mercantile phrase, are often well paid. Their interests, both spiritual and secular, are bound up with the existing state of things; and so not only in the Gospel history, but everywhere, the priests and the Churchmen will be found making common cause with the lawyers against any new prophet who presumes to prophesy as the spirit moves him, without any regard to traditional ortho-

doxy or inherited ceremonial. The only exception to this will be when, as in Ireland, the great mass of a people have had their religion ignored and even insulted by a dominant race, who had the strength to conquer without the wisdom to fuse; in this case the conservatism which is natural to an honoured priesthood will tilt over into liberalism, and the religion which might have been the most efficient coadjutor of the State becomes a nursery of sedition and a focus of rebellion; or again, as in Scotland, where the people have got into a habit of splitting into a number of small sects, and spending their unreasonable zeal in magnifying the importance of secondary points, and raising a foolish whim or a vulgar prejudice into the dignity of a divinely stamped dogma. In this case, the Church, deprived of its coherence, will cease to act with unity of effect as a political force; and the separate sections into which it is split will fling themselves violently into the political movements of the hour, lending their influence, which never can be small, to whatever advocates of change may be most forward to gratify their pride, to soothe their jealousy, and it may be also to replenish their pockets.

Two special points may be worthy of notice in reference to conservatism in churches. The churches of the old world, the Egyptian, the Greek, and the Roman, did not put forth their faith in the shape of curiously formulated creeds; their faith floated loosely in the ballads of the secular minstrels and in the hymns of the religious service; they were

free from the difficulty which meets the modern religious thinker so often, of harmonising their reason or their science with the reverential acknowledgment of a Divine government in the world. Many things unworthy of the gods might have been said in their traditions by the people, and sung by the bards, but they were not written down with the fixed aspect of an Act of Parliament or the decision of an œcumenical council. With us it is otherwise. There they stand in formidable array, thirty-nine articles, or it may be three hundred and nine, all as stiff as a row of bayonets when soldiers stand in square, or a row of pikes on an orchard-wall to deter idle young Shakespeares or Cromwells from the adventurous theft to which clever boys are so much inclined: immoveable, impregnable, in the estimation of those who made them doubtless infallible; for infallibility, though not always formally asserted, is always secretly implied in all Churches. "The Pope cannot err," as some one said; "the Presbyter never does err." But this stiffness of the written dogma cannot change the nature of things. Though the fundamental truths of religion, like the sunlight, are always the same, the opinions of men on supersensible subjects, especially when put into a scholastic shape, not only change, but seem to challenge contradiction. What then is to be done when all sorts of inquiring minds put all sorts of questions to the Church, calling loudly for an answer; and the very atmosphere which men breathe in their daily talk and reading is tainted with heresy and fretted with

contradiction? Is not the hour come for a great liberal movement for a reform of creeds, and the overthrow of a conservatism which consecrates absurdity, and forces many a God-fearing man, however unwilling, to declare war against the catechism which he sucked in with his mother's milk? Is it consistent with common honesty that doctrines should be professed and preached on a Sunday that are practically denied by every man of common sense on Monday and the other five days of the week? What is the use of articles in a creed standing with fixed faces in the same place long after the soul which looked through them has made another face for itself, and begun to look in a quite different direction? Nothing more natural than that such questions should be put; but nothing at the same time more certain than that confessions of faith, when once publicly formulated for a whole people, cannot be formally repealed at the call of any reasonable objection that may be made to them by ingenious or hyper-conscientious individuals. It is with creeds as with houses: they may have many faults, but this is no reason for raising a hue and cry against them, and pulling them down. A formal disclaimer of a received creed would set the minds of hundreds and thousands of good pious people altogether adrift; and even the very persons who came forward to make the disclaimer would not be able to agree about what and how much of the old falls to be disclaimed, and what and how much of the new is to take its place. The only course, therefore, to

adopt, with regard to antiquated articles of a national creed, is to let infallibility drop and common sense prevail. Let the necessary reform in the public creed work rather in the quiet way of admitting fresh air than in the form of rough assault and of battering down walls ; and let the reverence due to the great Source of all creeds and the condescension due to the weaker brother teach every member of a Church to avoid doubtful disputations on matters which pass the power of all human wit to decide, or, if they could be decided, are not worth the price of foolish and of fretful words that may have been paid for the settlement.

The other point which may be stated as a corollary to the general doctrine of Church conservatism is that democracy is a much safer form of government in the Church than in the State ; and this for the very obvious reason, that, as already instanced in the case of ancient Athens, people are much more inclined to kick against State forms and regulations for the conduct of civil affairs, than against the rooted inheritance of a creed. Every people is as willing to see its creed perpetual as its priesthood is to assert itself infallible. No better example of this could be found than the Church of Scotland, which has clung to its Calvinistic creed now for more than three hundred years, with as great tenacity as devout worshippers in Naples or Tyrol or Tipperary do the infallibilities of the Pope. But this conservative force of a Presbyterian democracy displays itself only within the strictly religious province. Out-

side of this, the divisive force inherent in all democracy will not be slow to make itself felt. Hence the variety of distinct little Churches in Presbyterian Scotland, all without any theological questioning of the Confession of Faith, but all with well-pronounced points of collision, petty enough sometimes, between the civil authority and the Church. Thus the democratic spirit inherent in Presbytery, and which no doubt originally lay in Christianity itself, chained into impotency before the awful authority of the creeds, finds an outlet for its strong instinct of self-assertion in quarrelling with the State about matters more political and financial than religious. So hard is it to maintain the unity and cohesion so essential to a stable social organism among a mixed multitude of persons, of whom every individual is forward to assert an equality which nature denies and experience condemns.

We have now to pass under review a battalion of professional Conservatives in all well-ordered States very closely allied to the Church,—the educational body: Schoolmasters, Professors, and Public Instructors of all kinds. The closeness of the alliance is obvious, especially in modern times, when all forms of religion aspire not only to elevate the emotions and to entertain the fancy, but to instruct the intellect, to form the character, and to guide the life. To the kindly co-operation of these two kindred classes, extending now in a line of continuous action for more than three hundred years, Scotland owes the superiority of her popular culture, so willingly conceded

to her by her less fortunate sister. The element of conservatism which academical square caps and mitred or gowned clergy have in common, lies in the traditions of the past, which it is the business of both classes to hand down to the future through the manipulation of the present. A public teacher may be a very original fellow, but it is not his business, as the educator of youth, to be continually sporting new ideas, however ingenious, and riding, however grandly, his own hobbies. He has his grammar, his dictionaries, and his compends, which control his action and dominate his sphere pretty much in the same way that the Statute-book and the Decisions control the lawyer; and, like the lawyer, unless he takes special care to enlarge his sympathies beyond his professional routine, he will be apt to become the slave of his own tools, and mistake a bookish indoctrination for a living converse with nature and fact as the true meaning of the educative function. He will begin also to swear by his book as Churchmen do by their creed, and nourish secretly that notion of infallibility which never fails to lay hold of those who put a dead book or a formula of any kind betwixt themselves and the pulsing reality of things in them and around them. The temptation to infallibility is perhaps in one direction stronger in them than in Churchmen; it is not only the book by which they swear, but the persons to whom they apply it, that make it specially difficult for them to say, what ought to be the most human of all words, *Peccavi.*

The crude young creatures whom it is his business to knead into shape look up to him with much more profound respect than a practising attorney does to the decisions of the wisest judge. The attorney knows that the wisest judge may err, but the schoolboy assumes that his teacher cannot err; and the habitual deference paid to his utterances slides easily into the conviction that he actually possesses the oracular virtue with which he is credited. It is an easy thing to be a giant amongst dwarfs; a certain magisterial self-importance is thus generated in the public teacher; and it is not merely himself, but the institution of which he is a part, that makes him proud of his position and jealous of his rights; like Gamaliel, it is his pride to sit in the Sanhedrim, and look with dignified sympathy on the congregation of unlearned mortals whose function it is to follow the prescript of the law which his interpretation sanctions. There is no greater enemy to that equality which is the shibboleth of Liberalism than the dignity of office and the consciousness of authority. If new ideas that stir the hour and revolutionise the age proceed sometimes from Universities, it is not from the teachers generally, but from the taught.

The next class of persons who, from their professional habits and function in society, have the most right to stand forth as models of Conservatism are Soldiers. How could it be otherwise? The men who devote their lives, and offer themselves to death at the word of command, for the purpose of

maintaining the existing order of society, can have no point of contact with the apostles of change and a new order of things, which often cannot be introduced without a considerable amount of danger to the maintainers of things as they are. The military man is the arm of the body social, as the statesman is the brain and the popular orator the tongue. As the arm, his only function is to strike; and though battles, as every campaign teaches, are often gained by legs as well as by arms, neither arms nor legs are consulted when the voice of a nation and the sentence of a statesman have decided that war must be made and battles fought. The most useful minister of the powers that be has nothing to do with the policy which the powers may dictate. Where his service is most wanted his opinion is never asked. Why then should he trouble himself about an opinion which can neither give him a good cause to fight for, or save him from spending his life-blood in defence of a bad? His business is to fight well, whether the cause be good or bad; and the only two words which he knows in the exercise of his function are not counsel and debate, but obedience and command. Trained to this absolute abnegation of self in the exercise of public duty, he is the last person in the world to have any fellow-feeling with that self-assertive class of persons who disturb the peace of society by exaggerating the evils of existing institutions, and magnifying the virtues of their favourite panacea. For all their schemes of reform and agitation of the popular

mind in the direction of change the soldier cares no more than the banks of a river do for the roar and the splash of a swelling flood in autumn. They stand the natural conservators of the enclosures of the lea, and will stand till the rush be over, and the stream learn to acknowledge the justice of its customary limitations.

We pass now to a very notable phalanx of Conservatives, forming not so much a profession as a class, and yet by nature, interest, and social position banded together in tendency and attitude with as marked an expression as if they were trained members of a common profession; I mean Landed Proprietors. The mere possession and use of land in a country carries with it an element of permanency, that creates an interest in the established order of things which does not attach to such loose social activities as, say, the monetary speculations of the merchant, or the literary speculations of the political writer, the novelist, or the historian. The proprietor of the soil is like the tree which grows out of the soil, which, after a certain stage, cannot be transplanted; if it is to be transferred, it must be cut down and sold as timber, and ceases to be a tree. Besides the love of his native country, which is as natural to a social animal as the love of the child is to the mother who gave it suck, the tie to landed property implies the love of the special part of it which the proprietor calls his own, and which in many cases is not his own merely by birth and parentage,

but by a long chain of ancestral traditions and family recollections. The pride of pedigree and the parade of titles, which in the so-called society world is only a vanity, becomes a virtue and the mother of virtues when it has a root in national history, and looks back with reverential regard to a long line of ancestors, who never blotted their scutcheon by an ignoble deed, and always made their presence felt, in their corner of the vineyard, as the guardians of local interests and the guides of the local population. There is, indeed, no more binding force in the complex organism of society than the landed gentry, when they reside on their properties, and perform with loving fidelity those duties which naturally fall to them as the heads of the local life; while, on the other hand, when they neglect those duties, there is no class of men at once more worthless in their personal character, and more pernicious in their social action. The absentee proprietor, who knows nothing of his people but the rents which he gathers by a strange and not rarely a harsh hand, instead of being among the most powerful of conservative agencies in the land, becomes the breeder of discontent and the nurse of sedition. Here, as in all other cases, it is the moral element that determines the social influence. The conservative force of the landed proprietor is lost, the moment he is felt to breathe an atmosphere of family vanity, personal aggrandisement, and isolated enjoyment.

But it is not only the great landed proprietor

whose position in the social scale makes him naturally a Conservative. The small proprietor, as Aristotle long ago remarked, is perhaps even more so. In the recurrent routine which the faithful tendance of his tiny acres necessitates, steadiness and sobriety and a certain fruitful sameness are the marked features of his social attitude. Living apart from the fret, the fume, and the fever that is bred in the excitement of town life, he is not given to meddle with political changes so long as they do not interfere with the course of the seasons, or the market prices of his seasonal products; and, if he is not an independent holder of land, but only a tenant of some large holder, the conservatism of his temper will be increased by the dependency of his position, and the natural tendency to go along with his superiors, so long as they show any desire to make common cause with him.

The Plutocracy, or holders of high-piled and well-stored bullion, have of course no part in that local root and habitation which tends so strongly to nurse Conservatism in holders of land; they have, nevertheless, an obvious leaning to the conservative side of political warfare, arising, in the first place, simply from this, that when a man has much to lose from unadvised changes, he has also much to fear; and again, because the possession of wealth naturally leads to the acquisition of land, a share in all the social respect that falls to the landed class, and a sympathy with the tone and sentiment by which that class is characterised. The new pro-

prietor, no doubt, is not always frankly received into the select circle of those who inherit old entailed acres, and display heraldry in their halls curiously interwoven with old Norman and Norse devices; but he knows that he is not a shopkeeper, that he is somebody, and feels decidedly a change in the social atmosphere which he breathes; he may be an M.P., and, if he serves his party well, he may die a baronet. Though he has no old dignities to conserve, he feels, perhaps, so much the more pride in nursing the new ones.

So much for professional and class Conservatism; and nine-tenths of men, we may safely say, are influenced in their political attitude to no inconsiderable degree by the professions which they practise and the class to which they belong. But the narrowing and specialising force of these professions and classes will always find a powerful counteraction in the character and temper of the individual, which stamp a man from his birth as belonging to the one party or the other; so that, on the one hand, a strong democratic nature may assert itself emphatically in the midst of an aristocratic class; as we see liberal priests, reforming lawyers, and original characters of all kinds, starting up on all platforms, to the wonder and disturbance of the class to which they belong; while, on the other hand, a mind naturally aristocratic, partly from noble sympathy, partly from the force of current events, may find itself some morning perched at the very top of a movement essentially liberal and

democratic. With regard to all these strong assertions of individual character on the stage of class and party, we may say that they are no less beneficial to the community than honourable to the individuals in whom they are manifested. A Savonarola in a Florentine pulpit, a Luther in the cell of a Saxon monk, or a Washington as first President of a great Transatlantic republic, is one of the most salutary forces that can appear in the first beginnings or critical periods of progressive society. All men of a very orderly, regular, compact, and well-balanced habit of mind are naturally conservative; and such was Washington, with an aristocratic descent, which marked him out from his cradle as a Conservative, and yet he became, as we all know, the most prominent agent in the establishment of the great liberal confederation called the United States. How was this? Simply because, though naturally the furthest removed from any taint of the democrat or the agitator in his blood, his natural instinct of justice revolted so strongly against the lordly insolence of the British Government in the matter of taxation without representation, that he flung defiance in the face of the constituted authorities, and drew the sword of liberty, preferring rather to die, if need be, as a rebel than to live a slave. And thus one of the greatest men in political history, though born the conservator of an ancient monarchy, became the assertor of a new democracy; much to the advantage of the latter: for there is in all democratic movements a

substratum of licence and violence, which requires to be kept in check by the moderation, coolness, and love of fair-play which are the natural virtues of an uncorrupted aristocracy.

It was his sense of justice, we have said, that made the steady, sober-minded, and prudent Virginian planter start suddenly into the ranks of a democratic rebellion. Without this fine sense of justice, his mere love of order in all things, separated from his exquisite moral temperament, would have left him a Tory, and a Tory of the lowest type—one who would rather brook habitual stagnation and weakness along with order, than health and strength at the cost of a little disturbance of his comforts. In great moral natures, like Washington and Wesley, the love of the *τὸ πρέπον*, or the respectably proper, becomes the best guardian of rashly acquired liberties; in small natures it produces a substitution of conventional proprieties and artificial legalities for natural rights and unbribed manhood; it has its proper field in drawing-rooms and saloons, in all places where show sits in the seat of substance. In nature as a shaping force, it is nowhere; in philosophy ridiculous; and in policy disastrous.

There is another class of minds closely allied to the lovers of order and system, but by no means the same, which in their normal state are conservative in their attitude, viz., minds of comprehensive sweep and large survey, and that either in the practical world, in which case they make statesmen, or in the speculative world, in which case they take

their place as philosophers. These are men who see not one side of things intensely—the habitual aspect of Reformers, but all round, who admit generally that changes are necessary and expedient, but cannot come forward as the enthusiastic advocates or armed apostles of any great change. Such persons will never be violent Tories, but as little will they be violent Liberals. They know, and have nicely considered, that every social force in one direction is sure to encounter not only an equally authorised force in an opposite direction, but is liable to be crossed and traversed in various ways by lateral forces that must be taken into account if the steam-carriage of Reform is not to entangle itself in an uncleared line, or spur itself into some perilous explosion. Washington, whom we have just named, was one of this type; he always saw far ahead, and knew as well how to make a wise retreat as a daring advance. Call them, if you please, men of compromise and half-measures; they know what they are about, and as mediators between extreme parties make the best statesmen, when great changes are necessary and great agreement difficult. In quiet times, when moderate changes are reasonably inaugurated, these men, like the late Lord Palmerston, will be moderate Liberals; but in times of revolution are sure to be classed with Conservatives, treated as traitors and apostates by the extreme men of the movement party, and perhaps, as happened to the Girondists in France, lose their heads on the scaffold, for no better reason

than because they had too much brains. So little does a wild horse know that it is only a cool rider that can save him from the consequences of his own impetuosity.

When the capacity of taking large views and looking all round is combined with a warm and catholic sympathy, a vivid imagination, and a love of rhythmical utterance, we have poets of the highest class, such as Goethe, Wordsworth, Southey, Coleridge. Men of this type may, no doubt, in the first upheavings of impassioned idealism in their youth, have planted themselves before the world as Liberals, or Radicals of an extreme and transcendental sort. Hence the pantisocracy, or socialistic idealism, in which the youthful authors of *Thalaba* and *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* indulged; but these high-horsed imaginations about a sinless commonwealth, to be founded somewhere in some far island of the Pacific, or in the upper regions near the moon, were only the effervescence of a crude, youthful ferment, destined at no period to work itself into the clear wine of a ripe and mellow judgment. With regard to Wordsworth, our philosophical poet *par excellence*, unless perhaps Browning may challenge a successful comparison with him as a great thinker in verse, one sees in his *Excursion* what a severe exercise of soul he must have gone through, in the troubled atmosphere of French liberty, equality, and fraternity, before he sat down to spin into shape his interpretation of what these much-used, and much-

abused, words might mean in the language of the gods. The Liberal ferment that worked in the depths of Goethe's mind in the early stages of his literary career is sufficiently evident in his *Sorrows of Werther*, a work which, in the year 1774, sent an electric tremor through the then languid and low-toned Europe, not easy for us in these days of resuscitated popular life to realise; but the great German poet-thinker was, like his great English compeers, essentially a Conservative or Tory in his whole political attitude, as well as in the tone and tenor of his poetry. This Conservatism in him arose from the presidency of practical reason over the emotional elements of his soul, and his habit of seeking for the Beautiful, as the nutriment of his spiritual nature, more in the fair balance of all existing forces, than in the hot-spurred intensity of any single force. Speaking of poets, we must bear in mind also that a loyal reverence for the past is no less natural to their specific sphere of spiritual utterance than an impassioned sympathy with the present; nay, rather, the past offers them a field more prepared for the harmonious action of the imagination than the present, inasmuch as the atmosphere of the hour is apt to contain elements which will not fit into the ideal framework of the poet's picture, and interfere uncomfortably with the free action of his fancy. That want of reverence for the past, which is so prominent, and not seldom so offensive a feature in the mind of the Liberal politician, can have no place in a great class of the most richly

endowed poetical minds, in whom, from Homer to Walter Scott, a decided preference of the hereditary aristocracy to the democratic agitator is distinctly shown. Of Scott nothing need be said; a reverential respect and a loyal sympathy with the aristocracy of the Borders was as much a part of his blood and bone as Ettrick shaws and Yarrow braes and sweet St. Mary's silver loch were of the earliest and most dear-loved scenes of his imaginings. As for Homer, the pitiful figure made by Thersites in the council of the people, when he opens his irreverent mouth to speak evil of sceptred dignities, is a sufficient proof of what modern Liberals would call the Toryism of the great father of epic poetry.

But of the intimate connection which exists between the loyal reverence so natural to the poetic mind and political Conservatism, we have the most striking example nearer home in the Jacobite ballads. In spite of the persistent pig-headedness of the Stuarts on the English throne—so great as to have turned the best friends of the last of the line into his declared enemies,—the reverential feeling of loyalty to the head of the great State family was so strong as to create a revolt of a considerable section of his Scottish subjects, for the purpose of restoring the descendants of the old race of kings to rights which they had forfeited; and in this attempted restoration, not the least notable factor was the poetry which it inspired, and in which its record is embalmed. The *Ça ira*, the Marseillaise, and other revolutionary chants of the French Revolution,

show, and will ever show, a very poor front in the pages of political song compared with our Jacobite ballads. In these compositions the reverence so natural to the poetical mind entered into an alliance with the past, so unreasonable and miscalculated that it could not but issue in a bloody war with the present, and a baleful contention for the future; nevertheless, such are the deep roots of reverence in the human soul, that a policy disowned by reason, and condemned by results, still finds a kindly acceptance in the hearts of a sober-minded people, from the moral grandeur and the human tenderness of the songs in which it is memorised.

Very different from these high-souled, strong-thewed, and chivalrous apostles of a hopeless political conservatism, though having a cognate root in the region of unreasonable sentiment, are a class of persons, not uncommonly found in the religious world, in whom no element of strength or moral grandeur is found, persons, we mean, of a naturally feeble character, of a soft, pulpy consistency, without bone and without grasp, who naturally lean on authority. The sentiment of these people in the religious world must be nourished by the continual sipping of mild streams of shallow devotionalism, on the one hand, and a parade of shows and symbols on the other. They may be found, of course, in all countries; but in England we know them specially as High Churchmen, weak-minded persons who, not having courage to look God Almighty and the Lord Jesus Christ directly in the face, cling to

priests and middlemen of all sorts, as lame persons do to their crutches. Between these people and the Romanists there is a close connection—in fact, looking behind the scenes, a substantial identity, both resting ultimately on a divinely stamped sacerdotal authority; but with this notable difference, that, while Romanism grows in a lusty fashion out of the insolence which hereditary usurpation begets, Anglican ceremonialism springs purely from mental weakness; for which reason Kingsley very happily gave it the designation of "Popery for weak-kneed Christians." Born in a Protestant country, a great misfortune for such persons, and not having courage enough to put on formally the scarlet lady's gown, or top their head with her triple tiara, they borrow a pair of gilded crutches from Rome, with which they limp along in the rear of the Papal train on procession days, not without a certain dignity, a dignity considerably raised in vulgar estimation by the fact that persons of high rank—duchesses and others, when they happen to be a little more devout than ordinary—are sometimes numbered amongst their most devoted adherents.

Among the Conservatives of sentiment women occupy a prominent place, and that in two ways: first in an impassioned and lyrical style, as in the part which they played in the Jacobite rising of 1745, when they rode through the High Street of Edinburgh with tartan scarfs and swords and cockades, while the sober old Presbyterian gentleman sat at home singing dolefully to himself, in the words

of the old song—

> "The women are a' gane wud,
> O that he had bidden awa'!
> He 's turned their heads, the lad,
> And ruin will bring on us a'."

This was simply the conservatism of loyalty spurring itself into a beautiful madness, as in the ancient world, women, who are naturally more excitable than men, are represented playing a prominent part in the train of Dionysus, under the name of Maenads, or mad persons, as, indeed, generally we may say that, when women are bad they are very bad, and when mad they are very mad. But in the common current of human affairs the reverential sentiment in women takes a quiet form; and their respect for authority, combined with the habit of decent and orderly routine in a limited sphere, which their domestic function implies, leads them to shrink from the hard struggles, disturbing squabbles, perilous explosions, and fatal collisions that belong to great social changes. Of course the part taken by the fair sex in the war of political parties may be determined, in not a few cases, either by natural temperament or by the contagion of the marital influence; but in general it will be found true that women are less given to violent political partisanship than men; and that in their more retired position they may often have the advantage of a more impartial judgment, and by their kindly clinging to the past, and to the sweetness of their present surroundings, may not seldom apply the rein with great

effect, where the hot energy of the other sex is spurring some pet liberalism of the hour into a fatal excess.

The classes of Conservatives which we have just been passing under review will be sufficient to convince the most cool-blooded persons that the passions and the imagination have in not a few great acts of the social drama as much to do with political parties as with poetry and the arts. But there are unquestionably several classes of persons of no mean influence in society who have neither strong passions, high ideas, nor vivid imaginings—persons whom we could as lightly conceive of as flying to the moon as spinning a verse of poetry or taking a part in a Jacobite rebellion. These persons always see clearly what is before their nose, and know to strike the nail on the special point, and with the special force that the moment requires; but they do not exercise their eyes on the floating forms of the future, nor read the signs of the times, before the indicated change stands in full growth before them. The sagacity and shrewdness which is their distinctive virtue is occupied mainly with the present, and, when it does meddle with the future it is rather in the negative style, to deter from a rash venture, than in the positive vein, to point the path that leads to a noble achievement. These men never do a foolish thing; but the wisdom which saves them from blundering is more allied to the prudence which avoids risk than to the courage which encounters danger. Constitutionally devoid of enthusiasm, and

counting zeal for madness, they will ever be cool administrators and safe guides; the Gamaliels of the State or the Church over which they preside, they may refrain from persecuting the Christians, but they will not turn to follow Christ. They are the regulators, not the propellers, of the social machine. They will keep it in good working order, so long as it is working, but, when the steam or the water-power fails, their vocation is gone. The hour for a new creation has come. God has taken the business of the time into His own hands; and a Paul, a Luther, or a Cromwell is sent forthwith to make a bonfire of the ordinances with which a short-sighted phalanx of formalists had weened to smother the inspiration and strangle the independence of a people.

Among the persons who are Conservatives from defect of emotional inspiration, men of science, mathematicians, naturalists, chemists, and all persons familiar only with the processes of exact cognition, deserve mention as a distinct class; of course only so far as they are mere scientists, and taking a distinct stamp from the specialty of their function. To some of these men, indeed, immersed in the minute specialties of their favourite study, the whole moral world with its motions and commotions may remain a stranger; they can acknowledge only the knowable, the measurable, the tangible, and so refuse to have anything to do with those higher influences which come into the moral world, as the great Teacher says, no man knows whence or whither. But even when your scientist has an interest in moral matters,

outside of his special communings with the interior machinery of antediluvian crocodiles, toads, tadpoles, and such like, the exactness to which the daily exercises of his faculties has trained him may lead him to look with aversion on those far-reaching schemes of social reform which are often crude in their conception and always vague in their realisation. Thus the scientific man becomes a conservative, not because he hates change, but because the changes which social reformers propose defy equally his method to calculate and his instruments to measure.

Two classes yet remain—one rather a numerous class, but not at all noble. If man is not such a wicked creature, such a fountain of all sinfulness, as Calvinistic preachers delight to paint him, he is certainly rather a lazy creature, and fond of his ease; and for one man that is spurred forward by a restless activity, and a love of strange adventure, ninety-nine men will be found who delight to sit in their chair, and to work quietly when they must work, with as little risk and as little disturbance of familiar movements as may be. Now men of this type are naturally conservative; above all things, they hate to be shaken out of their habitual groove, and be forced to think and arrange about new possibilities; in fact, thinking is not in their line; they constitute not only a large, but what John Stuart Mill called the stupid party in the State. All change implies doubt and discussion, disturbance and trouble, struggle and danger, and with these things no wise man will have anything to do. Though the pillars

of the State be shaken, and the Church reels from its foundations, they will not disquiet their souls so long as their easy chair and their comfortable fireside remain. Though the whole world should march forth to battle, "boots and spurs and a'," they will go in their slippers, and make no more hurry than the dun ox in the village when it comes home in the gloaming weary with the day's work, and an old shepherd with a grey plaid limping after it. These Philistine Conservatives, as the German students call them, with an appellation not particularly appropriate, are well described by Goethe in Act II. Scene 1 of *Faust*, and with this we may let them pass :

> "'Upon a Sunday or a holiday,
> No better talk I know than war and warlike rumours.
> When in Turkey far away,
> The nations fight out their ill humours,
> We sit i' the window, sip our glass at ease,
> And see how down the stream the gay ships gently glide ;
> Then wend us safely home at even-tide,
> Blessing our stars we live in times of peace.'
>
> 'Yes, neighbour, there you speak right wisely ;
> Ev'n so do I opine precisely.
> They may split their skulls, they may,
> And turn the world upside down,
> So long as we in our good town
> Keep jogging in the good old way.'"

The last but not the least effective battalion in the Conservative line of battle is formed by the class of Old Men. Old men are conservative for several reasons. First, because old age brings wisdom. A man who has lived through two-thirds of a century,

and seen half a dozen splendid schemes for the remodelment of society end in smoke, is not apt to follow your volatile juveniles in the chase after any new bubble, however brilliant. You ascend your light balloon, to take high tea with the gods, but the benign old gentleman sits at his fireside smoking his pipe, smiling at you, and not at all desirous to have wings. He is a man and sits upon his seat, and his seat stands on the solid earth. He sits on his chair, not, like the class just touched on, because he is lazy, but because he is wise, and does not wish to break his neck. And because his arms and legs are not so strong as they were thirty years ago, but his brain much stronger, his experience larger, and his judgment clearer, the healthy instinct of society assigns him his proper place in the social organism, forming a *γερουσία*, senatus, or council of the old men—men above sixty—to advise the young men how to act. But age not only brings wisdom, it brings quiet, gentleness, and a certain love of repose. Therefore your old senator will not counsel unnecessary wars, or instigate a people to enter hastily into prolonged struggles, of which the issue may be doubtful, and in which the gain, even when realised, is more than compensated by the loss that accompanies the strife. He will be, both in virtue of his wisdom and in respect of his quietude, a conservative in State policy; and, if in playing this part he may sometimes appear to be performing the function of a mere drag on the coach, he may console himself with the thought that it is better for a coach to have a

drag, though put on sometimes on a level road, than to have no drag at all. At the same time, we must bear in mind that old age sometimes brings with it timidity and lack of nerve; in this case the conservatism of the old senator might bring ruin to the State; but the course of human affairs is generally too full of propulsive power to allow either very old men or very old women to exercise any dangerous influence in the way of standing still where motion is necessary, or shrinking when the hour comes for advance. On the whole, one may safely say, more harm has been done in the world by young men spurning the wisdom of the old, than by old men cooling the courage of the young. Read 1 Kings xii.

The above presents a very formidable array; but this is just as it should be. Society, as we started by saying, is composed mainly of conservative forces; without these the cosmos would leap back into chaos, and all harmony resolve into a harsh interminable jar. A Liberal party is then only safe when it holds within its ranks a preponderance of the Conservative element—so long, that is, as it remains what we are accustomed to call Moderate Liberalism. Pure Liberalism, like strong spirits unmixed with water, stimulates only to destroy.

We shall now attempt a similar classification of the motive party in the state,—the Liberals. Looking at Liberalism, in the first place, historically, we find that no society, unless we dignify nomadism and gypsyism with that name, starts from the democratic

idea of self-government by independently associated individuals, but always in the early stages of national life some kind of authority is found to prevail, in the person of a chief or ruler whose will is absolute law, acknowledged by absolute obedience on the part of the other members of the community. The difficulty of making crude masses agree on principles of common action presents itself as a sufficient reason for this submission of naturally equal individuals to the authority of one man, or one knot of men; and the absolute obedience which the father demands from his children in the social monad called the family, supplies the precedent on which monarchical government may base its claim to being a natural institution. Anyhow we find that in Greece and Italy, as in modern Europe generally, the form of government, whether aristocratic or democratic in its later development, grew out of some sort of kingship; and even amongst the Hebrews, who retained the tribal or clan system to a late period, the election of judges from time to time, as occasion seemed to demand, proved how necessary the monarchical form of government is to a people for any large purpose of common action. In the East this absolutism of authority in a single individual has remained from the earliest times, and only ceased to exist in India by the altogether anomalous and unique intrusion of a great trading company from the West. And not only in the earliest stages of the great classical nations, but in their ripest outcome and consummated fruitage, a recurrence to the original monar-

chical type proved necessary for the preservation or expansion of their social organisation. Greece Hellenised the East not till she had received a Hellenised Macedonian upon her back; and Rome, to save herself from the war of factions, stood forth in her completed form as a military despotism, which in the western half of the Empire ruled with absolute sway for five hundred years, and in the eastern half for a thousand more. Here, then, lies before us ample proof that, as human nature is constituted, liberty and individual equality and self-government in the social organism is by no means a common phenomenon or an easy achievement. Long ages pass in a state of unconditional obedience to some acknowledged authority without the slightest attempt to control or to modify its action, by what we now call the Liberal party. In the whole history of the Byzantine Empire, to the irruption of the Turks in 1453, there was no Liberal party. In such absolute monarchies Court cabals and petty aristocratic jealousies may find a place, but nothing worthy the name of a Liberal party, or indeed of any party, as a permanent member of the social organisation. And it is impossible to say how long people might be content to live under a government with absolute sway, so long as the governors use their authority with moderation and discretion; for man is a creature naturally formed to obey, not to rebel, to bear the yoke, not to kick; his daily experience leads him to know that, unless there be somewhere a seat of supreme command, there will be no obedience;

and if there is no obedience there will be no order, and cosmos will resolve into chaos with an uncomfortable facility. Besides, as above remarked, man is a lazy animal, or, at least, an animal that, like a cow, loves recumbent ease. Government is a difficult and a troublesome business; and, as the honest people of Weimar said to the Grand Duke in 1826, when, in obedience to the cry of the age, he gave them a constitution, *Do we not pay you for doing the business of governing? why bother us?*

Nevertheless in the process of the ages, with new stages of social growth and new circumstances, the day is certain to arrive when the people, either individually or in certain representative classes, will claim to have a share in the business of governing; nor is this tendency in any way to be looked on as unnatural or monstrous; for, disguise it as we may, to live under an absolute master is to live in a state of absolute slavery, or, to use a milder phrase, of perpetual pupilage. Who then are the classes of the people, and by what influences stirred, to stand up to make this claim of emancipation from hereditary bondage, and reception into the ranks of a legitimate freedom? Of course, generally speaking, all persons who, being by the form of government excluded from the exercise of power, the privileges of office, or the comforts of salary, may happen at any time to be stirred with a strong desire to turn their present negative position in the social system into a positive one. Nor is it difficult to understand when and how this desire should happen to be stirred. Either the

excluded classes in the course of social growth have risen to a position and a prosperity which makes their continued dependence on a privileged few unnatural, and their exclusion from social office and dignity unjust; or the privileged classes, with the insolence which hereditary possession of power is so apt to breed, have offended the sensibilities of the rising class whom they ignored, and roused into consciousness the sting of the insect that otherwise might have slept; or both these motives may have worked together. The most notable example of this stage in the march of Liberalism is found in the history of republican Rome. In that State of essentially aristocratic composition, the priestly offices, the most dignified in the State, though not confined to any special caste, as in the East, were by law and custom in the possession of the patricians or men of noble descent; and in this exclusion, as in some sort a sacrosanct prescription, the plebeians for a long period acquiesced; but ever as the democratic element grew stronger they advanced from one inroad on the preserves of the aristocracy to another, till they acquired the courage to break down the wall of partition, and preside at the banquets of the gods with a sacerdotal pomp as august as if their fathers and grandfathers had been supreme pontiffs from the wolf of Romulus downwards.

The discontented classes who compose the Liberal party will in the general case, as in Rome, be the plebeians,—that is, the great mass of the untitled and undistinguished people. But in monarchies, where

the throne is belted round with a strong aristocracy, it may readily happen that the king, partly to make more room for himself, partly from a desire to do justice to the lower classes, oppressed by the dominant aristocracy, shall so touch the pride and move the indignation of the nobles that they will band themselves into a conspiracy to abolish both the king and the kingship at a stroke; and this they will the more readily do, if the monarch, in his pride of place, not only is a constant thorn in the flesh of the patricians, but may even make licentious inroads into the personal rights and family peace of the plebeians. In this way the aristocrat stands forward not only as the assertor of his own position in society, but as the friend and protector of the people. So Tarquin fell in Rome; so kings and despots and archons successively disappeared in Athens; so the double kingship in Sparta was a device of the aristocracy to limit the power of one king by the necessity of sharing it with another; so *Magna Charta*, or the great charter of English liberty, was extorted by the barons from the monarch, when the people, in the modern sense of the term, could hardly be said to exist; and in the same way, before the democratic changes of the present century, the old Liberals, called Whigs, were only one section of the aristocracy and the upper classes protesting against the narrow views and exclusive practices of that portion of the aristocracy who seemed willing to sacrifice the safety of the people and the dignity of the nation to the splendour of the Court and the

pretensions of the Crown. In this attitude they might justly be entitled to look upon themselves as the advocates of popular rights, and a certain extension of the popular suffrage; but of democracy, as a form of government, or of self-government in any form by the mass of the people, they had no conception. The time, however, was not far distant when they must walk out of their aristocratic circle with formal separation, and class themselves with Liberal reformers, advocating the right of the great mass of the people to participate in the responsible business of government. In their opposition to the narrow and more courtly circle of their own body, they had exposed to public odium the open sores and offences of that class, and at the same time flung out hints of sympathy with the rising popular class that could not be forgotten. The old Whig aristocrat thus became a modern Liberal; and a Duke's son might shake hands with a Birmingham manufacturer and call him brother.

This Birmingham manufacturer is a man that may fitly stand for a whole class of men, who are the natural heads and leaders of the Liberal party, the supplanters of ancient aristocratic exclusiveness in all countries; the great middle class, originally of no governmental significance, and rising into positions of social influence, not by any grace of king or law or priest, but purely by their own industry, energy, sagacity, and individual talent, by arts, trade, and commerce, by work of the most productive kind in a working world, wherein he who worketh not has

no right to abide. To suppose that such a class of men should spring up and plant themselves prominently in an intelligent community without any kindly recognition from the hereditary holders of power, is to suppose that men should cease to believe in themselves, and be content to be used as tools or counters by a favoured class the members of which are in nowise superior to themselves in intelligence, in energy, in social value, or in personal virtue. Therefore as soon as this class presents itself in full form and with well-massed front the aristocracy of the earlier ages is doomed. To prevent so great a shifting of the centre of power at such a stage of social advance is as impossible as to interdict a young man of one-and-twenty from acting for himself without waiting for the sanction of his father. In modern States, as in ancient Megara, a poet of aristocratic breeding, like Theognis, may complain melodiously of the decay of old family gentility, and the irruption of upstart vulgarity; but vulgarity will have its day, and a very brilliant day too not seldom, as the demos of Athens proved at Salamis, and the plebeians of republican Rome, when their lusty presence began to purify the blood which it was feared they would contaminate. Trade no doubt has its vulgarities; but aristocracy has its dissipations, its sensualities, its pretensions, its pride; and, when the Clio of the British fates, some centuries hence, will have to put her stamp on the roll of the most prominent personages who have contributed to the making of the most unique of all

social aggregates, the British empire, there can be little doubt that the cotton lords of Manchester, the traders of Liverpool, the shipbuilders of Glasgow, the makers of buttons and steam-engines in Birmingham, the spinners of jute in Dundee, and of tweeds in Galashiels, Selkirk, and Hawick, with the brewers of porter and ale in mighty London,—all these classes, and many more of scarcely less fruitful notoriety, will not fail to receive a mark from her impartial sentence as commendatory as any that will fall to the lot of the most illustrious Duke that ever derived his title from the licentious court of Charles II., the most high-blooded Marquis that ever played away his substance and his brains in gambling at Baden and Homburg, and the most noble deerstalker that ever banished a colony of poor crofters or a troop of inquisitive botanists from his glen on the braes of Badenoch or the slopes of Lochnagar. Good men and good citizens belong to no class; but the highest and the lowest class have the greatest temptations to be bad.

The old wall of partition between the aristocratic class and the captains of industry being thus broken down, it will be difficult to say at what limit the enfranchisement of the excluded classes shall stop. For is not industry made up of two factors, capital and labour? And, if the man who supplies the capital is to acquire political influence in virtue of the capital which opens a new field to labour, shall there be no social recognition to that labour, without which the capital must remain for ever as

unprofitable as the wool on the sheep's back without the shears of the shearer? Plainly therefore the labourer will claim political rights and social equality; and this not only because he is a labourer, and a co-producer of all the industrial products in which the country glories, but because his position in the industrial workshop makes him so dependent on the capitalist, that, unless the law, which does not always favour the weaker party, looks after his interest, the persons by the sweat of whose brow the wealth of the country has grown, may be deprived of their due share in the money value of the product, and be condemned to pine on starvation wages; while the comparatively idle capitalist sits softly at a richly furnished table, drinks Burgundy, and keeps company with peers and princes. It will be of no weight to argue with persons in this humour that irregularities of this description are as common all over nature as in manufacturing towns; the man who feels the shoe pinch will try to make it easier; and, if the absolute equality between the employers of labour and the labouring class cannot be achieved, at least the labourer is fully entitled to have a voice in the National Council, in order that his side of the question may be fairly stated, and some reasonable attempt made to adjust the profits of capital and the wages of labour, on conditions less disadvantageous to the hard-working man than have hitherto prevailed. Therefore the enfranchisement of the rich manufacturer will be followed by the enfranchisement of the poor man

whose labour makes the rich man possible. This, as a point of principle, must be granted; but in conceding the equitable claims of labour special care must be taken so to adjust the suffrage, that mere multitude shall not be allowed to overwhelm every other element in the array of political forces; and it must never be forgotten, that while, in the mere article of wages, capital and labour, in popular language, seem to stand as hostile interests, the one against the other, they are in fact fellow-labourers in a different fashion or fellow-partners with a different stake in the business. Capital, as every tyro in economical science knows, is only stored labour; and, if the labourer has a full right to withhold his labour unless a fair wage be guaranteed, the capitalist has an equal right to withhold his capital unless he is allowed to invest it in a field which promises a fair return for the expenditure. The labourer and the capitalist are, in fact, as necessary to one another as the driver who holds the reins and the horses who pull the traces in a vehicle —a relation in which, though the more elevated party appears to be only sitting on his seat and doing nothing, yet his guidance at critical moments may be more necessary for the happy issue of the journey than the speed of his four-footed coadjutors. So much for labour. But there is another claim of right which will not fail to be advanced, whenever the movement for individual liberty and social equality has penetrated down to the lowest stratum of the social aggregate: it is the right to live. Men

who either will not labour on the scant wage offered them, or who cannot get labour, will contend that they have at all events the right to live; that it is not their fault but their misfortune that they are not as well off as their neighbours in all the substantials of a comfortable existence; and being a numerous body, and well organised, after concussing the powers that be into the concession of universal suffrage, they will set themselves to introduce such fundamental changes in the constitution of society as shall level all existing superiorities, and especially with regard to the land, as the basis of social well-being, cause such a redistribution of it on large and liberal principles to be introduced, as that every member of society shall have as much of it as he can utilise by personal labour, and no person be allowed to possess anything more. Something like this extreme form of liberalism seems what socialism and communism are aiming at; a state of things hitherto unknown in history, but imagined by its propounders to be the one possible starting-point for the regeneration of society, and the one possible device for realising that grand ideal of democracy, as Bentham was fond to express it, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Of course our business here is not to discuss either the advisability or the practicability of such notions, put forth as they are with such noise and protestation in the extreme Liberal programme. We merely state them as the extreme end of the historical sequence which starts with government by the will

of the one, and ends with government by the consent and co-operation of the many. The three watchwords of the French Revolution—Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity—may be allowed to disport innocently among other phases of extreme Liberalism, so long as they do not attempt to assert themselves by the legalisation of robbery, the consecration of idleness, the curtailment of all enterprise, and the establishment of universal monotony.

Rights of labour and rights of capital are good; but there is something dearer to a high-souled manhood than either—rights of conscience. Of this the two great nations of classical antiquity, Greece and Rome, knew little; partly because polytheistic religions are naturally more tolerant than monotheistic ones, being by their very nature called on to give free play to local diversity in the conception of the Deity; partly because the expression of the State religion, in which every man was expected to take part, was mainly ceremonial and lyrical; and, not being laid down in an array of formal dogmas, did not directly challenge contradiction from thoughtful men. Therefore, among the Greeks and Romans, before Christianity appeared, which was regarded as a common enemy, we hear little of religious persecutions or of the individual conscience. The individual conscience was not interfered with so long as the sacred processions might move along the street without disturbance, and the hymns chanted on feast-days gave voice to sentiments with which every reverential and patriotic mind would readily

concur. But in modern times it has been otherwise. The State identified itself with a creed curiously formulated in dogmatic shape, stoutly protesting against the variety in the aspects of worship so dear to polytheism, and, what was more than all, manipulated by a priesthood believed to be the sole authorised expositors of divine truth, and feeling themselves called upon to put down all contrary doctrine as a moral poison and an intellectual lie. Hence the sacred right of persecution on the one side, and the human right of protest, with the cry for liberty of conscience, on the other—a liberty which, in the face of such a formidable conservatism of Church and State and public opinion banded together, could not be obtained till after long centuries of fretful struggle and bloody wars. But at last it was obtained. Monotheism and priestly infallibility were forced to accept toleration; and the Dissenters took their place as a distinct organism among the legally recognised corporations of the State. But their political significance did not end with their religious struggle. Their right to exist as separate bodies was no doubt fully recognised, but they were human, and could not but bear in their breasts a deeply-seated grudge against the parties who had made them pay so dearly for the natural right to be themselves; and besides, though they had obtained to the full that liberty of individual thinking in sacred matters for which they had so bravely fought, they were still denied that social dignity and pecuniary aid which their adver-

saries enjoyed in virtue of their alliance with the State. Their dissent from State doctrine thus, with a natural weakness of human nature, passed into a jealousy of State privileges. The minister became a politician and a reformer—a Liberal reformer too of the most forward class; for what other men look upon as mistake the religious Liberal condemns as a sin, and any violence of language and harshness of procedure may well be condoned, when the captains of the offensive warfare lead on their hosts in the name of God, and relegate the adverse party wholesale to the devil.

So much for those Liberals—by much the greater number I fancy—who act together from class motives, political, economical, or ecclesiastical; but here, as in the Conservative army, personal feelings, sentiments, and convictions will play their part independently of all special corporate interests. Of these sentiments there are three which play a prominent part among the moving forces of the Liberal party, whenever the majority of the inhabitants of a country have attained the stature of complete social manhood. These three dominant forces are the idea of progress, the sentiment of justice and benevolence, and the sentiment of liberty; sentiments which no doubt lie at the root of all the forms of Liberalism just enumerated, but which fall to be mentioned here separately as part of the universal equipment of humanity, and asserting themselves often more forcibly in the unhampered individual than in persons constrained by the bonds

of corporate association. The sentiment of progress arises from idealism wedded to energy; apart from energy, idealism would have merely a floating charm; without idealism, energy might give birth to any course of action, willing to serve the devil, if well paid, as readily as God. When the ideal once takes full possession of an essentially active creature like man, he is compelled to go on in a continued struggle after a goal which can never be reached, but can always be approximated. "Be ye therefore perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect," says the great Teacher. "Brethren, I count not myself to have attained," says His greatest apostle, "but, forgetting the things which are behind, I stretch forward to the things which are before, and press towards the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." These words, wisely interpreted, according to time and circumstance, will always be the best war-cry of true Liberalism. Not less characteristically Liberal, and not less Christian in its authoritative sanction, is the sentiment of love and benevolence, of which justice is only the positive degree. Society, as distinguished from purely selfish individualised action, depends upon sympathy; sympathy not extending beyond what a healthy feeling of fellowship demands in associated beings is justice; the overflow of this feeling, which delights to bestow what cannot be demanded—the luxury, so to speak, not the bare necessity, of sympathy—is benevolence, charity in the evangelical sense, the *ἀγάπη* of St. John and

St. Paul, declared by the latter, with significant emphasis, to be the fulfilling of the law. This love is the natural mother of true Liberalism; for love above all things delights to see a free career opened to every human brother, and shuns nothing so much as the exclusiveness of narrow conceit and the insolence of lordly assumption. That this feeling of love should have been developed strongly in the different Christian Churches, though too often untrue to their best principles, was to have been expected; but it has blossomed forth most prominently in the Society of Friends, to whom we alluded at starting,—persons of an extremely fine and delicate constitution, to whom all rude strife and rough antagonism is hateful, and who in this way will often prove a valuable aid to the party of freedom by quietly protesting against all acts of selfish masterdom, and by their mere presence smoothing the front of the wrath of man in a quarrel with which they would disdain in any partisan fashion to intermingle. The same delicate sense of human kindness which disposes them to universal peace, imposes on them a renunciation of all the styles and conventions of society, which lead men to forget their natural bond of human brotherhood, and to place themselves artificially now above and now below the platform to which they belong. With the Friends every man is simply a man, and all men are brethren; no Frenchman ever conceived fraternity in so wide and gracious a sense as it is practised by the Quakers. Very different from William Penn

was Robert Burns; but the potency of lyrical love in the breast of the poet expresses itself not less emphatically than the strength of evangelical love in the piety of the peaceful people, against the idol-worship of conventional titles and pedigree, in which people are so apt to sink their reverence for all that is best and noblest in unsophisticated humanity.

> "You see yon birkie, ca'd a lord,
> Wha struts, and stares, and a' that;
> Tho' hundreds worship at his word,
> He's but a coof for a' that:
> For a' that, and a' that,
> Their dignities, and a' that;
> The rank is but the guinea stamp,
> The man 's the gowd for a' that."

The man who wrote this was the prophet of democratic equality in the only true sense. So also was the apostle Peter. "Honour all men" in their several places, and in the performance of their several functions; but in nowise worship rank. Specially, as St. Paul has it, "Mind not high things, but condescend to men of low estate." This again is evangelical Liberalism.

The third idea from which Liberalism takes not its inspiration only but its name, is Liberty; and it is of all the ideas that inspire the party of movement at once the most natural and the most liable to be abused. How natural it is, any bird will teach you when you put it into a cage, or a colt when you put it into a stall; how liable to abuse, any man may see who gives a pig free liberty to

range over the potato-ground, or a young puppy to romp at large among the flower-beds. In fact, the significance of freedom in the history of society springs not so much from its absolute value as from its necessary agency in freeing men from those artificial bonds and hindrances to normal development, with which insolent power, official formalism, or ossified institutions may have enthralled them. It is not freedom but the use of freedom that ennobles man. Savages and nomads have always more freedom than civilised societies. All civilisation is the progress of law; and the progress of law is the march of limitation. Liberty is truly the least human of all the qualities that are popularly predicated of man. The lion, the tiger, and the hyæna have more freedom in their own haunts than can be enjoyed by any man in the best organised society. The dream of liberty in which extreme Liberals have been sometimes fond to indulge is not only a dream; it is a disownment of humanity, and, as such, leads straightway to disorder, disintegration, and dissolution, which would not be the case with the brutes, who, being in God's hands, may always be trusted to follow the sound instincts of their nature. Not so man. The power of self-direction, which is at once his privilege and his peril, leads him

> "With reasoned subjection
> To make his election,
> And bend with awe
> To sovereign law,
> And reasons that wisely confine"

—which if he fails to do, he violates the primary law of his being, and brings down on his head the penalty which Nature is not slow to inflict on the disturbers of her plan.

Among persons who are specially apt to flap their vans in the realm of freedom are poets, and men of genius of a certain disorderly class. Of course it is only the natural exercise of their function to revel in the fields of imagination, which are sufficiently free; but so much the more careful ought they to be to revel chastely and with moderation. No doubt it is a sore temptation; but they ought to remember that they address mortals made of flesh and blood, and have to do with an architecture of which bone and muscle, and not rainbows and sunbeams, are the materials. In their passionate worship of ideal beauty, especially when living in an age of great social excitement, these persons are apt to rebel against all existing conditions of life, and to divorce themselves with a lofty renouncement from the fellowship of earth-treading mortals, and the trammels of conventional proprieties. Like Prometheus in the Æschylean play, they declare war not only against Jove, but against men also, and either soar above them in a region all their own, where not even a memory of human vulgarities can approach them, or keep wandering up and down in an unsettled fashion on *terra firma,* flinging thunders of sublime hate and lofty scorn on vulgar mortals as they pass. Of the one type Shelley is the most notable example in recent times, Byron of the other;

both men of surpassing genius, but out of gear with common human feelings and common human relations, and therefore more admired by the few of a cognate temperament than profitable to the many of more healthy and happy human sympathies. Burns, on the other hand, was a poet who, like Shakespeare, could shake hands heartily with the humanity of common life, and yet remain an idealist.

In our analysis of Conservatism we found an element of marked potency in old age; conversely, we ought to find a strong element of Liberalism in youth. And so it is. If movement is to be found anywhere, it is in fresh young blood; and if a young man is to do anything notable as a member of society when he is full-grown, it is most meet that he should start with a high ideal of what is to be done, and with a strong propulsive force to enable him to do it. *Altius ibunt qui ad summa nituntur*—aim at the highest, and, though you don't clutch the stars, you will get hold of something high—is a maxim which applies to nothing with more propriety than to youth. Lofty schemes and daring venture in youth are the proper stuff of which effective manhood is made; the brain that doesn't ferment at fourteen will never ripen into clear wine at forty; and the youth who shrinks from danger, and calculates every step at sixteen, will have no glorious victories to look back on at sixty. There is an anecdote told of the great Doctor Bentley, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, that he had a habit of taking off his hat to the undergraduates,

when he left the Dons and big-wigs of the town without a greeting. Why? Because, as he answered to one of these mighty old gentlemen, "there is hope of good in these fellows; you I know to be utterly hopeless." Exactly so. The wings of youthful imagination may be destined to be rudely clipped, and the branching forwardness of its speculations to receive a salutary check from the great snubbing school, the world; but there is at least something stirring there which looks like progress,—a sword that is impatient of the sheath, not a wig that is content to be worn and displayed with dignity. Let young men indulge largely in dreams of the best possible world; all the best things that have been done in the world were dreams before they shaped themselves into facts: let them display on every occasion a contempt for all artificial distinctions on natural freedom; and let them count it sport to pluck the beard of pretentious hollowness, and to tear the mask from venerable hypocrisy. Let them be true to their place and their function, direct from Nature, unbribed by convention, to plash about largely with free thoughts, free words, and free experiments. If they are not wise enough to lead the world, they have at least life enough in them to prevent the world from falling asleep; they can stir the stagnant waters, which more experienced heads may guide; and, if they make rash plunges now and then into uncalled-for risks, they will not shrink from real dangers nor create imaginary ones. Thus equipped,

young men are eminently fitted by Nature for the vanguard of all social advance, when ideas of progress are in the wind; so much so, indeed, as above noted, that even a Coleridge, a Southey, and a Goethe, though ranked in later life with the Conservative party, made their youthful start with a full flood of liberal and revolutionary sentiment. There are, however, exceptions to all rules; and though, as a class, young men, when worth anything, rank with the apostles of progress, there is a species of young men, also previously alluded to, and these of the best quality, who are Conservatives from the womb, and will remain so. These, of course, are youths of sentiment, in whom a reverential regard for the past is more powerful than an ideal outlook into the future. Walter Scott is their most honourable type; and no man can blame them, if, while their imagination receives healthy nutriment from dwelling on the glories of the past, they take small note of the grievances of the present, and spin no theories about the possibilities of the future. Only a god, a Janus, can have two faces looking in opposite directions; a mortal man, a poet, if he is to be great as a prophet of the future, or a painter of the past, must be content to have only one. A Shelley and a Scott cannot take flesh in one poetical Avatar together.

Only one battalion of Liberals remains, and that, like the men with whom Falstaff marched through Coventry, not at all respectable — "very sorry knaves" indeed. All disorderly, lawless, desperate,

and restless persons, all those whose soul and whose life is a chaos, and who are ready to pull down the whole well-ordered fabric of society on any occasion that may offer into common ruin with themselves, all who love change for the mere sake of change, and who, not without reason sometimes, think that, whatever happens, they cannot be worse, or worse off, than they are now; nay, who perhaps, as Carlyle somewhere has it, like vessels of dishonour in a flitting, may have a chance of being tilted up to the top for a season—all these belong to the party of movement of extreme Liberalism, the devil's own brigade, who never fails to have a body of specially authenticated persons to represent his interests in all periods of social derangement and reconstruction.

What now, we wisely ask, is the conclusion of the whole matter? Simply this, that as God has manifestly formed a world, and created man on the principle of two co-existing antagonistic forces, that man is a fool who conceits himself that society can be well governed by the presidency of only one. Not absolute dominance of one, but wise balance of two is the formula. Not victory, where one party triumphs and the other lies prostrate; but harmony, where, as in music, the high note and the low, though of opposite pitch, know to adapt themselves to one another in calculated vibrations: a marriage of contraries, so to speak, in which each party remains conscious of separate individuality and separate tendencies, and yet presents with its

opposite the unity of a conjunct life. This is just the old wisdom of Aristotle and of all the wise Greeks, and, what is of more consequence, the wisdom of daily life and of common sense. All extremes are wrong. All virtue, all health, all happiness is a mean between too much and too little, the just balance of whatever forces are in action at the moment. So that the philosophy of party comes simply to this, that both parties shall learn to tolerate and to use one another; and that there is no absolutely good constitution, but the best policy is always that which allows both the aristocratic and the democratic element their just sway, according to capacities and circumstances. So Solon boasted of his legislative remodelment :—

> "I gave the people power as much as they
> For safety needed, but no larger sway.
> I for the wealthy cared, and for the strong,
> So far that they might ne'er complain of wrong.
> Before them both my ample shield I threw,
> And nicely held the balance 'twixt the two."

Parties there must be, and balance of parties in all good government. Parties are not an evil, but a good, a sign of a vigorous and healthy national life; but how is faction to be avoided, which is the besetting sin of party, and how is revolution to be forestalled, into which parties rush when they fail to find a balance? And here there can be no doubt that the power of preventing these unholy frettings and uncomfortable commotions lies mainly with the Conservative party. They hold their place in virtue

of the natural tendency of human beings to obey the constituted authorities; and, if they will only keep their eyes open, and introduce those changes in the State machinery which the moving time has made necessary, the Liberals will find nothing to do, for what requires to be done will already have been done on Liberal principles by the wise conservators of existing arrangements. But as such watchful and far-sighted prevision is not always found in the comfortable and easy-going persons that too often compose the bulk of the Conservative body, parties must arise, and, when they are once in full action, the tendency to degenerate into faction must be watched with the most holy care. For if it is most certainly true, on the one hand, that the Supreme Ruler works out His great purposes in the development of society by the war of parties, it is no less true, on the other hand, that the wrath of man, as we read, worketh not the righteousness of God; and if party warfare means, as it sometimes seems to mean, a fever of habitual ill-will; if it deals in lies, or in exaggerations which are more than half a lie; if it smothers all generosity, and affects infallibility, it is a very sad thing, a thing little better than the man of sin depicted in such striking language by St. Paul in his Epistle to the Thessalonians. What we want in public life, to prevent party degenerating into faction, is some touch of the chivalry of the Middle Ages, when the combatants shook hands with their adversary before and after the sharp encounter. It is a sad spectacle indeed, when persons

chosen to represent the collective wisdom of the nation are not ashamed to bark and bite at one another like curs, to tear one another to pieces like tigers, and to bellow like infuriated bulls. Let us watch, therefore, and pray against this great evil, and specially in this age of omnigenous talking and omnipresent printing. Bear in mind what the apostle James says of the little member the tongue, what mighty things it boasteth, and from what source it draws its inspiration. No intelligence, no resources, no governmental manipulation, can save a nation in critical moments, without the constant presence of four not over-common virtues: coolness and caution, modesty and moderation. "Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth!" Who knows what thunders of civil strife might have slept, and what tears of bitter rancour ceased to flow, if one little inflammable word had been withheld, a word flung out in folly by a hasty ruler, and by a jealous people interpreted as treachery!

SCOTTISH NATIONALITY.

"A people which takes no pride in the noble achievements of remote ancestors will never achieve anything worthy to be remembered by remote descendants. Such pride is a sentiment which belongs to the higher and nobler part of human nature, and which adds not a little to the strength of States."—MACAULAY.

I WILL commence with a definition.

A nation is a multitude of human beings occupying a definite locality, and associated together permanently under a common authority for the purpose of common order and local action, and under the influences of common laws, common beliefs, common customs and common traditions, along with peculiarities of race pure and mixed, presenting to the historical eye a distinctly marked type or species of the genus man.

Observe here, that while all these elements are found in the composition of a nation, some of them are more or less variable; but two points are essential—the permanent occupation of a definite locality, and the continuous acknowledgment of a common authority. If a people of the same race, and with the same customs and religion, and even acknowledging a common authority, do not permanently occupy a definite locality, but swarm from place to

place, year after year, where they may find grazing-ground for their cattle, they are merely what, by a term borrowed from the Greek, we call Nomads, from *νομή, a pasture*; and in this sense Abraham and Lot, in their first occupation of Palestine, were merely a superior sort of Nomads. Again, had Donald of the Isles, who at the beginning of the fifteenth century made such a stiff stand for Celtic independence in the bloody battle of Harlaw, so famous in Aberdeenshire ballad, succeeded in maintaining his Hebridean lordship against the superiority of the king of Scotland, there would have been no kingdom of Scotland to the extent which history recognises by that name. The race which occupies the western and north-western Highlands would have been the same; but there would have been two separate nations north of the Tweed, not one. Take another example. The Germans in the middle ages, so long as they recognised and acted submissively under the common authority of the head of the German, or, as it was called, the Holy Roman Empire, were a nation; for an empire is only a big nation whose parts are dissimilar, but whose political action is common. But when, in the course of time, the separate members of this imperial confederation ceased to acknowledge habitually the headship of the Emperor, and took upon themselves to act for themselves, as Frederick the Great did, then the nationality of Germany ceased; the Holy Roman Empire, as Napoleon or Voltaire said, was neither holy nor Roman, nor an empire. There

was a German people, notable enough in the stages of the most recent European culture; there was no German nation; there was a big Prussian king, and a big Prussian nation—a little Saxon king, and a little Saxon nation; but the German people, neither acknowledging a common authority nor taking common counsel together for political action, could in no sense of the word be called a nation. On the other hand, when, in the year 1870, this so unhappily divided people united with one soul to repress the invasive violence of the French, and returned from Paris after giving to that pretentious people the chastisement which they so richly deserved, forthwith the birth of a German nationality, or of a people acting under a common supreme authority, became possible, and under the guidance of Prince Bismarck and the inspiration of that great war, did in fact come to light in a fashion that the powers of Europe are not likely soon to forget.

Let us now consider how the other forces in our definition affect the character and the consistency of nationality in a people. The first and most natural element that comes into account here is RACE; and there can be no doubt that, like kinship, cousinship, and clanship, it is an element that contributes largely to social union and common action. Along with race the element of LANGUAGE generally asserts itself; for, though a race of people, like the Dutch the German, of common descent and cognate character, under the influence of local circumstances and surroundings, may sometimes be found speak-

ing what practically amounts to two different languages, the more general phenomenon is that the race and the language, as the inside and the outside of the same specific type, go together, as the Irish Celts and the Gaels of the Scottish Highlands speak one language called the Erse. As a ready-made organ for common understanding and common action, unity of language in a nation is unquestionably a great advantage; it will co-exist also along with certain marked tendencies and habitudes of the race that facilitate harmonious co-operation. Nevertheless we must not allow ourselves to be carried away by the apparent simplicity and naturalness of this element. As in the mixture of pleasant and healthful liquors the well-blended compound is often better than the pure draught, so in the composition of a great nation a well-balanced mixture of races may often produce social results far more efficient than the unqualified virtue of a single race. Though the amalgamation of antagonistic forces is more difficult to achieve than the action of a single force, it is not therefore less excellent. On the contrary, the happy combination of opposites is an indispensable condition of the highest excellence, as strength combined with sweetness in personal character is always more admirable than sweetness without strength, or strength without sweetness. In this way it may happen that a mixed people like the Scotch, exhibiting a type harmoniously compounded of Celtic fire and Saxon solidity, may have reason to thank God for the Southern proclivities of Malcolm Can-

more, by means of which Saxo-Norman elements were so happily infused into the original Celtic blood of the Scottish people; and no man can doubt that the great English people are not a weaker, but rather a stronger type of the modern Europeans than if they had grown up from a purely British root, without any fine contagion from Roman policy, Saxon solidity, or Norman adventure. Mere borrowing, or slavish copying, in any shape, has no productive force; it ends either in ridiculous patchwork, or in utter degradation of the weaker element; but borrowing with assimilation, like engrafting in the gardener's craft, leads not seldom, when soil and sunshine agree, to the most fruitful and the most splendid results.

The next most natural, most prominent, and most dominant force in the constitution of a great nationality, is Religion. What the family feeling and reverential recognition of the authority of the father is to the members of a private family, that the community of reverential subjection to the Divine Head of the great human family is to any association of human beings that has acquired the consistency of a nation. Respect for a common authority, externally enforced, is no doubt the primary necessity of national existence; but the moral authority which has its source in the common recognition of the well-spring of all law, and the key-stone of the social bond, in the shape of a supreme superhuman power, is at once more potent and more permeating,—possesses, in fact, all the

strength of a natural growth, while the other presents the aspect, and sometimes entails the reality, of a compulsory imposition. Accordingly we find in history that every well-marked people has its specific form of reverential recognition of the Supreme Disposer of all things as distinctly impressed as the most marked peculiarities of race or language. An atheistical people, or a people without a god or gods, is an altogether abnormal phenomenon, a social monstrosity, inasmuch as man is, as Socrates remarked, the only religious animal, the only creature that has not only a reverential feeling—for dogs have that to their master—but creeds, and theologies, and churches, and ceremonials, and worships of various kinds. The Romans had their well-marked national religion; so had the Greeks; and so essential was the community of religious acknowledgment to the social community, that, when Socrates was asked by an inquirer according to what form the gods ought to be worshipped, he simply replied *νόμῳ πόλεως*—by the law and custom of the State. A State without religion, and a member of the State with a religion for himself, were in the estimation of the wisest of the wise Greeks two things outside the pale of all reasonable practice. No doubt the experience of nearly two thousand years has taught us otherwise now; the comprehensive sweep of vast empires like the Roman has worked, together with the appeal to the individual conscience, so strongly accentuated in Christianity, to make tolera-

tion of diverse religious types in a State almost a test word for the higher forms of civilisation. Nevertheless, it is true that religion is so essential to nationality, that it impresses, more than anything else, a marked feature on the character, and gives a distinct hue to the aspect of every distinctly differentiated nation. Differences may be tolerated, and even individual whims and crotchets may be allowed to incorporate themselves into distinct organisms, and parade themselves before the public unmolested; but, taken overhead, each separate people presents to the eye of the observer the stamp of a peculiar piety, as unmistakably present as the cut of their features, the tissue of their nerves, or the colour of their skin. Thus a Spaniard or an Italian is a Romanist, a German a Protestant, in the face of what any man may see that there are large congregations of Germans, as in Cologne and Austria, who own allegiance to the Pope; while, on the other hand, since the days of the Waldenses, there has always been, as to-day there is, an increasing body of godly Italians, who are allowed to worship the same God under less cumbrous forms and less exclusive assumptions. In the same way the Scot is historically a Presbyterian, and the normal Englishman an Episcopalian; his peculiar ecclesiastical attitude has stamped each of these representatives of British Churchdom with such a distinct physiognomy that he can no more be conceived without it than a lawyer without his gown or a Highlander without his kilt. The very name Dis-

sent implies a self-imposed disownment of some distinguishing feature of the dominant historical type from which the dissent is made; and in this way, while no Dissenter in England is a normal Englishman, so no Episcopalian in Scotland is a normal Scot. He is like a Highlander who has broken away from his clan; a very good fellow, it may be, but certainly not a Highlander in the full sense and historical acceptance of the word.

The resultant of all these forces going to compose a nation is the formation of a certain well-marked national character, made up of certain dominant excellencies, physical, moral, and intellectual, which ought to be cherished as the devout heritage of a people, co-existent with certain weaknesses which require to be strengthened, certain defects which should be supplied, and certain follies and vices which ought to be submitted to the pruning-knife, or altogether eradicated.

We now turn specially to Scotland. Are we a nation, and how much in comparison with other peoples? To this question there can be but one answer. We Scotch are a nation in the most complete sense of the word. The best contrast here is Ireland, which no doubt possesses in the popular sense a very well marked nationality, more distinctly expressed, certainly more dramatically, with striking stage effects, than Scotland; but in the eye of public law, and the sequence of historical links, not a nation at all, only a people, as the Germans were before the incorporating force of the great Franco-German

war. For proof of this we have merely to recall the fact mentioned by our historians, that at the Revolution of 1688, when Dutch William assumed the title of King of England, he *ipso facto* became King of Ireland. All our great jurists regarded Ireland as a mere colony, more important, indeed, than Virginia or Jamaica, but like them dependent on the mother country, and bound to pay allegiance to the person whom the mother country had called to the throne.[1] Ireland, in fact, never was a nation. Half-conquered by Henry II., and altogether, till very recently, governed in the spirit of hatred, not of conciliation, it has remained for centuries in a fretful and feverish state, unparticipant alike of the blessings of a friendly union and the glory of a valiant defiance. Though possessed of the most strongly marked features of race and religion, the Irish people have been cursed with a superinduced English civilisation, which has not known to fuse itself with the native stock, as the Norman in England amalgamated with the Saxon. In consequence of this mismanagement, there has been a constant fret and a smothered discontent in that unhappy country, breaking out again and again in wild bursts of conspiracy and rebellion, a state of loveless servitude on the one side, and insolent lordship on the other, similar to the relations of the Greeks with the Turks, and the Poles with the Russians. With Scotland the case is quite

[1] Macaulay, chap. xii. To the same effect, Burton, vol. i. p. 271.

otherwise. The Scottish nation was never conquered. Twice, indeed, did our strong English neighbours make a stout attempt to master us; but the political yoke which the Plantagenets essayed to fling on our neck was thrown back by the heroism of Wallace at Stirling Bridge, and Bruce at Bannockburn, while the treacheries and butcheries of the priest-ridden Stuarts on the English throne were rendered nugatory by the persistent manhood and martyrdom of the Covenanters. Under whatever aspect we contemplate it, we shall find that there is no people of note in history more justly entitled to be stamped with the character of perfect nationality than the Scotch. We may summarise our claims to be in the eye of history a distinct and well-marked nation under twelve heads. We are a nation—(1) by centuries of continuous common action and continuous struggle; (2) by a well-balanced mixture of Celtic, Saxon, and Scandinavian elements in our blood; (3) by civil liberty achieved at Stirling Bridge and Bannockburn; (4) by ecclesiastical liberty asserted in the Greyfriars' Church, and maintained at Drumclog, Sanquhar, and Airdsmoss, and the conditions prescribed to William of Orange when he was admitted to the Scottish throne; (5) by our independent kings, kings of whom only one was nominated by a foreign power, and who soon learned that Scotland would not be content to have a slave for her master; (6) by our independent national Parliament; (7) by our giving a king to England, 6th May 1603; (8) by the Union of 1707, which, though it was

made certainly on no fair terms, and on conditions prejudicial to the dignity and the influence of the Scottish people, was nevertheless a bargain between two parties, authorised to act for the two independent nations whom they represented; (9) by our separate laws, founded on the Roman law, and less technical than the English, and by our independent law courts; (10) by our separate language, the musical or lyric dialect of English, a well-marked literary type in such men as Burns, Scott, Ballantine, the Baroness Nairne, Joanna Baillie, Lord Cockburn, Dr. Norman Macleod, Dr. Chalmers, Dr. Guthrie; (11) by our educational system, essentially popular and essentially democratic; (12) by the intelligent recognition of the whole civilised world, who always accept a Scot as a social unit of the British empire, possessed of certain very valuable home-bred virtues, and at the same time free from certain traits of character and manner which are apt to render his big brother besouth the Tweed less popular with foreigners than his substantial worth deserves.

We shall now attempt a detailed enumeration of the characteristic virtues and vices of the Scottish character as they present themselves to the world, in the daily activities of public life at home, and in the larger sphere of colonial enterprise, where Scotsmen have ever been named amongst the most enterprising and the most successful.[1] And the

[1] "In America we have all classes of people; some succeed, and some do not succeed; but the Scotsman always succeeds."—*Mr. Phelps to me*, 13th Nov. 1886.

first thing that strikes us here is the working power of the Scot; and without doubt this is a great commendation; say rather an excellent quality, without which nothing great or fruitful can be achieved in this world. The world is a working world; all life is work; all force is work; and the world is a complex of forces cunningly worked by the supreme directing Intelligence for the production of that marvellous symphony of embodied ideas which we call the Universe. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work;" to be "a fellow-worker unto the kingdom of God," as St. Paul has it, is the highest praise that can belong to any member of the great human family; and the man who works most nobly and most persistently to this end is the most worthy member of the family. Whatever may be the cause of this special faculty for hard work in the Scot, whether some power in the racial tissue, or the necessity of struggling with the difficulties of an unkindly soil and an uncongenial climate, or both together, certain it is that as a steady productive worker the Scot is superior to the more softly nurtured Englishman, or the more quick and lively sons of the sister isle. Make inquiry at any school in which English and Scotch boys are mixed together, and you will find that the sons of the north are the men who make the most diligent use of their books; or ask any man of business conversant with office-work done in the great metropolis, and he will have no hesitation in assigning the first place in this field of labour to the Scot,

the second to the German, and the third to the Englishman. The Germans, no doubt, beat us in some departments, but this arises partly from their better education, both scientific and technical, partly from their habits of cheap living, which gives them a better chance in the labour market, not from a greater capacity of persistent labour. In the same way, I have regularly heard from all Scottish ladies domestically established south of the Tweed, that, whenever they can get a Scottish servant they take her in preference to an English one, because, for the same wage, she will do twice as much work in half the time. And our Scottish poets, whose name is legion, in the musical dialect of the English, which they handle so effectively, make earnest lyrical appeals in behalf of the same great national virtue :—

> "Be eident, be eident, fleet time rushes on ;
> Be eident, be eident, bricht day will be gone ;
> To stand idle by is a profitless sin,
> The mair that ye work aye the mair ye will win."

So Ballantine ; and to the same tune Wright :—

> "Help yoursel' where'er ye gang, and aye work awa',
> In the summer sunshine, and through the winter snaw,
> Never lippen to your friends, though they may loudly blaw,
> But help yersel's where'er ye gang, and aye work awa' ;
> Aye work awa', my friends, O aye work awa',
> Help yersel' where'er ye gang, and aye work awa' ! '

So is it, and so has it ever been, from the days when Dunstaffnage Castle held the fateful stone of old

Celtic Scotland, to these latter days, when the captains of industry and the masters of mechanical invention have raised Glasgow to the dignity of the second city in the British Empire; and so will it be as long as Scotland remains Scottish, and does not allow herself to be softened down by the seductive influences of a civilisation from the South; for *Labor omnia vincit,* when wisely applied, is an equally noble and a less slippery motto for action than *Omnia vincit amor.*

The next feature in the character of the Scot, closely connected with the preceding, is that he is a conscientious, well-principled, and reliable workman: the fruit of his religion, which is personal, not ceremonial, and means character. I once heard my sagacious friend, the late Dr. Guthrie, remark that, though there were no doubt foolish sermons preached not a few, and too much preaching altogether nowadays, yet there could be no question that preaching had made Scotland in the moral sphere as effectively as Bannockburn and Stirling Brig had made it in the political; and for this plain reason, that, as distinguished from masses and liturgies, and long prescribed routine of sensuous or emotional ceremonial, preaching means in Scotland, in the main, now what it meant among the Gentiles in the days of St. Paul, an earnest appeal to the moral consciousness of each individual that he shall not live as a natural brute beast for the indulgence of those instincts and passions which he possesses in common with the lower animals, but for the culture of those loftier

capacities and nobler aspirations which stamp him as fashioned by a differentiating grace in the image of the Divine Creator; and, however such preaching may have been abused on occasions by this pulpit orator or the other, for the purposes of a barren dogmatical orthodoxy, it cannot be doubted that the main stream of its tendency has been towards the purification of the passions, the regulation of the life, and the formation of the character. As little doubt can there be that the superior thoughtfulness and intelligence with which the mass of the Scottish people has generally been credited has its fountainhead, not primarily in the Universities, as a leader in the great *Metropolitan Journal* once asserted,[1] but in the Universities as the natural and necessary sequence of our national Church, our national theology, and our national piety. In this view neither our Shorter Catechism, with its severely concatenated dogma, nor our Sabbath observance, with its solemn and somewhat awful gravity, is to be kept out of the account. For, however true it may be that our Calvinistic Catechism is too scholastically doctrinal in its form

[1] "The English Universities produce learning, the Scottish thinking." I have lost the exact date; but I can guarantee the quotation, called forth, I remember, by the great amount of debating and business talent in the Scottish Church displayed in the General Assembly. The Assembly, the "Thunderer" remarked, contained men, such as Dr. Begg, who could hold their own as public speakers against the best orators in the House of Commons, and others, such as Principal Pirie of Aberdeen, who, for legal acumen and astuteness, might contest the palm with the most accomplished pleaders in Westminster Hall.

to be in kindly touch with the sensibility of unripe minds, and may occasionally have brought more torture than comfort to our seriously disposed young men, it is no less true that a form of juvenile indoctrination that strikes such deep roots in the Divine decrees, the sacredness of the moral law, and the penalties which its violation involves, is eminently calculated to stir the germs of serious thought in the soul, and to lay the foundation for a philosophical theology, which, to use the language of Aristotle, is only another name for metaphysics. And if the severe consistency of our Catechism has tended to infuse into the more earnest of our youths a seriousness not so generally found in other countries, the grave and thoughtful tone of our Sabbaths has worked even more powerfully in the same direction.

> "Stern Scottish people, ye redeem
> Each seventh day severely:
> Sober and grave, with scarce a gleam
> Of frolic tempered cheerly.
> Light wits deride your thoughtful law,
> The tinkling and the gay;
> But wisely from deep founts ye draw
> Calm strength on the Sabbath day."

This let no man deny; but neither our Universities nor our Catechism, nor our thoughtful Sabbaths, with the Bible-reading which they imply, could have prevailed to produce a people glorying in such names as Hume and Reid, J. S. Mill, Dugald Stewart, Brown, and Caird, had it not been for the

careful working of the subsoil of individual intelligence in our world-famed parochial schools, which we owe to John Knox. The Bible the religion of Protestants, the parochial school to enable every parish child to read the Bible, the strict Sabbath, to secure for every man leisure to peruse and to digest that precious book,—these are the three factors which, by their continuous operation for three centuries, have made the Scot known all over the globe as a thoughtful and intelligent worker, of noble and noticeable activity; and to these three agencies, the lower, middle, and upper classes of society in this country must gratefully attribute any superiority which they may be, or may have been, entitled to claim to the mass of the corresponding classes in other European countries.

Another very notable feature in the Scottish character which has in these latter days been put forth with marked accentuation, is its democratic hue, and tendency to what is called Liberalism in politics. The leading London newspaper, to which we have just been alluding, once put the question articulately, Why is *Scotland Liberal?* But the answer is as obvious as the question. Our democracy proceeds from our Church, which is as markedly republican or democratic as the English is aristocratic, and the Romish monarchical in its constitution; and it is in the Church, and in all that flows from it, that the Scot expresses his nationality with the most unmistakable significance. The equality of a social brotherhood lies in the very nature of the

Christian Church in its earliest form; and, if equality in the mutual relation of the members of a society shapes for itself a well-marked expression in its governmental machinery, there can be no more democratic body in the world than a Presbyterian Church. No doubt there is in the very nature of religion a strong conservative instinct, which will act in repressing the motive forces inherent in all democracies; but the presence of this restraining check in his religious Avatar will leave the democratic Presbyterian free to assert his gospel of liberty, equality, and fraternity more largely in the arena of the political world. Unquestionably also the Scottish people have always shown no common amount of loyalty to their kings, an inheritance of the highest value from the clan system; but the fidelity to the kingly race, which displayed itself so chivalrously in the crowning of the exiled Charles at Scone, assumed the attitude of a haughty disownment, when the same heartless Stuart abused his paternal position to impose sacerdotal and ceremonial regulations on the conscience of an essentially democratic Church. Verily neither he nor his ill-starred advisers, the drunken Middleton and the brutal Lauderdale, "knew," as his grandfather said to his Episcopal adviser, "the stomach of this people"—a people who, like the early Christians, however willing they might be to bow to civil authority legitimately exercised, gave their bodies to be burnt, but not their souls to be strangled at the will of an insolent despot. Against such a

people the fierceness of the tiger and the cunning of the fox were tried in vain; and Rullion Green, Drumclog, and Airdsmoss stood staunchly true to the traditions of Bannockburn and Stirling Bridge.

But here perhaps some thoughtful reader will ask, and he will ask wisely, What made the Scottish Church so democratic? were there no anterior social forces that tended to stamp on the Protestant Reformation in Scotland a democratic type, while in England it assumed such a decidedly aristocratic character? Assuredly there were; social types of that kind are never produced accidentally, or even by the influence of one strong mind such as John Calvin or John Knox. The root of the essentially democratic character of the Scottish mind, as exhibited in their Church organism, is to be sought in the social order which united class to class in what is vulgarly called feudalism, but what was at heart the clan system, with the loose acknowledgment of feudalism in certain legal forms. In the clan system the relation of the landholder to the tenant was that of a father to his children: a relation of mutual love and esteem, and of friendly sacrifice the high for the low, and the low for the high, as occasion might require. This no doubt implied that the head of the clan, like the father of a family, might put forth his authority in a stern, and sometimes even in a violent way; but the occasions for this display of absolutism were rare; and the general feeling was that as the head of the clan held his position only as representing the interests of

the family, so their obligation to obedience ceased the moment that the superior acted as his own master, and presumed to dictate where his function was only to direct. This strong natural bond of fraternity and cousinship it was which gave such power not only to Donald of the Isles, and his Celtic allies, but to the Douglases, the Scotts, and the Armstrongs of the Border, among whom, though of Saxon more than Celtic descent, the same system of mutual interdependence prevailed. The clan system, however fertile it might be in feuds and fightings betwixt clan and clan, exercised within each clan, and through the whole people, so long as the system retained its vitality, a most beneficial influence on the character of the nation. It united a loyal obedience to the head with the assertion of personal independence and equality in the members of the society, a union of contraries, which is the ideal of the social order in every moral organism. It was essentially a moral, not a merely legal, bond that held the body together. The clansmen were the fellow-cousins and fellow-labourers, not the slaves and the tools, of the men whom they served in peace, and followed in war. Of the difference in the matter of personal independence under the Scottish clan system from that which prevailed on the Continent, some interesting traits occur in Burton's History; specially we read that in the reign of Robert II., when a body of gallant knights came over from France to have a taste of the English blood in the skirmishes of the Border, they complained

bitterly, before they returned to their native country, of the scurvy treatment they had received from their Scottish friends, in not being allowed at their own hand to pay themselves by plundering the peasantry, as they would have done legally in their own country.[1] And in another passage, commenting

[1] "The French deemed themselves very scurvily used by the Scots, and their record of grievances shows the contrast between the slavish condition of the peasantry in their own country and the thorough freedom of the Scots. To an eminent Scot or other stranger in France, it would be but natural to communicate, by way of hospitality, the power of the native nobles to live at free quarters and plunder the peasantry at their discretion. The French complained bitterly that they got no such privilege in Scotland. On the contrary, when they carried off a cow or the contents of a barn, the owner, with a parcel of ruffian neighbours, would assault the purveying party, and punish them savagely, insomuch that not a varlet dare leave the lines to bring in provisions. Nay, when they rode abroad, the people rudely called to them to keep the paths and not trample down the growing crops; and when the remonstrances of these churls were treated with the contempt they deserved, a score was run up against the strangers for damage done to the country folks. Froissart's bitter account of this inhospitality is confirmed by the Statute-book. The French took high ground, and it was necessary that from high authority they should be told of the incompatibility of their claims with the rights of the people. The Estates took the matter up, and required the admiral to come to agreement with them by indenture, the leading stipulation of which was, that no provender is to be taken by force, and everything received by the French troops is to be duly paid for. There is a provision for settling personal quarrels, which was equally offensive to the strangers, as it admitted the existence of civil rights in the meanest inhabitant of the beggarly country, by providing for the decision of disputes where there was disparity of rank."—Burton's *History of Scotland*, ch. xxvi.

on the Scottish preference for the Civil Law of the Romans, which the English abhorred, he says that, "while that system of law might be abused, and had been abused, in continental countries, for strengthening the royal prerogative, and turning the subjects into slaves, it was, under favourable circumstances such as it found in Scotland, a flexible system made to meet all possible exigencies on the broad principle that all are equal in the eye of the law. There is no precedent in the Civil Law for privilege of peerage, for forest laws or for game laws; hence it suited Scotland, where the spirit of the community did not readily adapt itself to the prerogatives of class, which the Normans had established in England." And a few pages further on he says, "In Scotland there was no contest of class against class, no Jacquerie, no Wat Tyler or Jack Straw. High and low, they fought together, and were of one mind; and it was only when their natural leaders were supposed to have betrayed the country to the common enemy that there was variance between classes, and the peasant would no longer follow where his feudal chief would lead him."[1] Here we see the soul of Scottish patriotism and of Scottish presbytery springing out of the same root; and the formative force in both is essentially democratic; in fact, there was at no period and in no country, either in Church or State, a pulsing vigorous life in the mass of the people, without a strong infusion of the democratic element. Aristocracy itself, in a healthy state of

[1] Ch. xxxix.

society, as distinguished from oligarchy, merely means the best *of* the people, not the strongest *over* the people.

But there is another matter that must be carefully considered before we can take a just measure of the amount of the democratic element in the Scottish character; this is War. The people were always fighting, either with their unruly selves or with their scheming neighbours besouth the Tweed; a most disorderly and lawless people, you will say, a rough and rude, harsh, unmannerly, and ungentle people, if you cast an eye over their whole history from the death of the great King Robert to the union of the crowns nearly three centuries later; a natural vice of the clan system, no doubt you will add in a condemnatory style, and a vice intensified by the misfortune of a succession of minor and baby sovereigns unexampled in history. Very true; and that war is an evil is no less true; but it is not an evil unaccompanied with good: the greatest evils, in the wise dispensation of Providence, often bringing the greatest good along with them; and so it is with war. Soldiership is a school of independence, courage, patience, discipline, daring, self-sacrifice, and all the virtues that constitute manliness; and where, as in Scotland, there was no standing army, the training of a soldier makes the whole people manly, which cannot be said either of shopkeeping or of spinning-jennies.[1] Anyhow, it is always better

[1] Of the manliness bred in the Scotch blood by their constant wars with the insolent Norman kings, no better

to have sword in hand, even after a somewhat disorderly fashion, and remain free, than to lead a peaceful quiet life, as wheels in a good despotical machine, and remain slaves.

There is yet another element to be duly weighed before we can thoroughly understand the phenomena of Liberalism, as a distinctive feature of political life in Scotland. This element is the birth of these later times, and proceeds on lines directly contrary to those which we have just mentioned. Ever since the union of the crowns in 1603, and much more since the unfortunate Highland rising of 1745, aided by the extraordinary growth of industrial life in the great towns, the owners of land have become more and more estranged from the tillers of the soil; the moral bond that bound the high and the low together under the kindly relations of the clan system has been rudely broken; disaffection has been engendered where attachment prevailed; absentee landlords, often strangers, governing by often heartless factors, and known to the people only as rent-exactors or game-preservers, have taken the place of the generous father of the clan, whose highest pleasure, as well as his most imperious duty, was to live with and to die for the people who served him. Nay, more: partly from attractions of various kinds acting on the country people from the near vicinity of the great industrial centres, partly from personal and pecuniary considerations in the minds

example could be give than the historical ballad of "Auld Maitland" in Scott's *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border.*

of the landholders usurping the place of human love and social duty, the peasantry, who used to be the pride of the proprietor, had clean vanished, and even under the action of false economical theories, been forcibly extruded from the soil. A war of class against class was undisguisedly proclaimed ; and the people who, when they remain on the soil and receive a kindly treatment from a resident landlord, are naturally the most conservative force in the social aggregate, being sent to swell the already over-burdened population of the towns, appear there on the political stage as fervid Liberals, fuming Radicals, and red Socialists of all descriptions. Thus so far as Liberalism in Scotland may by a one-sided excess have disturbed the balance which in a healthy state of things should ever exist between the stationary and progressive constituents of the body social, we have before us another example of the principle enunciated by Burke, that wherever there is discontent widely spread amongst a people it is the fault of the governors in the first place not of the governed. Man is an animal naturally inclined to obey ; and they who hold authority may hold it for ever, if they only know to hold it wisely. A horse does not object to a rider, but to the riding ; and, if not ridden sweetly, it will know to kick, and it will throw.

Let us now take a glance at the intellectual manifestation and distinctive literary character of the Scot ; and here we are met at once with a sort of bifrontal presentment not a little remarkable. On

the one hand we have the practical, shrewd, sagacious, hard, cold, prosaic, not at all imaginative, and eminently utilitarian Scot; he is an excellent man of business, sensible, sober-minded, systematic, and largely endowed with that necessary substratum of all fruitful endowment called common-sense. He is notable also for his caution, which indeed is only the necessary result of his thoughtfulness applied to practice; never wears his heart on his sleeve, and will be the last man in the world to unbosom himself to you before he has taken your measure, and knows what stuff you are made of. This trait of the "canny Scot" has been well hit off by our national bard in the familiar stanza :—

> "Aye free, aff-han', your story tell,
> When wi' a bosom crony;
> But still keep something to yoursel'
> Ye scarcely tell to ony.
> Conceal yoursel' as weel 's ye can
> Frae critical dissection;
> But keek thro' every other man
> Wi' sharpen'd, sly inspection."

In the higher walks of bookish achievement this sensible practical utilitarian Scot is typed in Hume, Robertson, Blair, Reid, the two Mills, Adam Smith, and the Economists. We make the best bankers in the world, as you may learn at Liverpool; and in fact Paterson, a scion of one of our Dumfriesshire farmers, claims a place in history as having taught the English people, at the latter end of the seventeenth century, the great mystery of making a piece of signed paper perform the part of hard cash in the

daily currency of business. Our other front, as different from this as summer from winter, or hard granite from blue-bells, is poetical, emotional, impassioned, excitable, fervid, enthusiastic. In this phase of our national character we are with very marked features a lyrical people, a people of song-writers, who with Burns in the van, are spread everywhere amongst us as plenteously and as bloomingly as the purple heather on the hills and the crow-flower on the mead. No people with whom I have come in contact possesses a body of popular song, at once so rich and so varied, so dramatic and so picturesque, so healthy-minded and so breezy, so pathetically tender and so delicately humorous; and this quality of humour deserves special mention, as eminently Scotch, and not only throwing a playful light over our popular lyrics, but prominent even in the front men of our most grave profession, the Chalmerses, the Guthries, and the Macleods of the pulpit. In wit, which shows itself in bright flashes of significant contrast, we are certainly deficient; but for this deficiency we have ample compensation in that kindly, thoughtful sport between the high and the low, the great and the small, in this richly varied world which we call humour. In England we sometimes hear it said that a Scotsman is an animal that does not understand a joke; but this is a mistake: he only looks for more meaning than they contain, in those shallow flashes of superficial oddity which Englishmen sometimes vent under the name of jokes, and thinks them stupid,—as far removed

from a pregnant joke as the brush of a silly pun is from the sting of an apt witticism. But the greatest glory of our intellectual manifestation without doubt lies in our moral earnestness, shining out as it does so conspicuously in our Scottish pulpit. The normal Scottish preacher may have many faults, but he is never tame or dull; the fire in the eloquence of Knox that burnt all sacerdotal sophisms like straw, and the force that "dung the pulpit in blads," still exist in most emphatic efficiency. The strong mountain torrent that comes rushing and leaping down from the crown of our granite Bens to our grassy birch-clad glens is the true symbol of our Scottish pulpit eloquence as it revealed itself in Chalmers, and is still making itself felt from not a few sacred stages in busy Glasgow, in stately Edinburgh, and in multitudinous London. The fervid moral appeal from the sacred rostrum has ever been the most powerful weapon which the noble Scot could launch to rouse the torpor or to wing the enterprise of his countrymen; and, if there have been persons who might call his pulpit speech contemptible, it could only be in the same fashion that the like phrase was used of St. Paul, because in the vehement flow of his address he was too much in earnest to be paying dainty regard to the nice balances and artificial beauties of the rhetorical schools.

All this no doubt appears a very pleasant picture, and may seem to indicate that the inhabitant of the northern half of the island, to whatever sum of virtues he is justly entitled to claim, may add this

additional one, that he has "a guid conceit o' himsel'," or, as Mr. Ruskin somewhere has it, that the typical Scot is a vain animal.[1] Well, self-assertion is good; but self-glorification is bad. I will therefore proceed now to take an exact account of the unfavourable side of the Scottish character; and we shall see here one or two notable illustrations of the great ethical fact that the most characteristic virtues and vices of nations, as of individuals, grow out of the same root; in other words, that the vices and follies to which any people is most prone are simply their virtues exaggerated or misapplied. A virtue in a wrong place, or to a wrong amount, is always a vice, as mercy where public safety demands strict justice, or justice where humanity pleads for mercy. If the corruption of the best thing, according to the Latin adage, is the worst thing, it is equally true that too much of a good thing is a bad thing, and often an utterly ruinous and suicidal thing, as Aristotle well says of the nose as a prominent feature in the human face, which, if it should insist on growing longer and longer, would not only overgrow all the

[1] "In the Art Schools there came a pupil to me, a Scot, who got prize after prize for his neat handling, and having in his restricted imagination no power of discerning the qualities of great work, all the vanity of his nature was brought out unchecked; so that, being *intensely industrious and conscientious*, as well as *vain* (a Scottish combination of character not unfrequent), he naturally expected to become one of the greatest of men." With this compare what Professor Veitch, in his *History and Poetry of the Scottish Border*, ch. vi., says of "the independence and self-assertion of the Scot sometimes assuming a form so pronounced as to be slightly disagreeable."

other features, blind the eye and block the mouth, but would altogether cease to be a nose, by the obliteration of the face of which it is its definition to be a part. Take, therefore, our first great national virtue, the power of hard and persistent work, and see how, being overdone, it becomes a weakness and a fault. The correlative of work is leisure; Nature, like a bow, will not always be bent; and the strength which is the mother of work is recruited in rest and cradled in repose. Now, this important principle of all effective action, the Scottish people, in two of the most important departments of their social presentment, have systematically ignored. Our schoolmasters and our clergy are, as a rule, overworked and underpaid. If it be the great glory of our Scottish ministers of the Gospel that they are a working clergy, it is equally true that they are overworked: two sermons a week, besides baptisms, burials, marriages, and the hundred and one meetings and gatherings, and committees, and social work of all kinds, in which influential clergymen from their position are naturally called on to take a part. Here, as in all one-sided presentations of a great principle, the principle of the Presbyterian Church, being alone, becomes offensive and tyrannical. All democracy demands the co-existence of certain aristocratic counterforces or checks; as indeed, under the influences of Washington and Hamilton, it happily did find in the American Constitution, but certainly has not found in the organism of the Scottish Church. In the scheme of Presby-

terian parity, as it is consistently worked out north of the Tweed, whatever else of good there may be, there is certainly no *otium cum dignitate*; it is forgotten that those whose business it is to stimulate the dull souls of others should be allowed a certain leisure to gather in those stores, and to be stirred by those influences, which are their necessary equipment for acting with an accumulated strength and a potentiated vitality on others. The consequence is that sermons are apt to become vague and unedifying, and that the Scottish clergy, however efficient as a body, have no leisure for intellectual growth and productive power, and are obliged to borrow whatever learning they may possess from Germany or England. Thus the same kind of work being imperiously exacted from all, renders elevation impossible and mediocrity universal. The same phenomenon of overtaxed brain and vulgarised work is visible everywhere in the schools. There is no career for schoolmasters in Scotland; in the few good middle schools which we possess, the most accomplished teachers are not paid as gentlemen ought to be paid, and are so overladen and oppressed with scholastic work that they find no leisure and no opening for research. Under such a system the highest teaching degenerates into a drudgery and a routine; and the educative force in the teacher, whose proper function it is to act with a certain vital electricity on the susceptible minds of youth, must content itself with the mechanical production of an article which has a certain marketable value

in the stages of a professional career—all work, and no inspiration; bookish furniture of a certain creditable aspect, but no moral stimulus and no intellectual life.

Closely connected with the Scot's power of persistent work is the force and fervour with which, as we have mentioned, he buckles to his task, especially in his pulpit demonstrations. But in these, it must be confessed, even in his most powerful exhibitions of sacred eloquence, he is apt to fall short of that highest excellence, which consists in the union of impulsive strength with calm dignity, and of earnest fervour with chastened grace. The supreme father of gods and men, in the Greek Olympus, when he shakes the sphere with his thunders, sits himself unshaken on his throne; a Mercury or a Momus might be discomposed by the strain required to launch an electric bolt from the sky, but not a Jove. Unquestionably, of all faults that can attach to a popular address, tameness is the worst—a fault for which no amount of dignity, however natural or assumed, can atone. But, on the other hand, it is undoubted that the *δεινότης* or powerfulness, which the ancient rhetoricians laud so highly in the eloquence of Demosthenes, cannot be attained when the winged swoop of a projectile force is not accompanied by the majesty of assured repose. Of all the great orators of the Scottish pulpit, whom it has been my good fortune to hear in my day, Guthrie was the only one who knew to combine the earnest fervour of evangelic appeal with the

tasteful grace of diction, and the calm strength of the man who exercises a kingly control over the mighty passions which he evokes. This want of dignity in our Scottish pulpit orators is, no doubt, to be attributed to the nature of the animal. Dignity, it must be confessed, is no attribute of the typical Scot; but there can, at the same time, be little doubt that its absence is caused partly by the want of continuous rhetorical training in the schools, partly by the evil habit which has been creeping in latterly, of reading sermons instead of speaking them. Pericles, we may be assured, and Demosthenes, did not read from a paper when they stirred up the Athenian people against the jealousy of Sparta or the aggressiveness of Macedonia. No man can address his fellow-beings with true manly dignity who bends slavishly over a piece of paper, instead of standing erect, bow in hand, like an Apollo, and bringing the well-aimed arrow from eye to eye and from heart to heart. There is an electric power in that which no reading can approach.

Again: the thinking faculty, with which the Saxo-Celtic Scot is so justly credited, is apt to make him diverge from the line of a well-balanced intellect in more ways than one. He is apt, especially after being submitted to a course of intellectual gymnastics in the Universities, to put his thinking into a logical form—which, in social intercourse, always means pedantry—and to become argumentative, and as the phrase goes, bumptious. He is given to argue

where argument is out of place, and to be in grave earnest where pleasant play is the grace of the hour. I remember, more than thirty years ago, dining with a large party in the public hall of the Queen's College, Oxford, when, with a natural enough notion that all Oxford men are Tories or Conservatives in their general tone and attitude, I flung across the table a number of pointedly liberal sentiments, with the view of drawing them out and getting into a discussion, but I altogether failed; no discussion took place; my provocative propositions were either gently evaded or seemingly assented to. Next morning, meeting some of the gentlemen who had sat with me at table, I expressed my surprise at finding so much assent to my liberal discourse in a place where I expected to find a strongly emphasised antagonism. "Oh, all a mistake!" was the reply; "they did not assent to your Liberal sentiments in the least; they only did not wish to interrupt the genial flow of table-talk with a serious disputation which was sure to be well cased in Scotch logic and strongly seasoned with Scotch theology." I took the reproof sweetly, and thereafter never repeated the impropriety of raising an argumentative discussion at a social dining-table with Oxonians.

Another vice which is apt to cleave to the Scot from the misapplication of his thinking faculty is a certain over-cautiousness and a want of directness in his address. He thinks where thinking is, or seems to be, an unworthy suspicion, and speaks to a brother as cautiously as if he were an enemy.

Of course cautiousness is a virtue, and is the direct product of thinking. A thoughtless man is a rash man, and rashness is the opposite extreme of caution; but to be systematically cautious is to be sometimes cowardly, and often to repel coldly, where love, which is the fulfilling of the law, calls for a fervid advance. In this aspect of his character, as in some nobler traits, the Scot is essentially a Jew, a Jacob, in whom—to use the language of Dean Stanley—we see the same timid, cautious watchfulness, like the instinct of a hunted animal which we know so well, though under darker colours, in Shylock of Venice and Isaac of York.[1] Whether this unlovely trait of extreme caution arose, as is not unlikely, from the jealousy of Border warfare, and the inherited enmities of the clan system, we need not inquire: there it is, as notable a feature in the normal Scot as the polished wit of the Frenchman, the lazy loll of the Neapolitan, the pride of the Spaniard, the lively quirkishness of the Irishman, the painstaking laboriosity of the German, or the paunchy complacency of John Bull.

I have said that our religion is the key-note of our character, and our Presbyterian Church the stronghold of our nationality; but if, as we have shown, our Church suffers from the want of aristocratic leisure, our theology has the evil repute of being somewhat narrow, and our piety of being sour and severe. These charges I admit, but with the qualification that every theology has its own special

[1] *Jewish Church*, i. p. 56.

field of narrowness, and the piety of every Church has something in it of the nature of defect, deformity, or distortion, which shows how far human nature in the religious world falls below the standard of the ethical ideal which it acknowledges. If the theology of the Scottish Church is narrowed by the strict terms of a one-sided dogmatic theology, that of English Episcopacy is even less worthily self-encased by the pretensions of sacerdotal exclusiveness, while Popery confines itself within even narrower bounds, by the convention of a sort of sacerdotal magic, which sinks reason in blind reverence, and flings an open defiance in the face of common sense. What Buckle says of our piety, that "we think all pleasure and enjoyment sinful, forbidding laughter and dancing, and delighting in sacred weeping and holy groans," [1] has no doubt so much truth in it that, while a man may be as stupid as he pleases on Sunday, it is a sin of the deepest dye to be gay; but with all this, a wise man may reasonably prefer the Scottish excess of gravity on Sunday to the lightness and looseness of all kinds that may attend its celebration in other countries. Besides, it must not be forgotten that this awful and forbidding aspect of the Scottish Sabbath—an awfulness which raised an artificial dumbness into a virtue, and denounced the breathing of fresh air as a sin—under the fusing influences of modern intercourse and travel, exists no longer with the same severe features, unless in some far north-western

[1] Buckle, p. 385.

regions, and under the scowl of the most dark and unlovely bigots of the members of a Church which found it more easy to free itself from the secular fellowship of the State than from the slavery of a spiritual Pharisaism. Even the door of the theatre, no Presbyterian preacher south of the Grampians nowadays will dare to denounce, in old Calvinistic style, as the gate of hell; organs are now as fashionable, in Presbyterian estimation, as one hundred years ago they were formidable; and the parish clergyman who expounds the propositions of the Shorter Catechism with all dogmatic gravity on Sunday will on Monday evening be found joining in "Auld Lang Syne" at a concert of Scottish song; on Tuesday taking the chair at a young men's congregational debating society; and perhaps on Wednesday, if he chance to be in London, daring even to show himself in the front row of a private box in the theatre, witnessing the moral plays of Wilson Barrett, or the chaste Shakespearean impersonations of Henry Irving.

That the Scottish character, so well pronounced in the fields of thought and moral force, is weak and ineffective in the æsthetical front which it presents to the world, must be admitted. In one department of Art indeed—painting—we can boast a school of artists who have shown themselves as keenly alive to the beauty of the living pictures in the midst of which they have grown up, as our Burns and our Tannahill, and their wide-spreading cousinship in the region of song; but the pedestrian stranger

who walks leisurely through our land from Maidenkirk to John o' Groat's House, with an eye for rural and village architecture, will seek in vain for the air of trimness, neatness, and graceful comfort which meets him everywhere in all those districts of England which have been happy enough to keep themselves free from the defacing and disfiguring influences of our great manufacturing industries. What he will find as most characteristic of Scottish masonry —for the word architecture may not be abused in this application—is a certain substantiality and solidity, which may seem aptly to symbolise the stout worth of the occupiers of those long rows of unpictorial domiciles, with nothing to distinguish them from the grey wall that encircles a garden, but a few necessary square holes for windows ; no mouldings, no cornices, no porches, no balconies, no verandas, no gracefully pointed gables or quaint turrets : the barest stone prose that can be conceived in the shape of a house ; and this continuously, not only where the face of Nature, as in the mineral districts of Linlithgow and Lanarkshire, presents no feature that might invite the art of man to emulate her beauty, but in her most picturesque districts, as in Roslin, Dunblane, Strathspey, and other regions, the favourite haunts of view-hunting tourists. Nay, more : I am afraid that we are historically not only a tasteless but a dirty people. He who does not know this will find it amply attested in notable passages of Froissart's Chronicles, and in a well-known book of travels in Scotland by an English

gentleman, whose experiences of life in the High Street of Edinburgh, some thirty years before Princes Street was dreamt of, were anything but of a comfortable character.[1] No doubt matters are much better now; the infection of the railway stations, and the æsthetical demands of English tourists and residenters in Moffat, Pitlochry, Aviemore, and elsewhere, are yearly teaching our Scottish builders and house speculators to regard the sweetness, cleanliness, and grace, as well as the solidity, of their structures; and it is morally certain that a reformation, so hopefully begun, under influences so congenial to the spirit of the age, will go on with no slackened speed to its legitimate conclusion. Monuments of the large culture and fine taste of the Scottish architects of the present day meet the traveller everywhere, from the grey strength of the granite in the North to the softer graces of sandstone in the South; and the people that produced a MacCulloch, a Harvey, a MacWhirter, a Paton, and a Graham, to illustrate the poetry of colour in the features of their picturesque landscape, will not be backward to present to the world models of the

[1] Burt's *Letters from the North of Scotland* (London, 1754); and Burton, ch. xli., says of the Scottish aristocracy in Queen Mary's time, that "their dress was that of the camp or stable; they were dirty in person, and abrupt and disrespectful in manner." See also chap. lxiii., where Weldon, in his *Secret History of James I.*, tells of "stinking Edinburgh and *lousy* Scotland." And Sir William Brereton, who visited Edinburgh in 1634, while he praises the city highly, describes the people as "sluttish, nasty, and slothful."—(Burton, ch. lxxvi.)

Highland cottage and the Highland village that shall vie with the best examples of the kind in Gloucestershire or in Surrey.

But the most striking proof of our defective development in the emotional region of the soul is that we have no historical place in the grand array of great musical composers; only now, in the evening of this nineteenth century, do the names of Mackenzie and MacCunn seem to indicate an awakening ambition in the Scottish mind to claim an ennobling kinship with the Glucks and the Beethovens, the Webers and the Rossinis, of musical art on the Continent. Strange as this may appear to a people blessed with such a rich heritage of popular song, whose excellence has called forth the most hearty recognition from the most eminent composers and the most large-minded critics of Europe, the causes of this lamentable blank in our æsthetical physiognomy are only too obvious. The root of the matter doubtless lies in the complete satisfaction which the Scotsman finds to his higher energies in the hard practical work of the world where he works such wonders. Music to softer natures is the luxury of the soul; but the tightly-braced and well-girt Scot finds more delight in challenging danger and struggling with difficulty than in the luxurious cradling of sweetly-harmonised emotion. We do not expect that the grand muscularity of a Yorkshire horse and the sweetness of a nightingale or a blackbird should be united in the same animal; so it may be that the preoccupation of the typical

Scot with the stern business of life exercises a numbing influence on that relish for the rich revel of sweet sounds in which scientific music delights. Οὐ πάντα πάντων ἐστὶν, as the Greeks said, *Non omnia possumus omnes*; and extraordinary expansion in one direction will naturally induce a corresponding contraction in another. But there were, besides, forces of peculiar potency at work for long periods to estrange the Scot from a nice sensibility to the emotional luxuries of the opera, the oratorio, and the cathedral service. Driven to desperation in the so-called "killing times," by the brutal despotism of the priest-ridden Stuarts, our noble covenanting fathers had enough to do to save the honour of their souls, without dreaming of those musical decorations which in quiet times lend a grace to the gravity of devotion; and, if in their experience of the strength of devout feeling, gushing spontaneously from the heart, not imposed by formal regulation from without, they went so far as to denounce as sinful that æsthetical enginery of worship which was the accompaniment of their persistent persecutors, this was only a human weakness against which no class of men in similar circumstances may dare to fling a stone. There can be no question, however, that the neglect of sacred music in our Scottish schools, colleges, and churches, has stinted our emotional nature of the best source of its nourishment, and robbed our religious service of those graces which are as natural to a healthy worship as the purple flowers of the field are to the

green grass, and the songs of the birds to the leafage of the groves. But happily these unlovely bequests of a mistempered Calvinism are gone, or going. *Magna est* NATURA *et prævalebit;* Nature, though she stands many a rebuff from fretful or foolish mortals, will not be mocked for ever.

There is only one other charge sometimes brought against the Scot, that he is fond of money, or, as an Englishman once wittingly defined him, "A Scotsman is a man who keeps the Sabbath, and everything else he can lay his hands on." Now, so far as this is true I can only be sorry for it; for I cannot afford to differ from St. Paul, who, in his First Epistle to Timothy, says that "they that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts that drown men in destruction and perdition;" but the sting of this text lies not in having money or in making money, but in being bent at all hazards on the making of it; and in this sense there can be no doubt that the Scots have been occasionally great sinners, as the famous Darien scheme at the beginning of the last century, and in our own time portentous hydropathic and other towers of Babel, flouting the sky to-day and to-morrow kissing the clay, loudly testify; for the Scot is not merely a working man, but an adventurous and enterprising man, and a man whose thoughtfulness shoots out every now and then into subtle schemes and ambitious speculations, whose golden fruit falls tragically short of their gilded promise. I cannot see, however, that Sandy is in this phase

of his character in anywise a greater offender than his big brother John, or his Far West cousin Jonathan. Not only in women and in wine, but in all spheres where human passions come strongly into play, is the besetting sin of the world what we may call in Saxon-English *too-muchness*; and especially in countries where industrial and commercial enterprise of all kinds abound, and the air is hot with competition, men will rush blindly into monetary speculations, which, as St. Paul says, bring temptation and a snare; but apart from this feverish excess, one may wisely say that the love of money is rather a virtue than a vice, and is no more to be blamed in any man than the desire of a workman to have good tools, of a soldier to have good ammunition, or of a farmer to have good manure to the soil. The whole sin, in fact, lies not in the thing, but in the object, the τέλος, as the Greeks would call it, for which the thing is sought; and as no one thinks the less of King David, when he reads that he was "prudent in matters" as well as cunning at the harp, so it will rather redound to the praise of the Scot that he knows the value of a penny, that he does not lightly squander what he has painfully gained, and that he knows how to store up the product of the labour of to-day, that he may proceed from a broader foundation and with a higher ambition to-morrow.

And thus he stands before us with all his faults plainly a very proper man; and yet I seem to have omitted one of his most remarkable qualities, his

spirit of adventure and enterprise, a quality without which, indeed, the stoutest worker were only a serviceable tool in the hands of any one who might know to use him. Whether it be from the narrowness of his native bounds, and the unkindliness of his climate, or from the instinct of rising with which his democratic Church has inoculated him, it is certain that there is no man like the Scot for pushing his way, and rising to the front, not only at home, but in all distant and unknown regions whither his adventurous genius may have led him; insomuch that "the Scot abroad" forms a chapter in the book of his story scarcely less notable than Bannockburn and Drumclog. No matter in what direction you turn, from the roots of the snow-clad Himalayas in the East to the giant growth of the primeval forests in the Far West, there you will find Sandy, at once the most persistent in labour, the most daring in danger, and the most fruitful in result. In the early history of modern Europe, when France was yet struggling to assert herself against the hereditary claims of our Norman kings, we find Charles VII. fencing his throne with an honourable body of Scotch guards. In the same country, and in the territory of the Netherlands, we find Scotsmen amongst the most eminent professors of learning, and champions of a Reformed religion in the Universities. In the Thirty Years' War, at the battle of Leipzig, a Scotch brigade, with a Mackay at their head, received the public thanks from Gustavus Adolphus for their effective aid to

the cause of Protestantism and free thought in Germany; and, when in the middle of the next century the great founder of the Prussian monarchy maintained his ground stoutly against the united forces of France, Austria, and Russia, it was a Keith from the granite-girdled north that stood by him in his extremest need, and sealed his loyalty by his death at the sanguinary battle of Hochkirch. The Scotch, especially the more Celtic half of them, have always been conspicuous in war; and even on the sea element, where from various causes they have been less at home, the names of Duncan and Dundonald stand second only to Nelson in the glory-roll of British naval captains. In the not less glorious field of geographical exploration and missionary settlement, the sons of Scotia shine amongst the first; and when the sources or the flow of the three great African rivers required to submit themselves to the conditions of exact science, it was a Bruce from Stirlingshire who did the work for the Nile, a Park from Selkirk who did a similar service to the Niger, and a Livingstone from Lanarkshire added the Zambesi to the roll. In America, if a new journal is to be started, or a new line of railway laid over tracts of country where only strong faith and far-sighted intelligence can see the prospect of a distant success, there the man who dares where other men fear, and who advances where other men shrink, will be a Scot, belike an Aberdonian; and among the constituent legislators and Presidents of that great Transatlantic common-

wealth we find few names more illustrious than Hamilton, Monroe, Buchanan, and Grant. Nor less in that wonderful empire which British enterprise and administrative capacity have founded between the Ganges and the Indus, had we to wait long for the emergence of a Scottish hero in the front; for, while on the field of military exploit the names of Baird and Napier take rank with Wellington, in the less loud, though not less fruitful, domain of civil administration and legislation, there are no names known in India of more unsullied repute than Elphinstone, Macaulay, and Dalhousie.[1]

Here therefore we have before us a type of the *animal bipes implume*, the unfeathered biped called man, formed in the process of the ages, which has good reason to look upon itself with a certain grateful complacency, and which certainly can have no justifiable reasons for committing suicide. And in proportion to the difficulty of producing such a type, as evinced by the long trials and struggles required for its production, ought in the nature of things to be a loyal desire for its preservation. In the domain of natural science we see that nothing gives the scientific botanist more pain than the extermination of some rare plant by the rapacious greed of collectors; and no man can look on the portentous display of birds' wings on the top gear of the fashionable ladies of the year of grace 1889, without being

[1] See on this whole section *The Scot Abroad* (John Hill Burton); and *Scotland and the Scots* (Peter Ross), New York, 1889.

disturbed by the thought that the appetite for lofty decoration of the female form may have been gratified in this case by the blotting out from the volume of the feathered creation some loveliest type that gave glory to the waves, joyance to the air, or music to the groves. In the same way no lover of human nature will look with complacency on the extinction of any well-marked nationality, whether by the overriding violence or the insinuating seductions of another nation; and every sympathetic heart is glad to contemplate the persistency of a noble national type in the face of adverse forces, as of the Greeks, for instance, for four centuries under the tramp of the Turk, the Hungarians under the fascinations of courtly Germanism in Vienna, and the Irish, in face of the degrading influence of a superimposed Church, a stranger-lordship of land, and the narrow jealousy of a commercial master. But true as this is, there are in the subtlety and complexity of the action and interaction of forces in the moral world powers at work strong enough to undermine in the process of the generations, even the strongest nationalities which it had taken long centuries to build up; and as in the individual, evil communications, according to the Pauline warning, corrupt good manners, so in the intercourse and alliance of peoples there is ample scope for the strongest nationality being gently undermined that could not be violently overborne. Let Scotland therefore beware! Proud as she justly is of her historical position, and stoutly as she seems to stand

up for her independent national character at Burns' Festivals and other such patriotic demonstrations, let her know that there are at the present time social forces, daily and hourly at work in these islands, tending to make her less and less her distinctive self, and to juggle her by a continuity of plausible wiles and gilded flatteries out of her position as an independent monad in the history of the human family. What these forces are, and in what shape they are now visibly presenting themselves to the intelligent observer of social changes, I will now endeavour succinctly to state in the following propositions :—

1. Though great territorial magnitude is not in any wise a measure of the moral virtue that belongs to a people—on the contrary, the most powerful movements proceed generally from the smallest peoples, as the Greeks of Attica and the Hebrews of Palestine—nevertheless it is quite certain that superiority of territorial magnitude carries with it a variety of social forces that act powerfully on all minor magnitudes with which they come in contact. Conquest proverbially means more or less assimilation of the weaker by the stronger power; and though Scotland was never conquered, but joined itself to England by a free contract, the assimilating force of the more numerous body still remains, so that the theoretical equality of the two countries becomes practically a subordination—the lesser country comes to be looked on as a sort of province of the larger, and the union is in constant danger of

passing through various stages of fusion till it ends in absorption.[1]

2. In the case of Scotland this danger of absorption lies peculiarly near, because it seems quite plain that the terms of the Union of 1707 gave no sufficient guarantee for the preservation to Edinburgh of its importance as the capital of a separate kingdom. Had the terms of the Union been settled with a due regard to the historical position of Scotland as an independent kingdom, there certainly would have been found a clause binding the sovereign to reside in the capital of the minor kingdom at least two months in the year, and ordaining imperial parliaments to be held in Scotland for the transaction of specially Scottish business in a similar way and for the same period. That such guarantees were not given probably arose from the presence of the servile, treacherous, selfish, and unpatriotic spirit which Macaulay notes as so characteristic of the leading Scottish politicians and public men in the generation immediately preceding. Macaulay says: "In truth, the Council Chamber of Edinburgh [the Scottish Parliament] had been during a quarter of a century [in the time of King William] a seminary of all public and private vices, and some of the politicians whose character had been formed there

[1] See in Burton (ch. xxxvii.) how, on the occasion of the marriage of Queen Mary to the French king, France forthwith assumed the same patronising air to Scotland that London, with the approbation of not a few servile Scots, now does to Edinburgh.

had a peculiar hardness of heart and forehead to which Westminster, even in that bad age, could not show anything equal."

3. The transference of the seat of government absolutely to the great English capital has had the effect of turning the Scottish nobility and the upper classes into an appendage of the Court in London, and alienating them from Scottish feelings and Scottish associations to such a degree that not a few of them have ceased to have any vital connection with the country, except in the matter of rent-gathering and grouse-shooting. In all countries, indeed, from various causes, the nobility are more easily denationalised than the mass of the people; and from the days of Edward the First downwards this has been peculiarly the case with the nobility of Scotland.

4. The middle and upper middle classes in Scotland, and to a certain extent naturally enough in all countries, are inclined to take their cue from the aristocracy proper, and to consider a few months' servile attendance on London notabilities of more importance to their social significance than the loving and assiduous performance of their patriotic duties in the corner of the vineyard which, under Divine Providence, has been assigned them. They subject themselves willingly to a systematic process of Anglification. This is observable, particularly, in the west-end districts of our great cities, where men like Sir Walter Scott and Lord Cockburn, and ladies like the Baroness Nairne and Joanna Baillie,

are becoming less common every day, if indeed they have not altogether disappeared.

5. As a consequence of this estrangement of the nobility and the upper middle classes from Scottish feelings and Scottish interests, we find that the children of Scottish parents, even when better education is to be had at home, are sent to be trained in English schools and Universities, which are not ventilated by a single breath of Scottish patriotism, and where they are trained curiously in various sorts of necessary and unnecessary learning, but grow up utterly ignorant of the history, the traditions, the poetry, and the music of their native country. This is a great evil, and is neither more nor less than a slow process of committing national suicide.

6. But there is something worse than this. Not only are the children of Scottish parents, under the denationalising influences mentioned, brought up as Englishmen, and not as Scotsmen, but even in our Scottish schools and seminaries we do not find the glow of the heather, the odour of the pine, and the fragrance of the birch asserting themselves as they might have been expected to do in the atmosphere of a distinctly Scottish system of education. In fact, our Scottish education, of which we make a not unjust boast, is national mainly in its machinery, very little in its soul. In our Universities no lectures are delivered either on general or on Scottish history. The one chair of history was absorbed in the law faculty; and the consequence is that scores

of young men yearly enlarge their names with the most honourable titles that learned bodies can bestow, but carry beneath their waistcoats breasts utterly untouched by any of those mighty events and heroic achievements in the social world with which every well-educated man, as a man, and every true Scot, should, in the first place, be familiar. This lamentable lack of national inspiration and national furniture in our schools and educational establishments is to be attributed partly to indifference and carelessness and utilitarianism in the mass of the people, partly to the peculiar defects in respect of local culture that are necessarily bound up with a system of metropolitan centralisation.

7. Observe further an educational evil for which the Scottish people have themselves to blame, or say rather which arose naturally out of the democratic character of their Church, and the stepmotherly fashion in which national funds which might have been used for the noblest scholastic purposes were appropriated by the grasping hand of the landowners.[1] We have few middle schools of the highest class in Scotland; and in defect of these preparatory institutions our Universities are peopled with crowds of raw lads capable only of a rudimental inculcation, while the function of the professoriate is degraded in certain departments of the highest culture to the level of a second-class middle school. This state of

[1] On the unchristian and ungentlemanly conduct of the nobility in seizing on the temporalities of the Church to which they had no right, see Burton, ch. xli. and xlix.

matters furnishes the nobility and not a few of the upper classes in Scotland with an additional motive for deserting the Universities of their native country, and seeking for their hopeful progeny, if not more solid knowledge, a richer gloss of reputable culture in the South.

8. As the most lamentable symptom of this disease of Anglification, which we are allowing to eat into our vitals, must be mentioned specially the sort of ban passed by the so-called fashionable world against Scottish song and the beautiful musical dialect of our popular poetry which, though infinitely superior to English as an organ of lyrical expression, is summarily dismissed as "vulgar," and the chastest songs of Burns and others ignored as much as if they were grossly immoral. When nature, and truth, and beauty, and good taste are thus systematically sacrificed to a dainty affectation and the worship of the gilded idol called fashion, it were in vain to marshal forth an array of serious reasons—the slaves of unreasonable fashion are not amenable to reason—we must content ourselves by saying in plain speech to these very genteel and very fashionable people, who thus allow themselves to be trained into the disuse of the richest heritage they have received from their ancestors, that they are by such conduct incurring and will continue to incur the merited contempt of every intelligent foreigner.

9. In respect of our national religion, it may be remarked, that, while a tendency to join the Episcopal body had till recently a plausible justification

in the baldness of our Presbyterian service, the practice of deserting the plain Geneva gown for the lawn sleeves of the bishop, not uncommon in certain quarters, seems to have no nobler motive than the same pseudo-genteel affectation which denounces our Scottish melodies as vulgar, and can be looked on only as one of those instances of declension from a high to a low level of patriotism which the union of a smaller with a larger nation in persons of a low moral type never fails to induce.

10. As the last symptom of the extent to which we have allowed the denationalising process to eat into our bones, I must mention the tameness with which even our utilitarian men of business year after year allow matters of the most serious pecuniary concern to be dragged up to London and settled there before a hasty and an over-burdened tribunal, at an expense of time, brains, and money which may conduce, it may be, to the imaginary dignity and the pecuniary profits of a few professional persons, but does certainly entail, in not a few cases, a very serious loss to the great body of the community.

That these causes have been working and these effects produced towards the denationalising of our beloved Scottish motherland any man must be blind who does not perceive ; in fact it would have been a miracle had it been otherwise, while the Scottish people, exhausted by the severe struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were willing in the eighteenth to take things easily, and swim, as the *οἱ πολλοί* ever will do, with the stream. Such

a potent influence both materially and morally as London exercises over Edinburgh cannot be resisted without a high purpose and a firm resolve. Not a few Scotsmen of the easy-minded class are willing to look on this absorption of the lesser into the greater country, as a historical result to be accepted, not only with resignation, but with gratitude, and are never weary of trumpeting the advantages which modern Scotsmen enjoy, as members of a world-wide empire, instead of being subjects of a petty kingdom; but these sophists forget that it is not the fact of the Union, but the unfair terms of the Union, to which patriotic Scotsmen object. It is not that we have shaken hands with an old enemy, and entered into a brotherly compact, but that we have given over the headship of the administration to one party in the concern, and are content to play the subordinate part of a head-clerk rather than that of a co-manager in the business. It is also forgotten by these Anglified gentlemen that England has gained as much from Scotland, in the way of fighting her battles and doing her business, all over the world, as Scotland has gained by the glory of being coupled with her name; nay rather, England has gained whatever she has gained from us without any sacrifice of her national dignity or her material interests; whereas for the honour conferred on us by the use of the English name and the prestige of the British Empire, we have paid dearly not only in the shape of material losses, as can easily be shown in figures, but, what is of much greater consequence, in the

weakening of our native manhood, in the toning down of our national features, and in the forfeiture of the historical status which was gained to us by our forefathers. And lest any reader should imagine that this view of our position as a people is the product of a fanciful sentimentalism in the brain of the present writer, I will append here the opinion to the same effect of a noble lord, who is at once a good Scotsman, an intelligent man, a philosophic thinker, and an influential statesman. In the autumn of 1886 the Earl of Rosebery, on being admitted to the freedom of the burgh of Linlithgow, standing in the great Public Hall of that historic site, uttered in my hearing the following words :—

"When we forget that historic national life—and I call it historic, because the very essence of our national life rests on our history—when we forget our individual national life as Scotsmen, you may be sure that the history of Scotland has come to an end. The principle of nationality I take to be this, that we should cling to everything essential to us as a historical nation—as a historical, and, in one sense, a separate nation ; and because we are a historical nation we should remember with all the more pride that we are one of many nations that go to make up the greatest empire the world has ever seen.

"In an empire composed of various races, of countless territories, the duty of the statesmen who have to watch over that empire is this : to take care that every part and every nation of that empire is a contented part and a satisfied nation. If we then,

in this island, cannot tell and cannot satisfy what are the wishes of Scotland or England or Wales, how can we hope to satisfy the wishes of Australia, of India, or of Canada? And if we cannot satisfy the wishes of Australia or India or Canada, the kingdom of Great Britain may continue to exist as a second-rate power; but the empire of Great Britain has come to an end. It is for this reason that I value every gradation of the empire: I value our burgh life, our provincial life, our national life."

So the wise young laird of Dalmeny; and whosoever does not say *Amen* to this sentiment, let him die, as he has lived, a slave! The man who knows not to respect himself has no right to look for respect from others.

I may conclude these remarks on Scottish nationality, by what our preachers are wont to call the practical application of the discourse, under four heads. All you who have not lost your pride in your Scottish character and your national traditions—

(1) Stamp in your souls the strong conviction that, as matters now stand, there is something rotten in the state of Scotland, and that, unless a decided stand be made at the present moment, you are in great danger of losing your two most valuable possessions,—your inheritance of a distinctive type of manhood from the past, and your estimation in the eye of Europe as a political factor of no vulgar significance.

(2) Screw your Middle Schools and Universities up to such a level as that there shall be no excuse for

any father of a hopeful Scottish son saying that he sends his son to England because he cannot find for him in Scotland the education that belongs to a gentleman.

(3) Give your native Presbyterian Church services such graces and embellishments as may prevent any desertion to the Episcopacy from purely æsthetical motives.

(4) Remove the double reproach of multitudinous babblement and insolent centralisation from the British Parliament, and let Scotch business be transacted in Edinburgh, either by a separate national Parliament for Scotland, in the fashion of the States Parliaments in America, or, what I personally would much prefer, by a session of the Scottish members of the present Parliament of Great Britain, to be held for two months, or six weeks, as the case might require, in Edinburgh, for the despatch of specially Scotch business, with an Executive, in either case resident in the historical capital of Scotland, for the administration of Scottish affairs.

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.

It is not always that the etymology of a word supplies us with a fertile idea on the subject which it signifies, but this is the case with the word *education*; for, while the corresponding Greek term *παιδεία* merely means vaguely *how to handle a boy*, the Latin *edŭco*—an obvious variant of *edūco*—plainly means to *draw forth*, or *draw out*: a word than which none could be more fit, both to express the essential character of a youthful training according to Nature, and to serve at the same time as a protest against a false idea not unfrequently entertained on the subject. For people not rarely both speak and act on the notion that to educate is not to draw out, but to put in, to furnish, as it were, the empty chamber of the youthful brain with all sorts of knowledges, or, to use Locke's simile, to imprint on the blank table of memory whatever measurable results a local Education Board or a centralised dictatorship may have prescribed. But it is obvious that there is something external, mechanical, and intrusive in this notion, which altogether ignores the mystery of growth from within,

the characteristic of everything vital. The gardener, in this matter, will supply us with a better analogy than the upholsterer. He knows very well that the fair fruits and flowers, for which he prepares the soil and irrigates the ground, accept his aid only as a stimulant to their natural growth, and as a condition of a more luxuriant development. He knows also that many of the most lovely of Nature's productions, such as the heather on the braes, or the birch-trees in the glen, grow of themselves with a peculiar beauty and a charm which no art can improve. Between this craft of the gardener, as exercised in our enclosed gardens, and the function of the educationist in the tending of young human souls, there is only this difference, that, whereas in the vegetable world the plant may attain its normal excellence without any artificial aid, man must submit to a certain process of artificial culture before he can come forth fully equipped for what Nature meant him to be and to do. Nature clothes the bear and dresses the peacock without any help from a zoologist; but a man will not get a warm coat, nor a lady a gay pelisse, without the aidful craft of the tailor and the milliner. So in all other matters: our boon mother does everything for the flowers of the field and the beasts therein; man she flings forth with the proud privilege of doing everything for himself, but at the same time with the accompanying penalty of becoming less than the brute, if he does not bestir himself to exercise this privilege. Hence Education; hence

the necessity to human beings of systematic training in schools and academies; but always only as a stimulus and a help, never as a surrogate for a self-rooted growth and an automatic tendency. Without these the best educational system can do no effective work in the training of human souls, any more than a ship can sail without a breeze or a dinner have relish without an appetite.

I have used the analogy of a garden; let us follow it out. In a complete scheme of youthful training, according to the ripe results of modern times, there are four gardens in which the human plant must be rooted in order to produce the richest and the most healthy growth. There is first the Family, then the School, then the University, and alongside of all these there is the Church. Of these four, the first is in many respects the most important; it is in fact a school instituted by Nature herself, an institution which, like all the Divine workmanship, cannot be wrong, and which contains within itself, acting in the most kindly harmony, all the influences, physical, moral, and intellectual, that help the young human creature to grow. Wisely does Dean Stanley say somewhere, "The family is the patriarchal church, and the father of the family is the patriarchal priest;" and though it is quite true, as Aristotle remarks,[1] that no man belongs to himself individually, or to the family of which he is a part, but to the State, it is equally true that no State institution, however perfect, can

[1] *Politics*, ix. 1.

be vitalised by such a healthy atmosphere for youthful growth as that which is begotten of the relation of parent and progeny. Whether, therefore, it be Plato that from a philosophical notion, or Sparta that from a military ideal, wished to abolish or subordinate the functions of the family in the rearing of good citizens, they run equally contrary to Nature, and must be condemned. Much more are certain English fathers and mothers to be reprobated, who, whether from laziness, or want of natural affection, or merely from traditional bad habit, send their children away as soon as possible to distant schools; by which a double loss is incurred, —to the child in its removal from the kindly atmosphere of the parent, and to the parent from the absence of those stimulating impulses communicated to a sympathetic father or mother from the budding intelligence and the vernal freshness of the child. Let this, therefore, stand as a sound reason why, in every well-ordered country, schools of all grades should be planted in such proximity to the centres of local population that there may be no excuse for young persons being sent outside the family atmosphere, till such time as they are about to be launched into the large world, and must learn to stand on their own legs, and shape their own careers in the crowded arena of society; for, of course, after a certain age pure home-breeding may be as bad a preparation for the business of life as premature schooling is for the healthy growth of the unripe youngling. Exclusive home-culture is apt to breed

either conceit or shyness, or, as Shakespeare has it, something homely in the wit—

> "For home-bred youths have ever homely wits;"

while, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that the self-assertion and self-reliance which are forced upon English boys in the conflicts of the great English schools are the germs of that manly spirit, pluck, and ready efficiency for which Englishmen all over the world are celebrated. In our second garden, the School, the chief thing to be attended to is that the different kinds of schools be not confounded in their natural gradation, but kept apart in their peculiar spheres. Where infant-schools are necessary or advisable, as they may be in exceptional cases, the main thing to observe is to let the young creature grow, and to keep it in a pleasant fashion out of mischief; here any pedagogic interference with the natural process of spontaneous forth-putting of untried vital energies is particularly to be deprecated. After the age of seven or eight, when formal schooling may safely commence, special care must be taken not to confound the boy with the youth, and to observe a well-marked boundary between what a boy requires simply as a boy, and what he may afterwards require as a member of an organised society; for this later stage the middle school, with its natural divarication, as the Germans have it, into burgh school and learned school will come in. Into this higher region the boy will be transferred about the

age of twelve. Here he will remain for five or six years, occupied partly with subjects of general human interest, such as suit his years, and with a distinct pointing, at the same time, to his proximate destiny in life, whether in the mercantile line or in a professional career. At the age of seventeen or eighteen, the young aspirant will pass, either into the Universities, or into such other upper-class training-schools or colleges as lead more directly into his destined sphere of life-work. If at the University, two years will wisely be spent on such human studies as either belong to effective citizenship, in the best sense of the term, or are more closely connected with the special professional outlook of the student, as history with law, geology, botany, and natural history generally with medicine; and, after this, three years of special technical study will equip the young gentleman fairly for a well-trained worker in his department of the specialised machinery of society.

In our British Universities, as contrasted with those of Germany, two great faults have been committed, which may wisely be mentioned here.

In the English Universities they have fallen into the error of cherishing a few pet subjects—Greek, for instance—instead of making the field of intellectual equipment as wide as Nature, and as various as the capacities with which the Creator has so richly endowed His creatures; and connected with this is the compulsory drill to which all young men are subjected in the formalism of these pet subjects,

instead of allowing them a large option of mental action, and the free choice of service, not under an academical drill-sergeant, but under the direct commandership and leadership of the greatest intellectual captains and gladiators of the age; in other words, tutors in the English Universities do a certain prescribed work in a narrow sphere, where Professors ought to perform free work in a large sphere. In Scotland again, though the sphere of prescribed culture is larger—not, however, in any wise like the large catholicity of Germany—the yet greater error is committed of neglecting the middle schools and sinking the whole tone of University teaching, and allowing whole armies of unripe boys and belated lads to march directly from elementary schools into college classes, and be furnished there with the rudiments of a culture which, being without firm root, can never grow into any sort of ripeness.

Our fourth garden is the Church; and by this we need hardly say that we do not mean religious indoctrination, whether in its sacerdotal, scholastic, or ecclesiastical type—this belongs naturally to the special teaching of the separate Churches, with which a general scheme of the philosophy of education cannot interfere,—but we mean merely the moral element of education, as it is presented to the world most perfectly in the ethical ideal of Christianity: the human, popular, and catholic element of religion. For man, as Socrates wisely taught, is a religious, and the only religious, animal; and reverence for the Prime Cause of all law and order in the universe

may well be called the key-stone of the arch of morality, under every possible form of ethical association. Therefore, while we gladly demit the special orthodoxies of different Churches to the special educative enginery of the Churches, we cannot, in the great scheme of an education according to nature, dispense with the religious element. Religion, in fact, is not so much a separate subject of teaching, the business of a separate religious school, called a Church, as an atmosphere, and the one healthy atmosphere of all schools, from the prayer lisped on the mother's knee to the hymn pealed from well-trained throats in the cathedral service.[1] Without reverence indeed, as Goethe teaches, there can be no complete intellectual growth: only some sort of one-sided acuteness, cleverness, or dexterity; for large intellectual wealth without large sympathy is impossible, and sympathy means love and reverence, which are the generative forces in all true Christian piety. Let therefore the school be in this sense always a church; let praise and prayer be part of its daily breath; laying thus the broad foundation on which separate denominational churches may raise their special types of spiritual architecture, as venerable tradition or special capacity may dictate. The

[1] This distinction is carefully marked by the Greeks in the words *εὐσέβεια* and *θρησκεία*, of which the one relates to the tone of mind in the worshipper, and the other to the type of the worship; and this is what St. James means when he says (i. 27), that the true *θρησκεία* is not the temple or church service which many understand by religion, but the service of good works, which is the natural outcome of *εὐσέβεια*.

species exists for the sake of the genus, not the genus for the sake of the species,—both, nevertheless, equally necessary; for, as the genus without the species would be a grand monotony, so the greatest wealth of individual growth, not subsumed under a common genus, would be only a brilliant confusion.

So much for our gardens. Taking now the young human creature in the bosom of the family, and the exercise of the school, we ask what has the gardener to do beyond his negative wisdom of letting the creature grow?—a wisdom not always observed by intermeddling mothers, in China and elsewhere, who conceit themselves that they can improve Nature by close bandages and constrictive machinery of various kinds applied to the limbs. Well, supposing the educator wise enough to abstain from all such unhealthy appliances, what has he to do first? Plainly this, to watch the earliest indications of opening intelligence, and aid Nature in the direction to which she spontaneously points. And here, of course, the eyes are the first thing. The eyes of a fool, we read, are at the ends of the earth, but the eyes of a child are at what encircles him, and what is nearest to him; a fact which plainly calls out to the educator that curiosity, which is naturally dominant in young people, shall be carefully guided and wisely gratified. Therefore he must above all things, as Plato teaches, have a sacred care that nothing offensive or ugly, nothing distorted or disnatured in any fashion, shall meet the vision of the young. The natural, the normal, the beautiful are

the only proper food of the soul; and, though of course, laughter is natural and human, a healthful sport of the soul with otherwise painful incongruities, yet the ludicrous and the grotesque, which young people affect, must be kept in the secondary and subordinate position which healthy Nature allows; for the living poetry of God which the Psalmist celebrates in the 104th and not a few other Psalms, was not created to be laughed at, but to be reverenced and admired. This, translated into scholastic language, should mean that, in all healthy systems of juvenile training, natural history in all its branches, specially physical geography, topography, botany, geology, and zoology, should be given the prominence which Nature plainly indicates by the eagerness and quickness of the observant faculties in the young; and, in accordance with this principle, every well-conducted school should in the flowery season have at least one day in the week devoted to walks in the neighbouring country, or in the closely adjoining districts, now so cheaply open to all movers. In this way, and in this way only, will teaching abide in that living connection with Nature which keeps it free from the dry bones of bloodless facts on the one hand, and the pedantry of barren rules on the other. Our climate certainly is not so kindly as that enjoyed by the Greeks, who taught mostly in the open air, in the pictured Stoa, the Lyceum, the Academy, or even the public street, as was the practice of Socrates; but for this very reason we should be forward to make a fruitful use

of the bright days that we have; and we have fogs from the east and rain from the west at least six months in the year, which, if not always seasoned with summer warmth, are instinct with that breezy freshness which is the best stimulant as well to mental soundness as to pedestrian activity. No doubt there may readily be, in the study of external Nature, a one-sided tendency, which must be guarded against; and there is in the present age, in certain quarters, a magnifying of physical science at the expense of moral and literary culture, which is unhealthy; but this scientific one-sidedness, as it arose naturally as a reaction from the bookish pedantry of our classical scholars, so it will cease to parade itself as soon as that balance of antagonistic forces shall have been achieved, which it is the function of all reaction to produce. The subordination of merely physical science to moral culture in the field of general education has nowhere been set forth more clearly than by the great poet-thinker of Weimar, whose wise words on the subject I need make no apology for inserting here at length:—

"The knowledge of Nature is a good thing; but it must be studied primarily in its natural and healthy connection with ourselves. I would not force young people to court a curious intimacy with worms, and beetles, and monkeys, and other creatures removed from the natural range of human sympathy. With Nature we should have nothing to do in the first place except with so much of it as forms our living environment. With every green tree whose

rich leafage surrounds us, with every shrub on the roadside where we walk, with every grass that bends to the breeze in the field through which we pass, we have a natural relationship; they are our true compatriots. The birds that hop from twig to twig in our gardens, that sing in our bowers, are part of ourselves; they speak to us from our earliest years, and we learn to understand their language. Let a man ask himself, and he will find that every creature sundered from its natural surroundings, and brought into strange company, makes an unpleasant impression on us, which disappears by habit. A man must live in a certain whirl of motley life before he can have any natural pleasure in apes, and parrots, and negro boys, and such like. If such odd and paradoxical creatures are to be studied in a healthy way it must be in their *habitat* and amid their natural surroundings; and that master of natural science alone is worthy of respect who presents to us every creature, however strange and however odd, in its proper neighbourhood and element. Humboldt can so describe Nature, and him I gladly hear.

"A museum of natural history always seems to me like the tombs of Egyptian kings, in which various sorts of beasts and plants are presented in mummified rigidity. These oddities may claim a curious attention from a caste of mystical priests, but into the sphere of general education they should never enter—not only as being out of place, but as in all likelihood displacing things that have better right to occupy the attention of the young. A teacher who tries to

awaken the sympathetic interest of young persons in a single noble deed, or a single really good and heroic poem, does more towards his true growth than one who can tell off before him the names and describe the appearances of thousands of the inferior animals: for the upshot of all that curious study of low organisms is simply what we know already—that man, and man alone, has in a peculiar and special sense been created in the image of God."[1]

So be it! and, while we do not forget the wisdom of the Hebrew Solomon, who spoke of trees from the cedar-tree that is in Lebanon to the hyssop upon the wall, and also of beasts and fowls, and creeping things, and of fishes,[2] we shall carefully take along with it the wisdom of a wise English poet and a great German thinker, that in the education of a human being what is most human is most suitable, and that the proper study of mankind is man.

In connection with the sciences of observation, it is to be carefully noted that drawing, which is too often relegated to the sphere of technical education, has an educative force, a universally human value,

[1] Even grown men are sometimes dwarfed by intense one-eyed devotion to some field of specialistic observation. I have little doubt, for instance, that this was the case with Darwin, who in his *Letters* (vol. iii. p. 252), written so late as February 1882, honestly confesses that, when in his old age he had at last got a glimpse of Aristotle, Linnæus and Cuvier, his early gods in Natural Science, appeared to him mere schoolboys. A minute scientific specialist, such as the present age lightly produces, may become an Atheist or an Agnostic; a thinker of large survey and catholic appreciation, such as Aristotle, never can.

[2] 1 Kings iv. 33.

not only as teaching young people to use their eyes, but as giving them an early impulse to exercise the divine gift of sight in the appreciation of beautiful forms. This is Aristotle's remark;[1] but, if it was the Greek, I am afraid it is by no means the general practice of our British schoolmasters, both English and Scotch, who are fond of calling the Greeks, "Lord, Lord," but do not the things which they say. Certainly in my young days, when I went through the regular process of grammatical and other drill in a well-conducted school in Aberdeen, no attempt was made to teach me to use my eyes on any object but grey books; and I remember well when, as a young man in Rome, where I resided for fifteen months, and consorted principally with artists, I learned for the first time that I had never looked at things as they present themselves to the eye in their natural relations and proportions; and forthwith I set myself to take regular lessons in drawing, in which art I made some creditable progress. This neglect of the γραφική, which, as we have just noted, the most sound-headed of the Greeks so emphatically recommends, and which the wisest of the Germans, in his youth, so largely practised, has its source in one besetting sin of our modern education, the worship of BOOKS. Our schoolmasters too often use books to shut out Nature, not to help it. Books are, like money, a means to an end—not an end in themselves; the most useful of servants, but the most abusive of masters. Books are like micro-

[1] *Politics* ix. 3.

scopes, magnifying-glasses and telescopes,—useful only to those who have eyes to begin with. A book, in fact, should never be consulted unless to complement observation and experiment, when these are incomplete, or to supplement them when they are impossible. But partly from the cheapness of book-production in the present age, and partly from the laziness or want of direct vitality in teachers, not a few things are taught in our schools from dead books, instead of from the living eye and the living ear dealing directly with living influences; and in this way it happens that the patient young creature who for a length of time is submitted to the process of learning everything from grey paper instead of green life, grows up to puberty having the walls of his brain-chamber written over with all sorts of vague words and barren rules, but utterly destitute of that stout root, strong pulse, and blooming hue which belong to all knowledge vitally received from external Nature, and vitally assimilated by Nature from within. Books, no doubt, especially with the young, whose sphere of observation is necessarily narrow, will always claim a great field of work in the scholastic world; and reading and writing, what the Greeks called *γράμματα*, must in nowise be treated lightly; but let the schoolmaster beware, and watch with a holy jealousy against any substitutional encroachment which these subsidiary forces may be willing to make on his primary sphere of life upon life. Specially, let him take a leaf from the wisdom of the ancient Egyptians, who learned much from

picture-writing long before letters were invented or books were in general circulation. Let him take care that the walls of the schoolroom be hung round with speaking portraits of all the great and good heroes and heroines of national and general history, as also with striking presentations of the picturesque scenes, famous cities, and historic sites, that mark the dramatic moments of human progress; for these will remain through life, and compass their bearer with a rich array of monitory witnesses, long after whole volumes of dim record, and long columns of unfructifying dates, shall have passed into oblivion.

The next faculty that in a well-ordered scheme of education demands special culture is MEMORY; and here again, I am sorry to say, that I have a charge to bring against books, a charge which comes not from me specially, but primarily, and with the highest authority, from that great high priest of the worthiest thinking, Plato. In the fifty-ninth chapter of the *Phædrus*, it stands thus written: "At the Egyptian city of Naucratis there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis was sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation, and geometry and astronomy, and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days Thamus was the king of the whole of Upper Egypt, which is the district surrounding that great city which is called by the Hellenes Egyptian Thebes, and they called the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed

his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them. He went through them, and Thamus inquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them.

"There would be no use in repeating all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, 'This,' said Theuth, 'will make the Egyptians wiser, and give them better memories; for this is the cure of forgetfulness and of folly.' Thamus replied: 'O most ingenious Theuth, he who has the gift of invention is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance a paternal love of your own child has led you to say what is not the fact; for this invention of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories: they will trust to the external written characters, and not remember themselves. You have found a specific, not for memory, but for reminiscence, and you give your disciples only the pretence of wisdom; they will be hearers of many things, and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient, and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome, having the reputation of knowledge without the reality.'" [1]

[1] Cæsar, in a familiar passage, *Bell. Gall.* vi. 14, says exactly the same thing about the Druids, viz., that they eschewed committing their theological and ritual doctrines to paper, lest they should thereby lose their firm hold of the living memory.

This witness is true, and more true now unquestionably than it was in the days of Plato; for there are many more young persons under regular school drill in this year of grace 1889 than there were in the year 400 B.C., when Socrates drank the hemlock as the penalty of his superior wisdom, and the great idealist was a young man, not above thirty, walking reverently in the footsteps of the martyr-sage. It must be plain to every one that there is too much reading and too little memorising in our existing educational methods; a practice hurtful alike to the memory and the imagination, two intimately connected faculties, and which I would remedy in a very simple fashion as follows. Take for instance the Battle of Bannockburn, which, as the root and foundation of our existence as a distinct European nationality, ought to be as vividly pictured in the memory of every well-educated Scot as Marathon with its Miltiades was to the young Athenian, and Zama with its Scipio Africanus to the Roman. Well, supposing myself a teacher of youth in any Scottish school, assisted, if in the neighbourhood, by local inspection, or, if at a distance, by plans and pictures, I would visibly plant the English and Scottish armies in due order with reference to Stirling Castle and the burn of Bannock, marking specially the relative positions of Randolph, the Douglas, and the host of baggage-bearers on the Gillies' Hill, whose sudden appearance at a critical moment brought swift decision to the stiffly protracted struggle; individual strokes of force, such as that familiar one when the

warrior-king clave the English knight in two, breaking the handle of his own battle-axe by the fervid impulse of the blow, would be duly emphasised; and the picture would conclude with the English king and his scattered chivalry drifting before the victorious Scots from Stirling to Dunbar and Berwick, and from Berwick to the lands besouth the Tweed—never to return. Of this historical lecture I would allow no notes to be taken by my young hearers; they must hold the sequence of the events in a living memory, not on dead paper; and the scene they must retain in the picture-gallery of the imagination, not in the arbitrary symbols of a book. Next day I would march them up before me, and hear them tell in their own language the details of the great historical charter of our nationality which had been set before them. Then, and not till then, would I allow them to read the record of the story in print; and along with the more minute details of the great national achievement, which the written record might supply, I would stamp in their minds its exact date, 24th June 1314, to stand out, like a projecting cape on a shelving shore, as prominent in the memory of every true Scot as the year 1517 is to every stout Protestant, or 1688 to every loyal Briton. Better of course always than mere description, however vivid, and mere pictures, however striking, in such teaching, would be the personal perambulation of the ground; and for this reason, and also because, unless when dulled by long familiarity, our nearest surroundings are what we are naturally

most interested to know, all historical teaching ought to start from the pictures which the scene of the teaching is directly calculated to recall. Thus, in Arbroath, for instance, the teacher who should fail to place vividly before the eyes of the native youth the sad story of Scotland's subjection to England after the battle of Alnwick, under William, strangely called the Lion, and the significant coupling of his name with that of the ambitious Churchman before whom Norman Henrys and Scottish Williams were equally compelled to veil their kingly tops; or who, in St. Andrews, should not discourse with a fervid expatiation on the seed of the Scottish Reformation sown in blood by the stern old cardinal in his grim rock-castle beside the sea; or again, in Edinburgh, who should not point out, as he walked along Princes Street, the spot where the nephew of the Bruce, as a prophetic prelude to Bannockburn, scaled the steep Castle rock, and redeemed it from the hold of the stranger by a feat of masterly assault; or who should pass with a regardless eye the spot in the Grassmarket where the youthful Renwick watered the causeway with his blood, in order to prepare the way for the deluge of fiery indignation that within three months swept Popish James from a throne which he had used to betray, not to preserve, the rights of a too-confiding people:—in all such historic sites, the teacher who neglects the speaking stimulants before him to let the faculties of the child drift among scenes of which he can have no clear conception, and events in which he has no living

interest, shows himself utterly ignorant of the elementary principles of the noble art which he professes. The retentive power of the memory and the imagination, its natural adjunct, depends on two things—on the intensity of the original impression and the frequency of the repetition. Of these two agencies, the first will be secured by presenting to the learner subjects in which he has a direct living interest, and by not allowing him to wander over many pictures before he has fixed his mark with full vital intention on one ; and the other, the repetition, will follow as a matter of course, if the teacher will abstain from the vain ambition of turning the juvenile mind into a store-chamber of multitudinous dates, to make a parade for an hour before a mechanical examiner, and to be forgotten by the unhappy victim of bookish cram in fewer weeks than it cost him months to acquire them.

The next step in mental development is Generalisation, the first distinctly human process in the growth of a human soul ; for that many of the lower animals are both sharp in observation and strong in memory the most superficial persons must have had occasion to note again and again. The beginnings of generalisation, or advancing from the species to the genus, will be observed in children of early years in a very natural way. A boy who sees a frog for the first time, after having been familiar with fish, will naturally call it a fish ; he has formed the generalisation that a fish is a swimming animal, and that all animals who swim in water are fishes.

This of course is a jump; but it is a step in the process of thinking, and he will soon be taught to discriminate and subdivide his great swimming family into those that live constantly in the liquid element, and swim with fins, and those who live occasionally in that element, and paddle with legs. Natural history in this way presents itself as the great teacher in the logical process of generalisation; and nothing can be more shallow than a style of talking, not uncommon with a certain class of persons, who depreciate the study of natural history in schools, on the ground that there can be no mental training in a study that deals only with the facts presented by the senses. On the contrary, when the teacher knows his craft there is no more fruitful school of juvenile logic than the army of living objects which thrust themselves in such rich array before us in the magnificent parade of terrestrial life. Take Botany, for instance. How is that to be taught? Not merely by stamping on each product of the green field, as it passes before the eye, its proper name, its peculiar qualities, and its fruitful uses,—a very profitable exercise no doubt,—but by going out into the country on a summer day, and making a collection of all varieties of plants as they occur, and then, on return to school, spreading them out in bright confusion on the teacher's table. What then? The teacher, following out the scientific method, must here lead the pupils to teach themselves. He will call upon them to look nicely, and dispose the flowery heaps into separate bundles,

according to their most obvious points of similarity and kinship. Stimulated to self-help by this hint, the young herbalists will set themselves to arrange, shall we say, first the flowerless plants, the grasses, in one parcel; then the lilies, or other plants with long lanceolate leaves, in another group; after that the campanulate or bell-shaped flowers, our Scottish blue-bell; then again the flowers with a labiate or lip-shaped pendent blossom; after that all flowers with a starry blossom, as the saxifrage and star-worts, will be classed together; while the daisies, with a broad-faced chubby inflorescence, will form a well-marked separate group. Satisfied so far, the teacher will then call on the young logician to analyse still further, and by a more minute analysis make a more true and distinctive generalisation, and in doing so he will direct attention specially to certain organs found in all plants, but subject to different numerical limitations,—stamens, pistils, and petals. A full classification will then be made on this basis, and the Linnean orders, and some of the most well-marked natural families in the vegetable world, will stand out, the work of the young observer's generalising faculty;—at once an addition to his knowledge, and an encouragement to his knowing, an exercise in classification and the subsumption of the individual under species, genus, and family, than which he will find none more profitable in the best-taught logic class of the Universities.

So much for all sorts of knowledge that come to us so soon as we know what knowing means, through

the senses, permanently stamped by memory, and elevated into the picture-gallery of the soul by imagination. We now pass on to the distinctively human faculty of λόγος or reason, where the mind, firmly seated on the throne of its own consciousness, without any stimulus from a sensuous object, delights itself in tracing the necessary relations of definite numbers and spaces. Here an altogether new idea comes into play—things not only *are*, but they *must be*. Simple arithmetic, of course, is the starting-point here, not only from its general utility, and from the ease with which its abstract conclusions can be verified, but from the dexterity which it gives to the mind in dealing with multitudinous units that otherwise would fall into hopeless confusion, and overwhelm the master that ought to command them. At a later stage, and with a firmer brain, the less obvious qualities of definite spaces, both in relation to the parts of which they are composed, and to other spaces with which they may be composed, Mathematics, as the best possible discipline towards the apprehension of necessary sequences, must ever hold a prominent place in every well-ordered scheme of juvenile training. Not that mathematical truths are in any respect more certain than moral truths, or æsthetical truths, or any system of truths whatsoever, firmly rooted, as all truth is, in the Divine constitution of things; but because the problems which they present are less complex, and cleared *ab initio* from the disturbing influence of any extraneous forces. They

present therefore a pure field of discipline for initiating the juvenile mind into the idea of causation, in its strictest sense, a causation where the vulgar fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* is absolutely excluded, inasmuch as every mathematical demonstration is only an unfolding or evolution of what lies necessarily in the terms of the definition. When I make it plain to a young man that from the very conception of two parallel lines it is impossible that one of them should be so deflected towards the other as not to enclose a triangular space whose angles shall be exactly equal to two right angles, I introduce him to a process of thinking, as fruitful of reliable facts as thinking without such training is fertile in baseless fancies. All savages have some hint of thinking, and their theologies, however silly they may appear to us, are products of the search for an ultimate cause, which lies radically in the human reason as distinctly differentiated from brute instinct. And, if even among highly cultured peoples a search after the causes of things belongs rather to the philosophic few than to the intelligent many, it is equally true that the more the intelligent many are lessoned to distinguish inherent causation from accidental concatenation, the nearer will they approach to the true thinking which brings the human into intimacy with the Divine; and as the best palæstra for the severity of this true thinking, modern schools and ancient Academies have equally pointed to Mathematics. But besides this, there is a practical use in the science of spaces, as of numbers,

which appeals to the utilitarian needs as well as to the speculative genius of ingenuous youth. All things exist in space and time; and Mathematics, therefore, though in itself utterly devoid of contents, becomes in its application to material forms and forces the measure of all things, and in this way an indispensable instrument to all who desire scientific exactness in the calculation of moving powers, or the relation of spaces in the well-ordered economy of the universe. Let applied mathematics, therefore, by all means, or what we in our Scottish Universities call Natural Philosophy, maintain the place which it has so long honourably held in the scholastical curriculum. The only danger to be apprehended is that people might be taught to apply a strictly mathematical method to moral and æsthetical truths, which dictate their own laws with a quite diverse authentication; but this is merely the besetting sin of all specialism, to cheat the soul of its large catholic survey in order to sharpen its action preternaturally in one favourite direction; but no man in his just balance of mind will dream of applying to the poetical inspiration of a Shakespeare, or the ethical apostleship of a Paul, the same methods by which he would calculate the force of steam in a boiler or the sustaining power of a chain in a suspension bridge. The best things in the world, and those nearest to God, are not measurable.

On the top of all the ranges of purely intellectual education, forming as it were the cornice of the edifice, stands what the Germans call by the general

term "Philosophy," and what we in our University scale are understood to comprehend under the titles of logic and metaphysics, moral and political philosophy. Of course it is not every man's business to meddle with these matters. A house may be a very excellent house, both trim and comfortable, without an ornamental cornice and balustrade. The indispensable element in well-ordered education is the awakening and training of the soul to all that is characteristically and universally human, to strengthen in their general exercise, as we have just been sketching, the faculties of observation, memory, imagination, and reason; but the analysis of knowledge, the conditions of the knowable, the ultimate principles of all thinking, and the application of these principles to the many and difficult problems that belong to social organisation—these studies belong to the few who have either a power of speculation that leads them naturally into these regions, or whose high function in the social organism forces them to deal with formative principles. Morals, or pure ethics, as an atmosphere of healthy growth to every human being, as we shall set forth more particularly anon, belongs to every man, from the very first moment that he escapes from the bands of babyhood; but speculation about morals is a luxury of reason, which, as in the case of other luxuries, a well-appointed man may dispense with, and be nothing the worse. In the same way an artist may handle the pencil or the chisel with the strength of an Angelo or the grace of a Raphael,

and yet know nothing of the philosophy of the Beautiful. The formative principle must, no doubt, be potent within him; but how to formulate the principle into a set of propositions in a science of æsthetics is a matter with which he has no concern. Nevertheless we dare not say that the study of ultimate principles is altogether useless ; men of great genius may dispense with it, and men of spare opportunities must ; but it has its legitimate range of action, arising necessarily out of the appetite for pure knowledge, which is one of the distinguishing attributes of the human creature. Only care must be taken not to allow the craving for mere abstract knowledge to gratify itself at the expense of a healthy growth and a living experience. To set a company of crude youths, fresh from the burgh or village school, as is too often done in our Scottish Universities, to anatomise and systematise the operations of their unfurnished and unexperienced minds, is one of the most insensate of all educational proceedings—a proceeding, if not altogether barren, which can be fruitful in nothing but windy conceit, portentous pedantry, and shallow dogmatism. With this caution the study of ultimate principles may bear valuable fruit in the four following ways :—(1) Exercises in formal logic may be made in all directions to show how, in the opinions of men that form the currency of the best society, fallacies of the most gross kind are everywhere reigning—fallacies having their root in careless observation of facts, or assumption of postulates, and their growth in lusty shoots

of hasty generalisation. In the loose jointing of what passes for a cause, the puerile conclusion of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* plays an important part; and what men call their judgments on social, political, and religious questions are often nothing more than their individual points of view usurping the function of an all-round survey; a procedure just as far from the truth as it would be for a judge in a court of law to decide on a disputed question after hearing the statement of only one of the parties in the case. (2) Again, it is no mean advantage to persons of a strongly emotional temperament, and of delicate sensibilities, to be taught systematically, with all cool survey, the two most important lessons that whatever is noble in emotion is right in thought, and, on the other hand, that there is no emotion, however noble and however beneficial, that may not become absurd, ridiculous, and even pernicious, when it is pushed into an exaggeration, cherished as a fondling, or worshipped as an idol. That all extremes are wrong, that all excellence is a balance of contraries and a conciliation of opposites, is one of the most universal principles of the science of Ethics, and yet one the habitual neglect of which constitutes the besetting sin of all persons, of all parties, and of all societies. Everywhere and always too much. Against this disease I know no remedy so potent as a careful perusal of Aristotle's *Ethics*; but the great Stagirite, with his grand common sense, they will in nowise accept. They prefer Ruskin, or Carlyle, or Rousseau, or any extreme man who rules the fancy of the

hour. (3) In connection with the influence of the emotions, it deserves to be especially noted that persons of a highly emotional temperament, and guided in the main by sound instincts, when they go out into the large world, and meet with persons of a subtle and argumentative turn, who exercise themselves, Mephistopheles-wise, in a merciless negation of the most sacred truths, are apt to be puzzled, and sometimes even juggled, out of their firmest faith by the parade of cunning scepticism made by these contradictors, with which, from their point of view, they are unable to deal. To such persons a course of metaphysical speculation from the reverential school of Plato, Spinoza, Aristotle, Hegel, or Goethe, may prove of the greatest benefit. From these teachers a person of predominant sentiment will be glad to learn that, though an acute scientist or a mathematical analyst may be an atheist, a great thinker never can. (4) Lastly, the students of metaphysical science will learn the limitations of human knowledge, and the universality of moral principles. A reverential philosophy—and without reverence all knowledge is vain—will teach a thinking man not to attempt to sound the Infinite with a plummet, but be content to worship where he cannot define, and wisely find more heterodoxy sometimes in the presumptuous orthodoxy of the Church councils than in the modest doubt of the heretics whom they denounced. Instead of the Athanasian Creed, which the Episcopal Church thunders forth on certain festal days with such

cathedralic pomp, he will be ready to say with the Hebrew psalmist, "*Lord, my heart is not haughty, nor mine eyes lofty: neither do I exercise myself in great matters, nor in things too high for me.*"[1] On the other hand, he will find his faith only the more deeply rooted in those fundamental moral instincts which mark out man everywhere as planted on an altogether different platform from the ape, the kangaroo, or the elephant, and he will recognise in the most puerile theologies of the most savage peoples the rudiments of a sentiment that points heavenward in the creeds of the most highly cultured nations.

So much for the education of the intellect. But a more important chapter follows—say rather the most important chapter—for mere knowledge, however curious, and however extensive, can make only a clever devil or a Titanic fiend. It is better to have little knowledge with much goodness than to have much knowledge with no goodness at all. Here the great Christian apostle and the great German poet-thinker agree. "Knowledge puffeth up, but Love edifieth," says the apostle ; and if not so concisely, not less effectively the poet :—

"The bazaar on splendid trash
Tempts the buyer to spend his cash.
He who goes to learnèd college
Comes back puffed up with empty knowledge.
But if true bliss you wish to brook,
Learn to live in quiet nook.
That your every nerve you strain

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[1] Psalm cxxxi. 1.

Your mind to store with various lore
Is well; but how to use your lore—
The better wisdom this to gain—
You must knock at another door;
Nor have you far to search and seek,
Let the God within thee speak;
Love all things that lovely be,
And God will show his best to thee."

Love, therefore, and reverence, which is merely love subdued into awe by the presence of superior power, are the affections from which not only all ethical education, technically so called, as from its well-head flows, but all moral forces without which no truly human greatness or nobility of character can exist. We shall therefore call them the pervading atmosphere, the oxygen, of the healthy human plant, apart from which all skill of the school-gardener and all virtue of merely intellectual stimulants are vain. And here we at once perceive that as light from the sun, so the moral atmosphere in which the young human creature grows, proceeds from the teacher; from the mother in the first place, and the family, and then from the professional educator. How great the influence of the mother is in the earliest, and in some essential respects most important, development of the youngling is a commonplace of biography; but there are mothers who spoil their children; and as it is above all things necessary that young persons in their dependent and unripe condition should learn to obey, the firmness of the father should always be at hand to step in when the ill-timed gentleness of the

mother may be encouraging a licence which leads not to the fulfilling but to the abolition of the law. The special virtues which must flow to the learner, as the power of growing in the plant flows from the sun, need scarcely be particularised. The cheerful obedience which proceeds from love tempered by reverence, order, regularity, cleanliness, cheerfulness, truthfulness, courage, self-denial, strength of will, determination, firmness, patience, perseverance, trust in God, with an ever ready will to share a good with a fellow, and to help him in his need—all these flow directly from the moral vitality of the teacher's virtues, which neither books can create nor rules measure. But here, of course, especially in this bookish age, books, though secondary, are not useless; and to these, as soon as reading is mastered, the living teacher will be obliged to delegate his function, whenever capacity is wanting or leisure fails. What kind of books then should be put into the hands of young people? About this there cannot be a moment's doubt. All children love stories. Sermons for grown people, who can stomach them; but tales of human character, human adventure, and human incident, true, or very like the true, are the proper pabulum on which the young entrant into life is eager to feed. He wants to know into what sort of a world he is going, and how he can put forth his energies in such fashion as to play the game pleasantly and profitably; and the living picture of what has been done or may be done in the world

will always act more powerfully on him than any formal exhortation. To fictitious narratives, such as *Robinson Crusoe*, and Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, and even Shakespeare's plays, which I remember I used to read with eagerness when a boy, as moral forces, in the school and at the fireside, there can be no objection. And fairy tales, such as *Cinderella* and *Jack the Giant-killer*, often contain in a puerile dress lessons on the all-important wisdom of life on which persons of the ripest experience and largest culture may meditate with advantage. In this chapter, fables of the wise old Phrygian slave, with their variations from modern hands, will ever maintain a capital place. But life is real; and young people, with their less developed individuality, are constantly sending forth feelers in all directions to get hold of what actually is. *Mamma, but is it true?* is a question with which many a mother has been not a little puzzled after reeling off her best stories in her best style to her eager little boy. Travels, therefore, and biographies—Captain Cook and Plutarch, Mungo Park and Chinese Gordon, not to mention Joseph the son of Jacob, David king of Israel, and Paul the apostle of the Gentiles—are the proper stuff to chain the eye, and to brace the nerve, and to imp the wing of adventurous young manhood. Specially the noble life nearest to him, out of which his own grew, should form the picture-gallery of his moral world: if a Scotsman, Robert Bruce and the Covenanters; if an Englishman, Nelson and Wellington; if a German, Luther and Marshal Blücher; if a

Swede, Gustavus Adolphus; if an American, Washington and Abraham Lincoln. History in all its branches, civil and sacred, ancient and modern, is not, as some are apt to conceive it, a mere matter of concatenated facts systematically addressed to the knowing faculty; it is a great moral force, in fact the greatest moral force, in comparison of which the best sermons are mere blood and nerves without a body. Four-fifths of the Bible, or certainly two-thirds, are strictly biographical. So much the more wonderful, or rather shameful, is it, as we had above occasion to remark, that in our Scottish Universities, which boast so much of their popular character, the most popular of all studies, the history of our human race, with its brilliant achievements and notable blunders, with its dangerous adventurers and conquering heroes, is almost a total blank. No doubt there is a fashion of teaching history which makes it as barren of all moral virtue as a march through the desert of Sahara would be to a tourist in search of the picturesque; but there is a Nile as well as a Sahara in Africa; and so it is not the whole broad mass of human fates that has a claim to prominence in the moral education of the young, but the grand rivers of life which flow through it, and whose course is marked by names which are as bright as the stars in the firmament and as enduring as the everlasting hills.

Next to stories, songs will always maintain a commanding attitude in the moral education of the young; and, of course, though other songs and

hymns are not to be excluded, the preference must always be given to songs of truly national growth, which belong as characteristically to the moral growth of the people as the purple heather, the dark pine, or the graceful birch-tree, to the clothing of their native hills. But of this I have spoken particularly in the discourse on Nationality, and will therefore content myself here with setting down in a note a list of some fivescore popular Scottish songs, of which no well-educated Scot should be allowed to remain ignorant.[1] The young Englishman will

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1. The March of the Cameron Men.
2. Flora M'Donald's Lament.
3. Castles in the Air.
4. Johnnie Cope.
5. Caller Herrings.
6. The Flowers o' the Forest.
7. The Macgregors' Gathering.
8. My Nannie 's awa'.
9. The Bonnie House o' Airlie.
10. Wandering Willie.
11. Auld Robin Gray.
12. Lord Ronald.
13. When the Kye comes Hame.
14. Bonnie Dundee.
15. M'Crimmon's Lament.
16. Hail to the Chief who in triumph advances.
17. John Grumlie.
18. Hurrah for the Thistle!
19. Bess the Gawkie.
20. Braw, braw lads o' Gala Water.
21. The wee wee German Lairdie.
22. We 'll hae nane but Highland bonnets here.
23. Tam Glen.
24. For the sake o' Somebody.
25. Cam' ye by Athol.
26. Tak' your auld cloak about ye.
27. There grows a bonnie brier bush.

have his own peculiar stores from which to draw, as in like manner the Welshman, the Irishman, and the Gaelic-speaking Highlander. Songs of the British empire, belonging equally to England, Scotland, and Ireland, such as the *Battle of the Nile* and the *Battle of the Baltic*, and songs of grand European significance, such as Luther's *Eine feste Burg ist unser Gott*, and the French *Marseillaise*, will not be forgotten ; but in all cases the omission or subordination of native-born song in the educational curriculum will

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28. As Jean sat at her spinning-wheel.
29. Twa bonnie maidens.
30. He 's ower the hills that I lo'e weel.
31. Logie o' Buchan.
32. Ilka blade o' grass keps its ain drap o' dew.
33. When the King comes ower the Water.
34. Will ye no come back again.
35. My heart 's in the Highlands.
36. My wife has ta'en the gee.
37. Hame cam our guidman at e'en.
38. My love is like a red, red rose.
39. Gloomy winter 's now awa.
40. Get up and bar the door.
41. Come o'er the stream, Charlie.
42. O waly, waly.
43. The Battle of the Baltic.
44. Ye banks and braes o' bonie Doon.
45. Be kind to auld grannie.
46. Scots wha hae wi' Wallace bled.
47. Saw ye Johnnie comin'.
48. Jennie's Bawbee.
49. John Anderson, my jo.
50. O wha 's at the window, wha, wha.
51. Roy's wife of Aldivalloch.
52. Lochaber no more.
53. Away, ye gay landscapes.
54. O weel may the boatie row.
55. Allen-a-Dale.

be a capital sin against the motherhood of Nature and the fatherhood of history, for which the offenders will pay the penalty in degradation and contempt.

A word now remains on Religion, specially so called, the strong key-stone of the ethical arch, without which the whole structure falls. In all ages the peoples which have stamped their names most firmly on the pages of history—the Greeks, the Romans, the Hebrews, the English, and the Scotch—have

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56. Ca' the Yowes to the Knowes.
57. Jessie, the Flower o' Dunblane.
58. Jenny dang the Weaver.
59. O hush thee, my baby.
60. Jock o' Hazeldean.
61. Come under my plaidie.
62. Mary Morrison.
63. The Lass o' Gowrie.
64. A man 's a man for a' that.
65. The ewie wi' the crookit horn.
66. The rowan tree.
67. My boy Tammie.
68. Auld Lang Syne.
69. I 'm wearing away, John.
70. Tullochgorum.
71. A hundred pipers.
72. The Laird o' Cockpen.
73. Woo'd and married an' a'.
74. Whistle and I 'll come to you, my lad.
75. There 's nae lament now, lassie.
76. My jo Janet.
77. The Cauldrife Wooer.
78. Where does your Highland laddie dwell ?
79. Blithe, blithe and merry was she.
80. Mary o' Castlecary.
81. Huntingtower.
82. The braes o' Mar.
83. Whistle o'er the lave o't.
84. The Campbells are coming.

been noted for their reverential recognition of the Supreme Power, of which all human forces are merely the temporary expression. Foolish and impertinent no doubt have been the fancies of men about the gods, a folly from which not even the thought of the most highly cultivated nations has been able to keep itself free; but this is only an accident of the religious element in man, arising partly from the tendency of all strong passions, such as love and reverence, to overwhelm cool reason, and

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85. Dinna ask me gin I loe you.
86. Gin I were where Gadie rins.
87. There 's nae luck about the house.
88. My Nannie O !
89. The Garb of Old Gaul.
90. The Yellow-haired Laddie.
91. A wee bird cam to our ha' door.
92. Wha wadna fight for Charlie ?
93. The Kail Brose o' auld Scotland.
94. Ower the water to Charlie.
95. Contented wi' little.
96. I hae laid a herring in saut.
97. The auld House.
98. Welcome, royal Charlie.
99. Wha 'll be King but Charlie.
100. Scotland yet !
101. Highland Mary.
102. Young Lochinvar.
103. The women are a' gaen wud.
104. O why left I my hame?
105. Kelvin Grove.
106. Sheriffmuir.
107. The Rover o' Loch Ryan.
108. O send Lewie Gordon hame !
109. Gae bring to me a pint o' wine.
110. Doun the burn, Davie.
111. Tibbie Fowler.
112. Guidnicht, and joy be wi' you a'.

partly from the necessary futility of the attempt, in a finite product, to take an exact measurement of an infinite producer. In spite, however, of all the follies, absurdities, and even impieties, with which the fanciful theologies of rude peoples abound, as set forth in the interesting books of Lang and others,[1] there shines forth clearly enough in them all the recognition of an Omnipotent cause of which the world and all the troops of living creatures are the effect; a cause the search for which distinguishes man from the lower animals, and which, however inadequately recognised, gives a unity to the whirl of things called the world, sufficient to command the reverence, satisfy the thought, and enforce the obedience of every normally constituted mind. Accordingly we find that, even in the most rampantly polytheistic systems, this unity is represented in some Ζεῦς, some Olympian sovereign, some father of gods and men, by whose counsel all issues are determined, and from whose will the sanction of all the moral laws proceeds that make society possible; and thus, as we have just said, however mixed up with fantastical conceits and infantile traditions, religion does become with all associated human beings the key-stone of the moral arch, and a necessary element in their moral education. What that education must consist of in detail need not be curiously characterised—prayers and hymns and sacred story from the mother's knee, to the solemn

[1] *Myth, Ritual, and Religion.* By Andrew Lang. London: Longmans, 1887.

assembly of the congregation and the grand cathedral chant, with as little of formal dogma as possible, must form the substance of it. Like the Ethics of which it is a part, it is an atmosphere to be breathed rather than a subject to be taught. In this view the important point is that it should be everywhere and every day present and felt. The school-exercise should open with a psalm or a prayer, and close with the same; and the acknowledgment of the Supreme Father should be a bond of unity to all the members of the school, in the same way as the acknowledgment of the earthly father is the bond of union to the family. In Christian countries there exists a peculiar difficulty in the religious training of the young, from which the ancient religions were free; I mean the variety of distinctly marked and strongly accentuated ethical associations called Churches. This peculiarity arises from the greater worth given to the personal conviction of the individual, in the style of moral appeal used by Christian apostles and missionaries; doubtless a most valuable element, but accompanied with the drawback of making common worship difficult or impossible, from the importance laid on differential distinctions and preferential dogmas. Against this tendency, which showed itself at an early period in the Christian Church, St. Paul in his First Epistle to the Corinthians had occasion to protest in the strongest language; and there can be little doubt that, were he to rise from the dead to-day and note our national schools without religion, and our de-

nominational schools with strongly accentuated sectarian features, he would disapprove equally of both. The important element in religious teaching, he would certainly insist, is that in which they all agree, and all possess as a unifying soul in common, not the points, doctrinal, ceremonial, or sacerdotal, on which they differ. Let all the children of the nation, as a common family, join in such hymns and prayers as are scattered abundantly in the rich repertory of Old and New Testament devotion ; and let all petty differential points of sectarian indoctrination be remitted to the kindly growth of family habit or the catechetical exercise of the individual Churches. Varieties, in the moral as in the physical world, are a virtue, not a fault ; but they exist, not to divide the moral family into two or many hostile bands, but to make them more rich and more attractive as a group.

One important question remains : Is the Bible to be used in schools, and, if used, how ? The answer to this question lies partly in what has already been said. The psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, the singing of which forms the moral atmosphere of the schools, are, for educational purposes, the best part of the Bible ; this we have already emphasised. But the Bible, as the record of the moral education of the human race for more than three thousand years, has a historical backbone to which the ancient polytheistic faiths for the most part were strangers ; for which reason, in all well-ordered schools, I would certainly give a regular course of sacred history, and

the parallelism of sacred with profane story, without which, indeed, the separate books of Hebrew and Greek literature, which we call the Bible, are apt to lose all firm root in the mind of the Biblical student, to be thrust out of their natural point of view, and become altogether misty and vague in appreciation. Only as a common school-book, used in the daily routine of reading, the use of the Bible is by all means to be avoided, as tending, by undue familiarity, to lessen that feeling of reverence for the precepts of the Divine law from which they ought never to be divorced.

Two other not unimportant chapters on the subject-matter of education remain in order to complete our survey of its contents: the education of the emotions of the Sublime and Beautiful, or æsthetical training, as it is now called, and gymnastic or physical education. First, with regard to Music. The high position assigned to this divinest of the arts by Plato [1] is no doubt owing to its close connection with the moral nature above discussed; but it is equally certain that the enjoyment of the beautiful is an end in itself, which the wise educator has no right to overlook. In relation to this it is that Aristotle, speaking of the arts of design, says that though they are specially valuable from the utilitarian point of view, in various walks of life, they belong also to the highest general culture, as making those who practise them more nicely appreciative of the beauty of forms—*θεωρητικοὺς τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλ-*

[1] *Κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή*, *Pol.* iii. 12 D.

λους.[1] And what is true of the beauty of form as appreciated by the mental eye is equally true of the beauty of sound as appreciated by the ear. Both these appreciations are in a sense luxuries, but they are luxuries of the noblest kind, and, when wisely used, tend to keep the spiritual nature free from lower stimulants that disturb, and lower pleasures that degrade, the soul. We have only to cast our eyes on the manifold beauty of earth and sky, of field and fell, of flower and forest, spread everywhere in triumphal expression, above us, beneath us, before us, and around us, to become convinced that the true, the good, and the beautiful, as units in the triad of the manifestation of creative excellence in the universe, if not all equally necessary, are certainly all equally divine. Let therefore music be as much as possible scientifically taught in all our schools, as indeed it was formally enjoined in our Acts of Parliament more than three hundred years ago;[2] and let it be accounted as great a disgrace to a neophyte in polite culture not to know a minor from a major key, as to ignore the difference of an active and a neuter verb in the grammar. Only let it never be forgotten that music, to have its full effect, must go beyond the ear, and enter into the soul; otherwise a man is nothing better than a serpent that will raise its body and nod its crest responsively to a magnificent fugue of Bach or a symphony of Beethoven. Nay, more: it seems certain that persons who devote themselves exclusively to the culture of

[1] *Pol.* ix. 3. [2] Scottish Acts, 1579, ch. 98.

music as a luxury of the ear, and which, apart from words, neither stirs the heart nor informs the brain, are laying the foundations of a false culture, which grows in grace only by losing in strength, and which smothers by a superfluity of decoration the body which it ought to adorn. The like danger of luxurious intoxication does not naturally follow from devotion to the arts of design. The occasions which call for the tasteful exercise of the pencil by those who can handle it are fewer, while the power of beautiful forms occupying the eye is less stirring than the thrilling seductions that enter through the ear. Hundreds of men and women of all kinds and grades of susceptibility will be delighted with the floods of mellifluous tones in a concert, for one that will feast his eye with discriminating complacency on the chaste shows of a picture-gallery or the classical forms of Greek sculpture. The multitude thoroughly enjoys a classical song, though utterly unable to appreciate critically the scientific arrangement of its expressive phrases; but in the sister art, the eye of the million will prefer a clever caricature to a graceful design. In the schools, care should be taken, as Plato enjoins, to have the walls hung round with models of the graphic art, not only graceful in their lines, but elevating in their tone, interesting in their expression, and dramatic in their attitude; while in the visitation of picture-galleries, which, when opportunity affords, ought never to be omitted, the young observers should be trained not to allow the

eye to wander loosely from one group to another, but to fix their mark on some one most speaking portraiture as their fancy may choose, of which they will be required to give a vocal or written account afterwards in the exercises of the school. One thing too often forgotten, I fear, in our æsthetical education, where such exists, is some elementary instruction in the significance and history of the various forms of architecture, ancient and modern. The appropriateness of this branch of the fine arts for the training of the eye is obvious from the fact, that, whereas first-rate pictures are to be seen only at places and seasons far apart, the forms of architecture meet the eye in every street, and are unfortunately not seldom as instructive by their blunders as by their beauties. These blunders, noticed in passing by an intelligent teacher, will warn the pupil of the danger of borrowing foreign forms, and sticking them incongruously on an alien ground, instead of working out in rich consistency the unity of a native type—a warning which may not be without a wise side-application to the dress of the youthful population of the school; for a taste for the beautiful in art, like genuine Christian principle in the heart, will not content itself with admiring the excellence of dead forms, however perfect, but will descend to the details of personal decoration, and may in some happy cases preserve the well-trained school-girl from those gross deviations from the truth and grace of Nature in the attire of fashionable young ladies, which have their root in no more worthy

motive than an itch for novelty in the wearer of the dress, and a desire for a more frequent pecuniary return on the part of the maker.

> Nature loves freedom : Fashion forges rules,
> The shield of cowards, and the guide of fools.

Only one thing more we have to note in the æsthetical training of the schools. The importance of preserving the learner from the slavery of printed paper, as affecting the culture of the memory, was alluded to above; but what was then said applies with no less truth to the function of books in the æsthetical training of the young. Mere reading of a book with the eye in an easy chair by the fireside, or expatiating at length on a well-padded sofa, is a very lazy business, and may be practised profitably in the case of the last new novel, by the severe student exhausted by brain exercise, or the gay young lady relaxed by a long series of vespertinal receptions and midnight balls; but reading in the school must be done actively, and in such fashion as to make it felt that the eye is in all things the servant, not the master, of the mind. The youthful reader therefore will be trained to read loudly and distinctly, and with such change of tone, accent, and movement as the change of the subject and the range of the writer may demand. But reading at the best, even when quite free from the monotony into which the routine of reading-lessons so lightly degenerates, is a fettered sort of movement, and only half alive. The educational value

of the whole man, so far as expressed by verbal signs, can only come forth in living speech; and of this there are two kinds: either the direct vocal utterance of the matter working and shaping itself forth in the speaker's own mind, or the utterance of adopted matter from other gifted minds, commonly called recitation. Of these, the first, as the more natural, and in public life often the more useful, is the most neglected. Many a preacher has been chained to dead paper all his life, simply from the neglect of early training according to the freedom of Nature in schools and colleges. Man is naturally a speaking animal; but in our modern methods of youthful training, so tyrannised over by books and by reading, after a ten years' course of what is called classical training, a hopeful youth often ends in being dumb, or in addressing a congregation of his fellow-beings in a fashion of which any well-conditioned Red Indian would be ashamed. Either he reads with the tame propriety of an essay, not with the impulsive force of a moral appeal, or he has freed himself from the slavery of the paper, by a torturing process of memorising, which leaves no room for the natural drama of speech in the variety of pause, accent, gesture, and attitude, that belongs to a natural human address. I say, therefore, before all things let the future embryo pulpit speaker be taught at an early age to keep firm hold of his thoughts, to marshal them in order, and send them forth like charges of cavalry in a battle, to do their work directly, just as if the young gentleman

were hitting a ball on the golfing-green or flinging a grey fly into a salmon pool. A man that cannot speak without paper is like a man that cannot use his legs without crutches. Let them be gilded never so grandly, they are crutches still.

It will have been observed, no doubt, by some readers, that I have made no mention of gymnastics or physical training, which, in the order of nature, seems to come first. The reason for this postponement perhaps was that I am apt to think the exercise of the body may be safely left to the nurse and the mother and the young people themselves. Nevertheless one or two hints on this head, and one or two warnings against possible abuse, may not be unprofitable. One warning of first-rate importance, especially in the present age of high-pressure and strained system, is that the teachers and the teaching authorities shall be careful not to vex their unripe charge prematurely with much formal teaching; let growing creatures grow. Let school hours, not less for the teacher's sake than for the taught, be kept within moderate bounds. Let young boys and girls have ample hours of leisure, to run and to ramble about, to drink healthy breezes, and to extemporise as much as may be their own sports. In this view papa and mamma are often as much to blame as the professional teacher in the village and the teaching Powers in the capital. The father of John Stuart Mill, we read, who was a hard Forfarshire man, reared in the atmosphere of the east wind near Montrose, cheated his hopeful

progeny of no small part of his boyish enjoyment, and perhaps of the geniality that might have accompanied his thoughtful manhood, by an ambitious determination to brace him in a heavy panoply of learning before his time. In a similar fashion, though not with the like systematic concentration of force, not a few parents at the present hour will march their sons and daughters through so many weary hours of prolonged schooling that they may parade themselves before papa and mamma, and a bevy of admiring visitors, as German scholars and French scholars, with Latin and Greek to boot, and whatever other lingual accomplishments a fond parent may wish to see set forth in the person of his beloved offspring. Let all such rearing of precocious prodigies and display of multitudinous dexterities be avoided. Another hint that may be given with regard to bodily exercise is that open-air recreations, where they can be had, are always better than in-doors; and of out-door exercises those are to be preferred which unite a certain degree of calculating skill and thoughtful measure with mere physical force and animal strength: golf, archery, boating, and swimming, therefore, are better than football, as it is often played with a rude force and hasty scramble that make it difficult to distinguish the plunge of a tiger from the pace of a man. One more warning we may add from Plato. Young men are not to train themselves to gymnastics that they may become athletes; a few dexterities of the limb, as running

and leaping, and horsemanship and dancing, after the fashion of the ancient Greeks and the modern Highlanders, may be laudably acquired; but the main object of all gymnastic training in schools is to grow up into manhood with firm muscle, well-braced nerve, and supple joints; and for attaining these, in this age of cheap and easy locomotion, pedestrian excursions through side districts of topographical and historical interest are more beneficial to the whole man, both body and soul, than any artificial course of gymnastics, however well regulated and however wisely seasoned.

Have we now exhausted our repertory of educational material? No, you will say—what of Languages, which make such a large show in our classical and other schools of all sorts and degrees? They stand here last, on purpose, for the obvious reason that in education according to nature, which has been our text throughout, no man in normal circumstances requires any other language for his healthy human culture than the mother tongue; and even in the most unfavourable situations, where a remote people like the Scottish Celts have been overridden by the superinduced culture of a more multitudinous and more advanced civilisation, there are moral forces in the mother tongue which will be sought for in vain in all the borrowed material of a hundred foreign tongues; and the educational system which ignores these is guilty of the folly of preferring the body to the soul, and the dress to the body. There can be no doubt, the Gaelic songs of

the Highland people, the product of their own Bens and glens, have done more to create and nourish the heroism of our Highland regiments, displayed at Fontenoy, Waterloo, and the Crimea, than all the English with which they were diligently crammed by their Saxon schoolmasters. The circumstances in which it is necessary for a complete and well-rounded culture to go abroad for foreign organs of linguistic expression must always be regarded as a misfortune. No man imports from abroad what he finds in abundance at home. So the Greeks, the most richly endowed and most happily situated of the ancient peoples, studied no language but their own, to enable them to bequeath to all ages a literature for healthy tone, variety, chasteness, and completeness, unexampled in the history of the human mind. On the other hand, the Romans, from the one-sidedness of their political and judicial culture, were forced to borrow from the more accomplished Greeks that speculative philosophy, and that science of ultimate aims, which they could not produce at home. So it must be ever. The Hebrews in like manner, to whom God gave the profoundest consciousness of Himself, the most devout prostration before the sanctity of the Moral Law, and the inspiration to preach it to their fellow-men, confined as they were not only by the exclusiveness of their culture, but by the narrow bounds of their kingdom, were obliged, in the fulfilment of their mission, to learn the language of the people whom they were destined to convert. Hence Philo and Josephus and the

Greek of the New Testament. In the same way, at the great stirring of the stagnant waters of European thought some four hundred years ago, by what we call the revival of learning, we find a witty Dutchman and a learned Scotchman sending forth their eloquent appeals to the Europe of the sixteenth century in the language of a Venusinian Horace and a Patavinian Livy. And at the present hour we have before us a great nation, only recently emerged from Oriental barbarism, appearing everywhere with a French, German, or English phrase on their tongue, simply because their native Russian, utterly ignored abroad, produces only the most scanty and meagre literature at home. In all this we see plainly wherein the necessity of an acquaintance with foreign languages lies. It is simply to furnish us with certain materials or stimulants of a well-rounded culture which we cannot find at home; and in this view there is no people that stands so little in need of going beyond their native sources as the English. For we not only now, in the process of these later ages, have produced a Shakespeare, a Milton, a Bacon, a Newton, a Burke, a Wordsworth, a Scott, a Macaulay, and a Burns, but we are encompassed, and in a manner luxuriantly overgrown, with a world of original and translated literature, on all possible subjects, in the cheapest and most convenient form, as thick as the daisies on the field, which we have only to put forth our hands and pluck. Latin and Greek, therefore, which in the days of Bacon and Milton were at once the intellectual glory and the

architecture of the many, have become the luxury of the few; like tropical plants which spread umbrageous leafage in a hot-house, but, left outside, dwindle into dwarfishness, and produce nothing but prickles. But there is another respect in which the study of certain foreign languages becomes as necessary to the modern Englishman, and his brother Scot, as Greek was to the Roman. John Bull is an insular creature, and apt to be ignorant of much in quarters beyond his sea-girdle which much concerns him to know; he has also an administrative function over the scattered provinces of an empire on which the sun never sets; and is therefore morally, as well as politically, bound to cultivate a living sympathy with the peoples whose destinies under Providence he has been called on to control; and this he can in nowise do effectively without a knowledge of the languages which they speak; for, as Richter with his usual insight has it, as the key to a mother's heart is through her children, so the key to a people's heart is through their mother tongue. Let therefore by all means English and Scottish boys in schools consider it their primary duty, in this age of cheap travel, and in this empire of large touch, to familiarise themselves with the languages of the people with whom their genius or their duty may have laid it upon them to hold intercourse; but in doing this let them strive to avoid two very common errors. Let them choose one language, and learn it thoroughly, before they buckle to another; a language half learned is doubly useless: it grows

no fruit, and it wastes precious time. Then let them see to it that they get a master who knows in a living fashion the language which he professes to teach, and who will not remit them, in the lazy and formal fashion so common, to the memorising of grammar rules and the screwing of a meaning painfully out of dead books. Let them know assuredly that the knowledge of a language is an art in the first place, and only secondarily a science ; and let them have no man for their teacher who does not practise a frequent appeal from living ear to ear, and from living tongue to tongue dexterously, as the fencer flourishes his foils, and the pianist touches his keys. To do otherwise is to dance in fetters, and to be dragged on a rough road in a chariot with creaking wheels that never knew the grace of oil.[1]

It will have been observed that in the whole scope of the above remarks I have made no note of the difference of the sexes—taking boys and girls in the slump as human beings, as no doubt they are, having their main capacities and characteristic features in common. Nevertheless they are in some striking points characteristically diverse, a diversity which the wise educational gardener can no more ignore than his prototype in the vegetable

[1] The importance of this matter in the saving of time and brains, is so great that I have on various occasions done all in my power to bring it prominently before the public. One of these appeals, originally published in the *Pupil-Teacher's Magazine*, will be found in an Appendix to this volume—*Languages, how to Learn and how to Teach them*,—and another in an American periodical, *The Forum*, 1889.

world can submit to the same treatment the rhododendron of the turfy slopes and the globe-flower of the marshy meads. All trees are trees; but no man for economical uses or æsthetical delight will confound the graceful birch with the sturdy oak or the bristling pine. What, then, are the dominant traits and distinctive differences that mark the masculine and the female type of the unfeathered biped called man? And here we note without difficulty, first, in the bodily structure, a finer tissue, a more sensitive nerve, more delicate chiselling, and, generally, an inferior stature; and then, in the spiritual region, a decided predominance of emotion, sensibility, and passion, above the ratiocinative and judicial function of the understanding; and the educational corollary from these premises of Nature is simply this, that the woman shall be taken and trained in accordance with her type, and not have a training forced upon her that is properly adapted for the special capacities and peculiar destination of the man. No doubt there is a danger here of a very pernicious one-sidedness: for the relation of a woman to a man is not the relation of a flower to a tree, but of one kind of tree to another; it is the relation of a companion to a companion, not of a slave to a master; and in order to make this companionship as perfect and as pleasant as possible, it is necessary that the woman should share as much in the male culture as she can carry gracefully without stinting the growth of her own type; while the man, so long as he plants himself on the stage of life with marked

accentuation as a man, will consider himself improved rather than deteriorated by tempering his strength with the gentleness of the gentle sex; in other words, the educator must strengthen the weak points, as well as foster the strong points of the creature with whom he has to do. But still the fact remains that a boy is a boy, and a girl a girl; and the notion that, in the training of the school and in the organism of society, the sexes should be treated as much as possible on the principle of identity, is merely a freak of reaction, arising from the insolence with which the stronger sex has too often remitted the weaker to the narrow field of the nursery, the fireside, and the kitchen, within a certain prescribed sphere of graceful subservience to the male. Let young ladies, therefore, do as much of strong and vigorous work as may be consistent with the tension of which their more delicate nerve is capable; let them ride and dance in the open air, and play lawn-tennis with young gentlemen; but let them avoid football, golf,[1] and cricket; and by all means eschew smoking and everything that has no affinity with the sweet fragrance and the delicate bloom which is the special glory of their sex. In the school curriculum, music, and the arts of design, languages, literature, and the history of civil and sacred heroism, all furnish ample supplies

[1] I have been informed that there is a sort of field-golf specially adapted for ladies, but it exists only by shortening the distances, which in the traditional form of the game give such free play to the superior muscular forces of the male arm.

for their higher intellectual culture, without going deeply into the curious relations of abstract spaces and numbers in mathematical science, or the cold sequences of premise and conclusion in formal logic. As a rule, a woman is never natural when her brain acts without her heart, and her energies are put forth in a field where mere physical or intellectual force can do great things without love. Therefore in the social scheme, a woman, unless in a few exceptional cases, will never make a soldier, a statesman, a judge, or a professional politician : not a soldier, because she has too little bodily strength, and too nice a moral sensibility to do the rough, harsh, and pitiless sort of work which belongs to war ; not a statesman, because the cool calculation, nice balance of interests, and selfish regards of various kinds which belong to a wise policy are naturally abhorrent to a creature who, unless when inspired by noble passion, is never more than half herself ; not a judge, because the renunciation of all passion and all partiality, which the position of an interpreter of formal law implies, is as impossible to a true woman as it would be to a running stream, unless made into blocks of ice, to become a solid wall ; not a politician, because the habit of using your fellow-beings as tools for selfish ends, which politics when followed as a business unfortunately implies, is as unhealthy to the moral nature of a well-constituted woman, as the air of the slums in the east end of a great city is to the lungs of a Highland shepherd accustomed to inhale the pure and bracing air of

the mountains. These different pointings in the social destiny of the more pure and the less selfish sex, will to the intelligent teacher be guide enough to the fields in which he ought to encourage the virginal mind more largely to expatiate; and he will always at the same time ever bear in mind that there is a special sphere of action in the prospective mother of a family, with which the common education of boys and girls as mere human beings cannot intermeddle; there are what Homer calls the works of women—*ἔργα γυναικῶν*—works of devotion, ministration, and decoration, where she has social functions to perform not less important in their sphere than the deliberations of the great council of the nation, or the decisions of the judicial bench. Before all things, a well-educated woman must be a good housekeeper: her house is her shop; or, say rather her temple, when, if her service is not at call, she will be like a prayer-book without a priest, or a pulpit without a preacher.

So much for the teaching and the taught. What of the teachers? Certainly not the least important question; for when we have supplied a well-appointed and a well-freighted educational machine, both the steam and the guidance must come from the teacher. And here we have first to note a very obvious and a very common notion, that to teach the elements of knowledge to young persons requires only an elementary knowledge in the teacher. No greater mistake could be. It is easier always to deal with persons on our own level than with those

very far above or very far beneath us. Young people are far beneath their teachers; but not a few grown persons, to judge by their conduct, seem to have forgotten that they ever were children; while the whole art of the teacher consists in his power of sympathising with the tendencies, and stimulating the tender shoots of growth in the opening mind. The boy is father of the man, says Wordsworth; and there sleeps a whole world of metaphysics in the bosom of the child, says Richter; and if that be true, it is not every fool's business to meddle with his education. Take, for instance, one of the most elementary of all subjects, one certainly in which, when well taught, all normally constituted children take a great delight, viz., geography. For stirring the germs of puerile intelligence in this direction, it will not be enough to put a book into the learner's hand, from which he learns to reel off the names of a number of famous places, with their notable qualifications and appendages, as, Berlin is the capital of Prussia, Petersburg of Russia, and so forth; the teacher must not only know the book, but he must have had a living experience of the places, or at least an imagination well hung with true and vivid pictures of the places—not mere landscapes either, but scenes in which great dramas have been acted, and where great types of humanity have played their parts and left their stamp. To teach geography in this wise demands culture, a demand which, when not satisfied, leaves the learner devoid equally of respect for the

teacher and of interest in the subject. So it is all through. Any crude youth from a Normal School, well crammed with a long series of names and dates, and with a chronological table on the wall, may teach history in a fashion, as one may teach geography by saying that there is a promontory on the east coast of Scotland, north of Arbroath, called Red Head, and another north of Aberdeen called the Buchan Ness, and so forth; but to teach history with the moral force which makes it valuable in the indoctrination of the young, requires a man who is well furnished with the moral force himself, and who knows to appreciate it in others. Such a teacher, of course, is not to be found everywhere; and the conclusion is plain, that the State ought to look out for a good teacher with the same care and with the same prospects that a man going to law looks out for a sensible agent and a dexterous pleader. And the way to gain this result is equally plain. There is only one way to make teaching an honourable profession—like the Law and the Church—with service for honourable work duly acknowledged, and with an honourable career opened to those who practise it. What the "honest"—that is, according to the English of the New Testament, honourable—stipends are, which our old Scottish Acts command to be provided for schoolmasters, must vary with time, place, and circumstance; but this we may say, that perhaps in all countries hitherto, certainly in Scotland, it has been the practice to overwork that class of men, and to underpay them in a style not

at all creditable to our vaunted civilisation. The evil consequence of this short-sighted and niggardly procedure is twofold: on the one hand, talented young men with a praiseworthy ambition to rise in the social scale, are prevented from entering a profession where the race is hard and the prizes few; on the other, the men of good parts who, in spite of such discouragements, do enter on the teacher's career, are so worn down by overwork in the daily routine of elementary drill, that their personal intellectual growth is prematurely stunted, and they cannot be expected to impart to others a stimulus which has been lost to themselves. Teachers therefore of all classes and grades must be multiplied, in order that none may be overtaxed; and there must lie before the humblest teacher in the lowest grade a visible ladder of ascent, by which he may rise, if found worthy, to the top heights of the educational Parnassus. This is the way in which men rise at the Bar and in the Church; and, if it is not so in the School also, there must be something wrong. In every country there should be an array of parish schools, in an ascending scale of dignity and a descending scale of drudgery; higher work, with better payment in the future, as the natural fruit of lower work and less payment in the present —some share of the *otium cum dignitate* which distinguishes the dynamical force of free intellect from the mechanical performance of prescribed work. From the parish schools there should be an ascent to well-provided middle schools, in some of which

the learned languages might claim a preference, and in others physical science and modern languages, according to the genius, capacity, and social outlook of the scholars; but in either case, so as to place the educator, in the matter of emolument, on the same social platform with the legal and other public functionaries of the district. From the highest seat in the middle schools to a University chair the transference will be easy, provided always the headmaster has not been enslaved by the routine of his work, to such a degree as to contract rather than to expand his natural capacity for rising; for the professor has to do with the discussion of principles, the schoolmaster with the inculcation of rules; the professor is the strategist, the schoolmaster is the tactician, of the great host that goes out to do battle with ignorance; and the reason why first-rate schoolmasters have sometimes turned out poor professors, is simply that, having been too long cribbed in the narrow domain of the school, they wanted the ample wing, the large survey, and the rich experience of life that make a man a great academical teacher. Such well-considered provisions for the social status of the honourable office of teacher, along with the watchful eye of the public, the intelligent survey of official inspectors or examiners, and the conscientious exercise of patronage in the hands of those who wield it, will be sufficient to make the work of the educator in the general case as beneficial to society as it is honourable and onerous to himself. Payment of course is always an essential part of the

business; but payment for moral work can never be made by mechanical estimates; and any scheme, such as that recently imported into our schools, of payment by calculable results of individual measurements according to a prescribed form, can end only in fruitless labour on the least worthy plants of the garden, to the neglect of the more worthy, and in turning the gardener into a machine. Where-ever spontaneity is excluded from any domain of the moral world, the moral world ceases to be moral; and the best cultured man is drilled out of the best part of himself.

APPENDIX.

ON LANGUAGES: HOW TO LEARN AND HOW TO TEACH THEM.

ARTICLE I.

THERE is a general complaint amongst heads of families and employers of brain-work that the youth of this country are inferior to educated foreigners in the knowledge of languages. There are no doubt more causes than one for this lamentable deficiency; but the principal cause certainly lies in our bad methods of teaching, which involve great loss of valuable time with very inadequate results. I will therefore, with a view to a necessary reform in this matter, set down in this, and in a subsequent paper, the conclusions to which a long and varied experience has led me, with regard to the true method of teaching and learning languages,—a method which, I have no hesitation in saying, will produce double the results of the present perverse method with half the expenditure of time.

And first, here as in all matters, we must start with Nature. Man is naturally a speaking animal, and, as such, learns to speak an intelligible tongue, just as naturally as cocks crow, or pigs grunt. The method of Nature, therefore, in this matter lies

plainly before us; out of the mouths of babes and sucklings art is here perfected; we may extend and facilitate and improve the method of Nature in learning languages, but we may not ignore it, much less conceit ourselves to supplant it by devices of our private invention and shifts of our human laziness. What then does Nature say here? Her simple dictum is this: *Languages are learned in a natural way by the constant and frequent repetition of certain sounds addressed to the ear, and reproduced by the tongue of the learner, in direct connection with interesting objects of his immediate environment*; in other words, the true method is to commence with the living practice of the tongue and the ear in direct relation to interesting surrounding objects, — a method exactly the reverse of that which is generally followed, especially in the teaching of the classical languages, where class-books and formal rules are substituted for living speech and familiar practice; an ignoring and abandonment of the process of Nature, which sufficiently explains the woful lack of results which every one complains of in our so-called classical training. Nature bids us commence not with rules and grammar, but with hearing, thinking, and speaking in direct connection with the object, not as now practised with the cumbrous intervention of the mother tongue; so that for the first elementary lesson in this true method the learner uses the new tool of expression, exactly in the same way as the young boatman learns to use an oar, or the young fencer a foil. Attend now to the steps of the process. I will take Greek as an example, though, of course, the method applies equally to all languages.

(1) I name before the learner, and pronounce

distinctly the Greek word for all the objects that strike his eye, either in the room, or outside: as ἕδρα, pointing to a *chair*; πῦρ, pointing to the *fire*; γραφή, to a *picture*; εἰκών, a *portrait*; δένδρον, a *tree*; ἥλιος, the *sun*; οἶκος, a *house*; θύρα, *door*; ἄνθος, a *flower*; and so on. Then I bid the learner, pointing to the object, repeat the Greek word after me, once and again, till a direct and familiar bond is established betwixt his mind, his ear, his tongue, and the object. Observe this is the vital point of the natural method at starting; I do not ask what is the Greek for *fire*, but I point to the flame and say πῦρ; and the learner, by following my lead, thinks and speaks in the foreign language from the very first step of his start.

(2) After I find that the learner's ear and tongue are in direct and familiar communion with the surrounding objects, I proceed to extend his sphere, and to increase his interest by giving the noun some qualifying predicate, which we call an adjective; and here I take occasion to explain the phenomenon of gender marked in Greek by a simple change in the termination of the adjective, as ος for the masculine, η or α for the feminine. Along with the adjective I take in Greek the definite article, ὁ, ἡ, τό, which follows the same analogy; but observe neither in the qualifying word, nor in the noun, do I teach anything more than is directly used; that is, for the first and second lesson, only the nominative case. Then I say, for example, καλὸς ὁ ἥλιος, *beautiful the sun*, or, as we say, *the sun is beautiful*, καλὸν τὸ δένδρον, καλὴ ἡ θύρα, and so on; and then throw in any number of simple adjectives, such as λαμπρός, *bright*; ἀγαθός, *good*; κακός, *bad*; αἰσχρός, *ugly*, which may suit the object.

(3) My third step is to connect the single or qualified name of an object with a verb, to make what is called a sentence. I take a single verb in common use, such as *ἔχω, I have; φιλῶ, I love; μισῶ, I hate; ὁρῶ, I see*; and I use no more at starting than the first and second person singular, *ὁρῶ, ὁρᾷς*; and I say, pointing to the sun, *ὁρῶ τὸν ἥλιον.* Here, of course, I have to explain to the learner why I have changed the final *σ* of the word for a *ν*: and this leads me to explain the phenomenon of subject and object, and the significance of nominative and objective cases in language. After I find him quite familiar with the use of this modification, so that he can say without any feeling of effort, *ὁρῶ τὸν λαμπρὸν ἥλιον, I see the bright sun; ἔχω καλὸν ἄνθος, I have a beautiful flower,* I then ply him with the second person, *ἔχεις, ὁρᾷς, have you, do you see.* And for variation and emphasis, I can at once familiarise his ear with the adverbs, *οὐκ, μάλιστα, καὶ μάλα γε, καὶ δὴ καὶ,* and so on. To give full scope to this third lesson, I would teach him at the same time to use the imperative mood with a *δὴ* after it, as *λέγε δὴ, φέρε δὴ,* and such like, always, of course, in direct living connection with an object and an action vitally presented to the learner, so as by all means to avoid the impertinent and hampering intrusion of the mother tongue.

(4) Observe I have said nothing of writing or of books, to which our classical scholars are so disposed to delegate the whole process of acquiring a dead language. Letters and writing and books are extremely valuable inventions, no doubt, and of great service in the learning of languages, though by no means indispensable, when kept in their natural

place; that is, as secondary and subsidiary to the exercise of the tongue and the ear. Of course to bring in the evidence of the eye in a matter which belongs primarily to the ear, is to bring in an auxiliary force to which, under proper conditions, no sensible general will object; but the general will most decidedly object, if the auxiliary force is allowed to usurp the place and function of the central phalanx of the army; and this is a usurpation of which our classical teachers are too often systematically guilty; they teach our peeping bookish neophytes to acknowledge words with the eye and the understanding which they disown with the ear.

In the next paper I will follow the steps of this living method from the bud to the blossom; meanwhile observing only that I have already proved the vulgar objection against the colloquial method, that it teaches a man as if he were a mere parrot, to be utterly false; for in the first three steps of the process I have made the scholar familiar with two of the most important rules of the grammar, not only in Greek but in all languages. Man is and must be a parrot to some effects, inasmuch as he is an imitative animal, and the acquisition of languages an imitative process. But he is a parrot and something more; and to this something more I pay due honour when I regulate my conversation by my grammar rules; but observe the method of Nature is to superinduce the rules upon the practice, as the reins are added to a mettlesome steed, not to set them up on an abstract grammatical throne like a king with no subjects to command.

Article II.

Before branching out into its natural completeness the scheme of colloquial practice indicated in my first article, I have to direct attention to another line of procedure, which ought to run *pari passu* with that practice, and which gives a peculiar advantage to all students of foreign languages possessed of such a composite mother tongue as the English. It is a principle of all healthy intellectual action to proceed to the unknown from the known by natural links of affinity, wherever these are presented; and on this principle it is plain, that an English or Scotch student, say of Latin, Greek, or German, may pass at once into a familiarity with a considerable domain of any of these languages, by merely having his attention directed at the start to the fundamental identity of the stock of the native and the foreign tongue. In fact a large proportion of the upper strata of English is merely Latin and Greek in a very thin disguise; old friends, so to speak, with new faces or new dresses, and, of course, much more easily taken into familiar cognisance than perfect strangers. Let the teacher of Greek, therefore, not omit at the start to make the learner aware of the encouraging fact, that he daily uses some hundred Greek words, slightly masked, in the general currency of polite English; and, if he is a scientifically trained person, especially if he is a student of medicine, let him know also that at least two-thirds of the technical language of the healing art is pure Greek, with scarcely even a single brush of English to make it look native. As soon as he knows the Greek letters, which, as a matter of course, should not lag behind

the living exercise of hearing and speaking, let him be set, from his own knowledge, or from the best etymological English dictionary he can lay his hands on, to make a list of all the familiar English words of scientific nomenclature, which are almost pure Greek; let him commence with the compounds of *λόγος*, which strike every ear as the most common; and let him tabulate the results of his labour thus:—

Λόγος = reasonable discourse.

Theology—*θεός*,	God	= reasonable discourse about God;
Biology—*βίος*,	life	= ,, ,, about life;
Geology—*γῆ*,	the earth	= ,, ,, about the earth;

and so on; and, if he then proceed to the compounds of *γράφω*, or to the familiar words ending in the suffix *ic* and *ics*, as *optics*, *mechanics*, *pneumatics*, etc., I feel confident that, under the direction of a skilful teacher, he will start with the delightful feeling that he already knows two or three hundred words of the language of which he imagined himself altogether ignorant. Simple as this initiatory trick of teaching is, man is a stupid animal, and I can only say, that in my experience I never have seen any person who had the sense to use it. Closely allied to this recognition of identity with the vocables of a foreign tongue, is the principle of such large use in comparative philology, according to which words in cognate languages, apparently different, are proved to differ according to a law so constant that, when once the law is known, the differential feature can with certainty be divined. No doubt it required a German—Grimm, in Berlin—to discover this principle, and a German—Max Müller, in Oxford—to

expound it to English scholars; but when once discovered, like some of Newton's laws of motion, it is so simple that a very child may know it; and therefore I say distinctly, that no teacher of languages in this country, at this time of day, can be looked on as thoroughly equipped for his work, who is not familiar with Grimm's law, or, more generally, with the laws of interchange of sounds that distinguish the different branches of a great family of languages. Taking Greek again for our example, the expert teacher will direct attention to the fact, that, if in English a word commences with *f*, it will commence in Greek with *p*, as in *πατήρ*, for *father*; *πῦρ*, for *fire*; *πόδ*, for *foot*; and so on;—or, if German be the language, the student must be told to make lists of corresponding English and German words, in which the blunt German *b*, as in *Graben*, is softened into the soft English *v*, as in *grave*, and the sharp German *t*, as in *Traum*, becomes the blunt *d* in the English *dream*. Then, again, in such a word as *Magen*, English *maw*, or *legen*, English *lay*, he may be taught three great general principles, that regulate what has been well called the phonic decay of language, viz., that a termination is apt to be dropped altogether; that a hard *g* is softened into *y*, or *w*; and that, as in the French *père*, from the Latin *pater*, if the termination is not dropped, the medial consonant between two vowels is slurred over and disappears. Not necessary for scientific teaching, but extremely interesting both to teacher and taught, is the history—and, so to speak, the travels—of words, as distinguished from their anatomy and their physiology; a history which truly stamps them as the landmarks and milestones of civilisation, and which will reveal to the astonished learner, that

from the *sofa* on which he sits, to the *sloop* in which he sails, or the *punch* which he drinks, there are words in our motley English tongue that have a curious story to tell of their travels, as interesting as the diary of the most excursive of modern tourists.

With such a fair stock of examples, taken from the etymological sources here indicated, and the surrounding objects of interest with which we started in the previous article, the teacher now proceeds to enlarge the sphere of his colloquial practice, by a plain and sure gradation, never losing out of sight for a moment the vital principle, that the thought, the ear, and the tongue must from the first be made to act directly on the new materials, not indirectly, as is generally done, through the cumbrous intervention of the mother tongue. Let therefore a few additional simple verbs be given, always only in the three first persons of the present indicative and the second person singular of the imperative, and let the *dative* case of the noun be learned, and its more distinct relation to the dominating agent be explained, and then the practice be proceeded with, as thus:—δός τὴν βίβλον τῷ ἀδελφῷ, *give the book to your brother*; φέρε τὸ καλαμάριον τῷ διδασκάλῳ, *bring the inkstand to the master*; ῥάβδος τῷ νώτῳ τοῦ μωροῦ, *a rod for the fool's back.* Then the three first persons of the past tense and the future will be learned, and their general normal relation to the root in regular verbs be explained; and short sentences made to make their use familiar, as, ὁ πατήρ ἔδωκε τὴν βίβλον τῷ υἱῷ, *the father gave the book to the son*; ὁ παῖς δώσει τὴν βίβλον τῷ ἀδελφῷ, *the boy will give the book to his brother*, etc. Then in regular sequence the genitive and the vocative will be

learned, and illustrated always by living examples before the eye of the learner, as, *ὦ παῖ γενναῖε, φέρε τῷ διδασκάλῳ τὸν πέτασον, O good boy, bring the master's hat*; *φέρε δὴ τὴν τῆς ἀδελφῆς γραφίδα, bring your sister's pencil*; and so on. As the next step, the plural forms of the present, aorist, and future may be learned, as also the participles, and used accordingly. These tenses, diligently used, with an ever-enlarging list of regular verbs, and a few of the most common irregular ones, will produce a wonderful familiarity with the plain and direct form of speech, before any attempt is made to deal with dependent, indirect, and complex sentences. But, after all, at least in Greek, the conditional and dependent sentences involve no particular difficulty; a single vowel-change, as in German *hätte* for *hatte*, marks the step from a fact to a supposition; and for the indirect speech which demands the optative as conditional past tense to be substituted for the subjunctive, the constant analogy of *may* and *might* in English will serve as an easy guide.

I have only further to remark, that whatever language a man is learning, he ought to provide himself, as soon as possible, with a good book of miscellaneous colloquies, from which to pick out whatever examples he may have occasion to use. I felt the want of such a book sorely when I was studying Gaelic; and for the benefit of those who might come after me, I requested the Rev. Duncan M'Innes, Oban, to compose such a book, which he accordingly did. For Greek I composed such a book myself, and used it regularly in my class; and in the case of Greek, the dialogic style has this special recommendation, that it is the style of Plato, Socrates, and Aristophanes, and a style which the

lively Athenians cultivated with a success which the formal stateliness of the Romans in vain attempted to emulate.

To the natural system of teaching languages, advocated in these pages, I know only two objections, which are as easily answered as they are thoughtlessly propounded. The one, to the effect that the colloquial method treats men as parrots, not as reasonable beings, I have already answered. I do not discard grammar rules, but bring them forward only as they are wanted; I bring the regulator only when there is stuff to regulate; and I do not commit the folly of studying geology without having first seen rocks and pondered on the formative forces which they suggest. Nay, I am a great deal less a parrot than the objectors are; for I am willing to bring in not only formal grammar rules to aid my practice, but the fundamental principles and leading laws of exact comparative philology. As to reading, the more the learners read the better, provided they read what they care to remember, and do not make the dull eye to usurp the functions of the nice ear and the ready tongue; and the more writing also, as the mother of accuracy, provided it starts from a spoken basis. The other objection is generally made by teachers of the dead languages, as contrasted with living ones. We learn living languages, they say, for the purpose of spoken communication, and therefore properly learn them by speaking; but, as we do not talk with the dead, but can only read their books, dead grammars and books of reading lessons are the proper methods of studying them. The answer to this is threefold:—(1) The grammar rules of every language are mere visible signs of qualities of speech that can be

learned properly only by the witness of the organs to which they primarily refer; thus accent and quantity have no meaning unless explained by the pitch and breadth of vocal utterance to which they refer; (2) again, the direct bond established from the beginning between the thought and the ear and the tongue of the learner, in the method of Nature, creates a familiarity and an intimate feeling with the new organ of expression, which the bookish method cannot possibly produce; and, (3) besides this, what indeed is the main point, familiarity with a language can be produced only by the frequent repetition of certain sounds in connection with certain objects, and this repetition can take place ten times in the conversational method for once that it can do so in the method of mere reading and writing. Possibly yet another objection may be found lurking unexpressed behind the more specious ones; it might be this,—the teachers are either too ignorant, too lazy, or too timid, to do the thing as it ought to be done, if the dictates of mother Nature are to be respected. To such objectors I have only one thing to say: Let them be intelligent, let them be active, and let them be courageous; otherwise in this world of reasonable work and intelligent warfare God has no need of them. If a man wishes to cultivate ease, let him nod over the last new novel, or the last cartoon of *Punch*, by the fireside, on his easy chair; in the school, the teacher must be fully awake, and ready at any moment to see with his eye and hear with his ear, and cap every object directly with its name, without going to a book in search of it.

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